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 Foreword  
London, as one of the world’s leading financial centres, had a daily turnover in the foreign 
exchange market of £2,626 billion in April 2013 - all dependent on a highly interconnected 
electronic infrastructure and supporting technology. Yet this same technology that underpins 
and enables these global transactions also opens up businesses and individuals to new risks, 
in particular relating to cybercrime. 
The introduction of sophisticated technology has brought about a step-change in the way 
economic crime is committed – enabling frauds to be perpetrated at scale, at great speed, 
and at a distance, with no physical contact necessary between criminal and victim. It can 
be much harder to identify the individuals initiating crime, and often the location will be 
outside UK jurisdiction. These factors have resulted in a sharp escalation of such activities in 
recent years, bringing new challenges for policing and industry in preventing and tackling 
such crime.  
The City of London Police is the National Policing Lead for Economic Crime, and is playing a 
key role in proactively addressing these challenges including developing a national strategy. 
One major challenge has been coordinating information about criminal activity where this 
can be geographically widely dispersed. In addition to investigating some of the most serious 
frauds in the country, the City of London Police hosts the national reporting database – 
Action Fraud. This current research piece undertakes new analysis of data held by Action 
Fraud and its partner unit, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) also hosted by the 
City of London Police. It finds that between October and December 2014 alone there were 
106,681 reported fraud cases, a third of which related to banking and credit industry frauds. 
The median amount lost to fraudsters across all fraud types ranged from £112 lost through 
misuse of contracts in the telecom industry, to £38,974 lost from pension fraud. However the 
annual 250,000 crime reports received present only a limited view of several million crimes 
that are taking place within the UK annually to the cost of some £30billion. Under-reporting 
presents a challenge both in terms of research and policy responses. 
City of London Police initiatives to reduce fraud include training both the private and public 
sector in specialist skills through their Economic Crime Academy, piloting a focused victim 
care unit in London – the Economic Crime Victim Care Unit - and working closely with law 
enforcement across the UK to share information and co-ordinate action. Most importantly 
they include the formation of new national police fraud and cyber strategies focused on 
prevention at a national and local level. 
This research report highlights the necessity of working in partnership, both around primary 
prevention and building in security protection, and working with other agencies to disrupt 
criminal activities and pursue and prosecute offenders.  
Even with these initiatives, there is much more to do. Economic cybercrime is evolving 
rapidly, at a scale and speed never before seen. This report provides new data and analysis 
around the scale of this activity and offers a comprehensive view of the challenges facing 
the policing and law enforcement responses. It appraises the success of different 
approaches to preventing and addressing crime, and presents practical suggestions with a 
focus on partnership working, education and awareness-raising, information-sharing across 
industry, and intelligence-led policing. As such it is a timely piece of valuable research that 
can help to shape future policies focussed on combatting the growing threat of cybercrime. 
 
 
 
Mark Boleat      Commissioner Adrian Leppard QPM 
Chairman of Policy & Resources   City of London Police 
City of London Corporation 
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 1. Executive summary  
The use of the internet and technology to commit economic crime has been 
escalating sharply in recent years, bringing new challenges in preventing and 
tackling such crime. This research, commissioned by the City of London Corporation 
with the support of the City of London Police, and prepared by Cardiff University, 
sets out what we know about the rising role of the internet in economic crime; the 
variety, incidence and cost of economic cybercrime; who (as far as is known) the 
main actors are – victims, attackers, actual and potential protectors, and the 
facilitators or criminal actors themselves; and the implications of these findings for 
business, government and the public in terms of policing economic cybercrime. The 
report goes on to use this analysis as a basis for evaluating current policing models 
and approaches to economic cybercrime. It discusses some of the challenges 
faced in policing and the strategies developed to cope with economic cybercrime, 
as well as the varied responses available within the parameters of the ‘Four Ps’ of 
government strategy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare). 
1.1. What is economic cybercrime? 
There are three main forms of economic cybercrime: 
• Cyber-dependent crimes in law rely on networked information and 
communications technology (ICT), largely via the internet. Without the internet, 
the offending would not be possible.  
• Cyber-enabled crimes are facilitated by these same ICT-connected 
technologies, but are not dependent on them, and therefore can exist in some 
non-cyber form. If the networked technologies were removed, the crime could 
still take place but locally and more likely on a one-to-one basis. Being cyber-
enabled allows these crimes to be carried out at scale for less capital and 
sometimes with fewer criminal staff than would be needed for similar crimes 
offline.  
• Cyber-assisted crimes are differentiated from cyber-dependent and cyber-
enabled crimes, and use networked digital technologies (such as mapping 
applications) in the course of criminal activity which would take place anyway. 
The nature and volume of criminal activity are essentially unaffected by its 
involvement (i.e. if the internet involvement was removed, the crimes would be 
organised in different ways).  
Both the cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled forms of economic cybercrime 
provide criminals with a globalised reach in a distributed and informational way. If 
the networked technologies are removed, then the crimes still take place but both 
victim and perpetrator are much more likely to be located in the same country, or 
adjacent countries, when crimes are undertaken offline. The number of victims per 
criminal attempt is also likely to be lower and the means employed – in person, 
telephone, advert or letter – can be more amenable to investigation. 
The cyber element can occur in different forms at any stage, from the planning of a 
crime through to its execution, to the expenditure and/or laundering of its proceeds. 
The Crime Triangle theory1 teaches us that crime is the product of would-be 
offenders, targets/victims and guardians, including those professionally paid to 
1 For a brief summary, see Felson & Clarke (1998: 4). 
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 protect the public or whose routine activities serve to reduce opportunities for 
particular forms of crime. The virtue of this model is that it is dynamic, and can 
include insiders (some of whom may need or use ICT to complete their crimes), 
outsiders, and combinations thereof. So at any given time, economic cybercrimes 
are affected by the technologies available, those who are capable and motivated 
to exploit them and the vulnerabilities of the targets/victims. Some targets are 
deliberately selected for attacks (known as ‘spear-phishing’) whereas others are 
indiscriminately selected in mass attacks.  
1.2. What is the scale of the challenge? 
Criminal statistics and business and individual victim surveys show that fraud is on the 
rise, while the crime rates for other types of acquisitive crime are falling.2 However, 
the evidence base for how ‘cyber’ has contributed to economic crimes is 
incomplete and weak, both today and historically. Other than cyber security vendor 
data, we depend on victims, or other parties, identifying and communicating their 
experience of an economic crime and their understanding of how it was carried 
out, within the existing framework of data recording and capture. While limiting, this 
does allow us to see both the increase in economic cybercrimes and the varied 
levels of cyber-involvement and reported losses from different types of such crimes. 
The Action Fraud and National Intelligence Fraud Bureau (NFIB) databases are two 
such examples and represent important steps in developing an evidence-based 
response to a growing area of criminal activity. 
We can tell a certain amount about offenders from investigating the circumstances 
and techniques for criminal activity, but there is no evidence that large numbers of 
cyber-dependent perpetrators are primarily focused on financial gain, or that 
traditional criminals – particularly drug traffickers, burglars and robbers – are turning 
to cyber-enabled frauds in significant numbers. Relatively few cyber-enabled 
economic crimes are prosecuted, especially if suspects are based abroad, which 
means little is actually known about how criminals conduct their economic 
cybercrimes.  
In terms of what we do know, and identifying trends based on the data available, 
this report estimates that of the fraud-related crimes reported to Action Fraud by 
individuals and businesses in the last three months of 2014 (Q4 2014), well over half 
were significantly cyber-related: 43% were cyber-enabled, and 13% were cyber-
dependent, while a further 29% of them simply used technology (cyber-assisted).  
1.3. What is the nature of economic cybercrime? 
Data breaches and identity frauds have been rising steadily. E-commerce fraud 
losses increased rapidly in the early 2000s, especially after the rise of botnets, 
reaching a peak of £181.7 million in 2008 before falling until 2011. Losses totalled 
£217.4 million in 2014, when they accounted for 45% of all card fraud and 66% of 
total remote purchase fraud. Losses to the banking sector from online banking fraud 
rose in 2009 to £59.7 million, and peaked to a new high in 2013/14, at £60.4 million. 
Criminals also appear to be targeting businesses more, reflected in a higher average 
loss per online fraud case during 2014. It is, however, worth highlighting some of the 
2 ICT platforms have become central to the way business and social life are organised, and crime 
follows these changes when it is allowed to. This report, however, would point to a distinction between 
cybercrime intended to harm (e.g. hacking and some traditional malware) and acquisitive cybercrime. 
4 
 
                                              
 challenges of the data – for example, the risks of looking only at year-on-year 
changes, and missing the impact of new technological security measures. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, though losses to the banking sector from online banking 
fraud first peaked in 2009 at £59.7 million, the new recorded high of £60.4 million in 
2013/14 was only slightly above 2009 levels and less in real terms. 
1.4. What are the practical implications for policing?  
Based on the literature and analysis of Action Fraud data (covering Q4 2014), this 
report raises and considers some important questions for the policing of economic 
cybercrime. When answered, these will assist the police and partner agencies, 
businesses and individuals in their responses to the Four Ps Model where: 
• Pursue is about following up organised criminals by prosecution and disruption; 
• Prevent is about stopping people from becoming criminals (rather than about 
crime prevention); 
• Protect is about primary prevention for business and the public against serious 
and organised crime; and  
• Prepare is about post-event resilience for attacks and reducing the impact of 
crime, as well as future prevention. 
While law enforcement bodies have developed a number of relevant strategies, 
these strategies and their implementation by type of cybercrime and victim need to 
be reconsidered in the light of the data now available. For example, the ‘cyber’ 
involvement can vary in the course of a crime: many cyber-enabled crimes begin 
online to hook victims, but offenders may take victims offline (sometimes assisted by 
technology) in order to extort money; even if the victim (or purchaser of crime-as-a-
service software) pays in cryptocurrency, there may be a pay-out that is made 
offline (i.e. not connected to ICT) at a later stage when the criminals want to realise 
their gains. Thus Prepare strategies need to be flexible in order to increase resilience, 
and Pursue strategies need to find intervention points over the spectrum of 
economic cybercrime, from organising the crimes to money laundering, whether 
their aim is prosecution, asset freezing and recovery, and/or crime disruption.  
1.4.1. The implications for Protect and Prepare 
Protect spans a wide range of individuals and organisations. General improvements 
in cyber-protection methods are required to effectively reach all of these potential 
victims. Ideally, Protect methods would be built in with minimal effort or administered 
‘bottom-up’ through peer groups, community-level bodies and charities, to help 
individuals and small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) adopt simple security 
processes, such as two-factor authentication and antivirus auto-updates that do not 
require complex attention or regular effort; otherwise they will be bypassed by staff 
or not completed at all.  
Larger businesses can and should promote good security practice in the 
organisational frameworks already established, paying attention to insider as well as 
outsider threats. In addition to catastrophe risk reduction, more effort should be 
undertaken via segmentation exercises to identify those individuals and businesses 
who are at risk of repeat victimisation; a quarter of mass marketing fraud victims 
have been victims previously. This should focus Protect and Prepare efforts on the 
most vulnerable, preferably with the participation of community-level bodies and 
peers as well as technology firms and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) or 
Community Officers. (Arguably, a similar approach could also be employed for 
identifying potential offenders, with a greater focus on Prevent and Pursue motives.) 
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 Additionally, whether undertaken by police or civilians, initiatives to provide 
reassurance and practical help for those affected by economic cybercrime are of 
value in themselves, irrespective of their impact on the Prepare strategy. This is due 
to the negative psychological elements of being a victim of fraud – such as self-
blame or shame, particularly if we think ourselves complicit or gullible. This can make 
the experience worse for victims of fraud than for victims of theft and burglary 
(where most people take standard precautions and where the offence often occurs 
beyond our control). In addition, frauds tend to generate higher financial losses (and 
profits to organised criminals) than other predatory crimes. 
1.4.2. The implications for Pursue 
Much can and must be done to raise general cyber-awareness and digital 
capabilities in the police nationally, for general crime investigation as well as 
economic cybercrimes. One of the problems with the data to date is the lack of 
material on offenders and their engagement in cybercrime. For example, there 
have been few prosecutions under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 for cyber-
dependent crimes, with some 339 prosecutions and 262 persons found guilty at 
magistrates’ courts between 1990 and 2013.3 Of those prosecutions, unauthorised 
access to computer material is by far the most enforced offence. However, the 
prosecution data only covers cases where computer offences were the most serious 
charge, so in most economic crimes in which networked computers are used, the 
cyber component is largely omitted from the public record. Determining options – 
whether investigation, asset recovery, disruption or restorative justice – is thus 
problematic.  
Unless there are special liaison efforts (as in parts of West Africa and Eastern Europe) 
in which the ‘host’ jurisdictions and the UK work in partnership, there are limits to the 
feasible prosecutability of all but the most major offenders who are overseas. Where 
mutual legal assistance is very unlikely, police pursuit can seem pointless except to 
show victims that something is being done. A more controversial policy issue is 
whether one criterion for police investigation should be the degree of effort that 
victims have put into protecting themselves. The development of cyber insurance in 
protecting against catastrophic and lesser degrees of risk is also a subject of much 
debate in business and government. 
In collaboration with partner agencies such as Trading Standards and the 
Intellectual Property Office (IPO), and with private sector collective and individual 
bodies, both criminal and administrative sanctions can be pursued. In doing so, it is 
vital that we avoid separating ‘cyber’ from the crimes and from the offender 
groupings that it facilitates. Disruption strategies – including take-downs of websites, 
botnets and dark markets – are valuable for harm reduction, especially if websites 
are taken down early, which require policing resources and/or internet service 
provider (ISP) proactivity. However, we know little about the medium and long-term 
effects of these measures, since scam websites and exchange forums may spring up 
again, as they are low cost and easy to form. These often reappear with improved 
security/encryption measures in place, having learned from past take-downs, 
making future take-downs more difficult. There is scope for experiments involving 
warning ‘pop-ups’ on screen for those who fall victim to offers that could be 
3 www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
question/Commons/2015-01-27/222192/. 
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 fraudulent, though this would require careful management of the user experience. 
There is a need for more focused internet governance to deal with these challenges, 
but the politics of international opportunity reduction are very hard to achieve.  
1.4.3. The implications for Prevent 
Finally, with regard to Prevent, our research indicates that intelligence leads for the 
Pursue strategy should be closely linked with the Prevent strategy, in order to stop 
offenders descending into more serious criminality. For some early-stage offenders, 
warnings and advice would be appropriate, thus avoiding the development of a 
career-inhibiting criminal record, which would be aggravated by mixing with more 
mainstream serious offenders in the criminal justice system.  
1.5. Concluding remarks 
This report aims to provide a snapshot of where this important area of criminality is 
now, how it got here and how well we are organised against its various dimensions. 
There is no quick fix for these issues and we need to pay more attention to 
behavioural cues in order to develop security more in tune with the likely responses 
of individuals and businesses, rather than treating ‘cyber’ as a separate technical 
category. To improve the effectiveness of cyber security, there needs to be co-
working towards a shared goal between the various members of the ‘family of 
policing’, business and civil society; though partnership policing alone is not a silver 
bullet solution. However, as the head of the National Police Chiefs’ Council said 
recently,4 we may also need to acknowledge that some degree of ‘cost’ or ‘trade-
off’ is required; we lack the resources to investigate and/or the skills/technology to 
prevent every type of economic cybercrime. In acknowledgement of where some 
of the challenges lie, this report goes on to look at how possible policing responses 
may be developed and what the future of policing might look like when addressing 
economic cybercrime. 
  
4 See: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11767419/Police-chief-warns-that-officers-may-no-
longer-respond-to-burglaries.html.  
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 2. Introduction  
The purpose of the research is to identify, define and examine some of the key issues 
and complexities surrounding cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent economic 
crime. By analysing the implications of these for policing, the report shows how 
businesses and individuals are affected by economic cybercrime and presents 
practical suggestions on how they may be supported within the context of the 
ongoing Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare agendas.  
The research that underpins this report has been commissioned by the City of 
London Corporation, with the support of the City of London Police. It explores cyber-
enabled and cyber-dependent economic crimes, and their implications in relation 
to impact, policing and prevention, in accordance with government strategies for 
combating organised crime and terrorism. The research involved interviews with key 
UK and international stakeholders including the principal agencies for economic 
crime control, financial services and industrial firms, cybercrime prevention bodies in 
the public and private sectors, and police officers (retired and current), 
underpinned by an extensive secondary research review.5  
2.1. Context 
It is important to recognise that economic crimes of huge scale and impact 
occurred long before the internet. Serious economic crime has never required a 
cyber-dimension. The impacts of such activity have always included victims in both 
domestic and international jurisdictions. However, the presence of ICT in daily life has 
changed markedly over the past two decades. Every day there are more people 
and, more significantly, devices connected to the internet, spawning the term ‘the 
internet of things’ (van Kranenburg et al., 2011). The interconnectivity between 
people, machines and cyberspace is growing exponentially so that many areas of 
our lives, and increasingly so, are organised and undertaken through connected 
technology. This makes a large proportion of our working and non-working lives 
vulnerable to exploitation, with the potential for significant harm. Some predict that 
by 2020 there will be upwards of 50 billion devices connected to the internet (Cisco). 
Annual internet protocol traffic is projected to triple between 2014 and 2019 to a 
record 2 zettabytes,6 adding trillions of dollars to global GDP (Accenture, 2015). An 
unintended consequence of this will be to extend the range of important, if not 
‘critical’, infrastructure which is vulnerable to cyber-attack.  
This routinisation and pervasiveness of internet use has made certain types of crime 
possible (cyber-dependent crimes), and has facilitated immensely the scale of 
others (cyber-enabled crimes), by enhancing offender productivity and widening 
the scope for crimes to be undertaken. The ‘crime scene’ today can be part of ICT 
platforms with multiple uses, from social media to confidential financial transactions. 
Current technologies offer speeds 500 times greater, sometimes more, than the dial-
up modems of the 1990s. Technology and cyberspace have lowered the entry costs 
for mass frauds and eased their penetration within and across international borders, 
both in terms of the scale of this penetration and the speed with which it can be 
accomplished. In terms of cyber security, however, the necessity for, and types of, 
5 Individual sources have not been identified. Interviews were recorded by note rather than tape-
recorder and no direct quotes are used which could identify individuals or specific agencies. 
6 See: http://newsroom.cisco.com/press-release-content?type=webcontent&articleId=1644203.  
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 protection has often lagged behind such developments (marketing strategies, 
volume of traffic, speed and ease of access, and the reliance on automated 
controls). One of the unintended consequences of the massive growth in 
connected technologies has been to make it more complex for those individuals 
who are not ‘cyber-savvy’ to understand and act upon the different security risks 
presented by technical devices such as computers, mobile phones and tablets. 
Similarly, they may not appreciate the level of interconnectivity or proactivity by or 
between devices that do not require human intervention or authorisation, or even 
necessarily be able to identify updates or interactions that take place automatically. 
This has increased the difficulties of identifying, investigating and prosecuting 
offenders as much as it has increased vulnerabilities in businesses and individuals 
(including the general public) when undertaking routine transactions. For example, 
actions previously considered trivial (for example clicking on a URL link) can now 
initiate adverse consequences. It is difficult to develop plans that effectively respond 
to technological changes before the negative consequences of accidental or 
intentional misuse manifest themselves. In other words, making judgements about 
who or what the threats are, why, and how far they can be anticipated and pre-
empted, requires innovative thinking and also practical action.  
Cyberspace and, subsequently, cybercrime, have created a need to think through 
the nature of the threats and risks they pose and to understand what types of 
responses are most likely to be more or less effective, and under what 
circumstances. In addition, such developments have reinforced the need to better 
understand perpetrators and their motivations (for example, through online 
profiling). This report aims to contribute to that process, reviewing government 
strategy – adapted from its CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy – which has four 
components (Home Office, 2014, 2015a): 
• Pursue organised criminals by prosecution and disruption;  
• Prevent people from becoming criminals;  
• Protect business and the public against serious and organised crime; and  
• Prepare for attacks by building post-event resilience to reduce the impact of 
crime and improve resilience for future prevention. 
In so doing, it is our view that finding the right term to describe the various threats 
posed by ‘cyber’ is important, because the wrong terminology encourages us to 
adopt unsuccessful strategies. So, for example, while the language of 
‘cyberwarfare’ may stimulate a sense of urgency, it carries with it the expectation 
that the issue can be addressed as a distinct series of events or ‘battles’. In reality, 
the security challenges posed by economic cybercrime are more of a permanent 
struggle, and cannot be solved by conventional attack strategies alone.  
2.2. What does ‘economic cybercrime’ mean for this research?  
Economic cybercrime largely involves obtaining, or initiating dialogue to obtain, 
data, goods and/or money by deception, misrepresentation or straightforward fraud 
from individuals, businesses and government through the medium of the internet. 
Some of these crimes involve no direct personal contact but are purely electronic, 
including financial transfers. Intellectual property (IP) can also be duplicated or 
transferred, significantly lowering product value and with potential negative 
consequences from using the ‘faux’ product. However, most damage takes the 
form of private economic transfer, domestically or internationally. While we 
recognise that nearly all crimes which involve ICT can be considered economic 
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 cybercrimes, since most are intended to achieve some sort of economic gain, this 
understanding is neither practical nor particularly helpful. 
Action Fraud7 applies a typology of frauds including, but not restricted to, their cyber 
component – money laundering, for example, is not included because it is an 
enabler of and consequence of economic crimes, not a fraud in itself. This typology 
highlights the broad range of economic crime offences and, by implication, the 
range of people and business activities that need to be considered for prevention 
purposes, including: 
• Advance fee payments; 
• Financial investments; 
• Non-investment fraud; 
• Charity fraud; 
• Banking and credit industry fraud; 
• Insurance fraud; 
• Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts); 
• Corporate fraud; 
• Pension fraud; and 
• Computer misuse crime.  
This research restricts itself to focusing on cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled 
crimes where the intention of the crime is economic gain. It thus excludes online 
child exploitation, terrorism, violent extremism, computer misuse (where no financial 
gain is sought or achieved) and other social threats. It also excludes ‘service’ forms 
of organised crime (such as drugs or human smuggling/trafficking) that are 
facilitated by using digital technologies as forms of communication.  
2.3. What are cyber-dependent economic crimes? 
Cyber-dependent crimes require ICT in order to be executed (McGuire & Dowling, 
2013); they are ‘true’ cybercrimes and dependent upon the internet (Wall, 2007a). 
Some, such as malware and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks which crash 
websites and reduce their functionality, do not have easily identifiable offline 
equivalents. Other forms do – such as ransomware, a form of blackmail. They would 
simply not exist without the internet. The vast majority of research conducted on ICT 
and deviance focuses on the cyber-dependent types of crime, in part because of 
the cost of securing against them (Garvey & Patel, 2014). Examples of such crimes, 
which are recorded by Action Fraud, include: 
• Computer virus/malware/spyware; 
• Denial of service attack; 
• Denial of service attack extortion; 
• Hacking – server; 
• Hacking – personal; 
• Hacking – social media and email; 
• Hacking – PBX/ dial through; and 
• Hacking extortion. 
7 Action Fraud is the national fraud and internet crime reporting centre for British law enforcement 
hosted by the City of London Police. In calculating, for example, the volume of reports, it is worth noting 
the work of other centres such as Cifas and FFA UK. The latter coordinates information from and 
preventative approaches for some sectors of the financial services industry. In its analysis of crime data, 
the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), receives and collates data from all three sources. 
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 Cyber-dependent crimes are often profit-motivated, but may take the form of 
ideological or political attack (such as the Russian-inspired DDoS attack on the 
Estonian financial services system in 2007 and, though still strongly contested as to 
motivation, attacks on Sony in 2011 and 2014) or cultural rebellion (as post-
Assange/Pirate Bay/Swartz/Snowden), as well as hacking into corporate and 
governmental websites to acquire commercial, military and political knowledge not 
available to the wider public. For the purposes of this research, these crimes are 
addressed only when they involve identified financial gain. In the case of the Action 
Fraud data, we find, for example, that computer misuse crimes account for around 
4% of recorded fraud and fraud-related crime. Of that proportion, the severity levels 
are high but the financial losses accruing to the victim are lower per incident than 
are losses from, for example, dating scams or online shopping fraud. 
2.4. What are cyber-enabled economic crimes? 
A variety of crimes are, at least in part, facilitated by digital means (Lavorgna, 2013, 
2014a, 2014b). For instance, the networked component of ICT can aid in the 
procurement and selling of an item, communication between actors, or the transfer 
of funds at a distance, making such interactions more efficient and/or increasing 
their scale (both in terms of perpetration and impact).  
Cyber-enabled crimes are ‘traditional’ crimes that exist in law, whose scale or reach 
is increased by use of computer networks or other internet platforms, although they 
can be still be committed without the use of ICT (in which case they cease to be 
‘cyber-enabled’). We thus understand cyber-enabled crimes as crimes which can 
take place in two realms, both online and offline, often simultaneously, or at different 
phases in the commission of the crime. These include, from Action Fraud data: 
• Fraudulent sales through online auction sites or bogus retail websites. Once paid 
for, goods or services are not delivered or buyers unknowingly purchase 
counterfeit products (as with online ticketing fraud); 
• Consumer scams such as advance fee payments, for example ‘419 fraud’, 
inheritance or lottery frauds; 
• ‘Online dating’ frauds where individuals are persuaded to part with personal 
information or money following a lengthy online ‘relationship’ via dating sites;  
• E-commerce frauds, involving the fraudulent use of plastic cards for online 
purchases; and  
• Online banking fraud, where fraudulent access to online bank accounts is 
gained. 
2.5. Report structure 
Chapter 3 considers the current policing landscape in the context of economic 
cybercrime, identifies which issues require consideration from a policing perspective, 
and where some of the key areas of challenge lie, to assess targeted responses, 
whether in terms of prevention or criminal investigation.  
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of Action Fraud data, and considers which groups 
are most affected by economic cybercrime, such as individuals/the general public 
and businesses, and some of the key issues these groups face. It also explores efforts 
being made to support these groups, drawing on the existing evidence base.  
Chapter 5 considers the implications of the issues explored in chapters 3 and 4 for 
policing approaches to economic cybercrime, in particular reviewing Protect and 
Prepare efforts against economic cybercrimes.  
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 Chapter 6 draws these themes and issues together and considers what needs to be 
done, given the dynamics of these crimes and our uncertain understanding of 
victims, offenders and methodologies of offending, and looks at the impact of our 
efforts to date.  
This report draws upon an extensive range of secondary and primary material, as 
well as interviews with key stakeholders. There is an accompanying Technical Annex 
to this report which considers the different secondary resources available in further 
detail.8 
This report contributes to the early stages of a conversation about rational and 
effective management of this issue, rather than presenting a conclusive resolution, 
given the rapidly evolving environment. We believe this report complements the 
existing evidence base on economic cybercrime and identifies thought-provoking 
questions and issues for consideration when tackling economic cybercrime.  
  
8 The Technical Annex is available online at the City of London research webpage: 
www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-
publications/Pages/default.aspx.  
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 3. The modern role of policing and economic cybercrime  
This chapter considers how evolving changes in crime control have implications for 
the policing of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent economic crime. Where crime 
control in the UK was once widely seen as the sole responsibility of law enforcement, 
the past two decades have widened the range of actors, with an emphasis on 
partnership and prevention. At the same time, those involved in criminal activity 
have also changed, due to enhanced crime reduction capabilities and 
technological developments. The latter has had multiple impacts such as expanding 
the scale and speed of economic cybercrime, widening the range of potential 
people involved in committing crimes as well as the volume and types of crimes 
possible. This has implications for policing responses to economic cybercrime.  
This chapter seeks to review these different aspects to identify and understand the 
gaps in policing that need to be addressed. The shift in the nature of the policing 
problem is not specific to the UK – it is shared by all countries, with varied degrees of 
acknowledgement and response – but the focus here is the UK context. 
3.1. What does ‘policing’ mean in this context?  
The evolving policing approach to fraud very much reflects the wider changes in 
crime control over previous decades. Traditionally, crime control was widely seen as 
the sole responsibility of law enforcement, with those involved – namely, police and 
prosecutors – investigating and prosecuting breaches of the criminal law. Today, 
crime control involves other agencies, emphasising partnership and information 
sharing, and responses to crime are framed in terms of harm, disruption, prevention 
and reduction, as well as in the more traditional tasks of investigation and 
prosecution. Much attention is given to analyses of crime patterns and trends, and 
to the application of intelligence-led policing, as means to strategize responses and 
target resources.  
Another key dimension of crime control today is the role played by those affected 
by crime and potential victims, by third parties, and by policing and criminal justice 
agencies. The latter include the police (with the City of London Police holding 
National Lead Force status for fraud and economic crime), the National Crime 
Agency (NCA) and Trading Standards. Third parties include an array of for-profit and 
not-for-profit bodies ranging from financial services institutions and vendors of 
antivirus and forensic/social network analysis software and prevention and post-
event consultancy services, through to anti-counterfeiting intelligence and policing 
bodies. The latter may or may not pursue their own investigations and sanctions 
approaches without law enforcement involvement such as the Federation Against 
Copyright Theft (FACT), Get Safe Online and Cifas (the UK’s fraud prevention 
service). It also includes organisations that have regular contact with the public, 
such as Citizens Advice.  
There are essentially three drivers which have transformed the problems of 
economic cybercrime that the police and fraud control face. These are:  
1. The volume of crimes that can be committed;  
2. The speed and instantaneousness with which crimes can be committed and 
completed, and at which new or different types of crime can evolve through 
technology; and  
3. The distance or scale at which crimes can be committed, often without it being 
obvious where the offender is operating from, meaning the actual offence can 
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 take place thousands of miles away from where its impacts are felt or the victim 
is based.  
Though these issues were all manifest historically before the internet age (Levi, 2008), 
their scale has overwhelmed traditional police models of reaction to crime, and their 
technicalities challenge the police role in protecting citizens globally. The growth of 
cybercrime and internet capacity generates multiple targets for economic crime; as 
the 2011 ‘UK Cyber Security Strategy’ noted: “cyberspace is also being used as a 
platform for committing crimes such as fraud, and on an industrial scale” (Cabinet 
Office, 2011:15). Anyone can be affected and most can be inadvertent enablers of 
victimisation, from the least to the most sophisticated individuals, businesses, third 
sector bodies and government departments.  
Policing itself has been subject to continuing efficiency reviews, budget reductions, 
performance measurement, management approaches and external reviews. The 
popular emphasis on ‘front-line policing’ has led to forces reviewing the retention of 
central units, including levels of resource, what type of organisational structures to 
apply to those that are retained, and which policy agendas should influence the 
focus of those structures. In parallel developments, corporate entities have assumed 
responsibility for fraud prevention and detection, often as a consequence of 
perceptions that a readily available enforcement and investigative deterrent is 
absent (Brooks, Button & Frimpong, 2009), while public sector organisations have 
expanded their own anti-fraud functions and taken on responsibility for investigating 
fraud themselves (Doig & Macaulay 2008). Alongside these activities has been a 
diminishing police resource for addressing individuals’ victimisation. A recurring 
challenge raised by fraud reviews and research is the limited resources available for 
the policing response to fraud and to economic crime. 
This understanding of policing – whether applied reactively or proactively – informs 
this research and particularly our focus on how to prevent economic cybercrime. 
3.2. The policing landscape for economic cybercrime 
Policing around the world is being challenged by evolving patterns of crime, 
especially economic crimes and the cyber-forensic aspects of police investigations. 
Subsequently, the last decade has seen an increasing focus on research mapping 
the amount of economic crime (Levi et al., 2007) and, more recently, measuring 
economic cybercrime. A better understanding of economic cybercrime is a 
necessary prelude to making decisions as to what to do about it.  
The cost of fraud has risen significantly. The first contemporary cross-sector 
examination into this, the 2000 report prepared for the Home Office and the Serious 
Fraud Office (National Economic Research Associates (NERA), 2000), argued that 
discovered fraud and undiscovered fraud could each range from £5 billion to 
£9 billion, giving an overall upper range of £18 billion. It also included staffing and 
other costs associated with the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution 
of fraud, assessed at: criminal justice system costs – £500 million; public sector 
organisation costs – £521 million; and private sector organisation costs – £114 million. 
Though a vital contribution to understanding the nature and costs of fraud, the NERA 
figures were collated from material published by various agencies in both the public 
and private sectors, with no review of the methodology used or the data’s 
robustness. Furthermore, it overlooked fraud policing costs and the cost of fraud 
dealt with by the police (but not the Serious Fraud Office – the 1998 and 2000 surveys 
on behalf of the National Working Group on Fraud proposed a self-assessed value of 
cases handled by police fraud squads at £3 billion to £4 billion). 
14 
 
 Research sponsored by the Association of Chief Police Officers (Levi et al., 2007) 
estimated the overall cost of fraud at a minimum of £13.9 billion. Subsequent 
National Fraud Authority cost estimates have risen over time, from £30 billion in 2009 
to over £38 billion in 2010, and substantially higher still to £73 billion in 2012, before 
falling to £52 billion in 2013. Although the quality of the underlying data is variable 
and much extrapolated rather than based on actual losses (which themselves 
would be affected by under-reporting), this rise also reflects a broadening in the 
coverage of the Annual Fraud Indicator,9 so year-on-year data does not entirely 
compare like with like. Nevertheless, the work on losses associated with fraud has 
identified that fraud is, as an economic crime, a significant area of criminal activity. 
On the other hand, staffing resources (in terms of numbers) for the pursuit of fraud 
have been declining over the past two decades compared with those devoted to 
other policing priorities (Button, Blackbourn & Tunley, 2014; Doig & Levi, 2013; Doig, 
Johnson & Levi, 2011). Resources devoted to fraud have been in decline, partly 
because of competing priorities and partly because government agendas prioritise 
economic crime by organised crime groups (Gannon & Doig, 2010). In 2015, the 
total figure of full-time equivalent police staff for fraud was at least 1,000, out of a 
total police complement of 127,000 for England and Wales. Around half of these are 
in London, limiting the scope for the investigation of difficult cyber-enabled cases in 
the capital and, especially, elsewhere. 
However, there have been some significant achievements and progress in policing 
fraud and economic cybercrime, most of which followed from the 2006 Fraud 
Review. These have included the designation of the City of London Police as the 
National Lead Force on fraud, covering both traditional and cyber forms of 
economic crime, with increased resources and a training academy for officers (the 
Economic Crime Academy); a National Fraud Strategic Authority (later renamed the 
National Fraud Authority but abolished in 2014, with some of its functions transferred 
to the Economic Crime Command of the NCA) with responsibilities for 
comprehensive measurement of fraud and a national strategy for dealing with it; a 
National Fraud Reporting Centre as the sole central reporting point for fraud (later 
renamed Action Fraud and managed by the City of London Police); and an 
intelligence resource (now the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) reporting to 
the Lead Force). In 2013, Action Fraud was rolled out nationally; since 2014, all fraud 
complaints, unless immediate action is required, are recorded through Action Fraud. 
The NFIB’s role has been to synthesise and analyse all Action Fraud reports, to assess 
patterns and trends, and to direct intelligence packages (with variable intelligence 
enhancements) to the most relevant police force. 
Reporting to the police for crimes other than fraud remains local, even though some 
offenders may target victims in different police force areas. In the case of economic 
cybercrime – which, as mentioned, spans geographical areas and police force 
jurisdictions – localised reporting is not appropriate. The City of London Police has 
worked with stakeholders to centralise fraud reporting at a national level, through 
Action Fraud. 
There have been challenges – for example, some citizens prefer to report frauds 
physically to their local force, and it can be difficult for reporting tools to keep up 
with the technological developments. However, the national reporting mechanism 
9 Discontinued - produced previously by the National Fraud Authority, which has since been abolished.  
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 offered by Action Fraud and the filtering process of the NFIB have produced a much 
more organised mechanism for handling frauds, including those that have multiple 
victims and/or cross police force boundaries. Though there remains some resistance 
and challenge to the take-up of a new system where tradition has so long prevailed, 
much City of London and NCA effort has successfully gone into outreach. At the 
same time, in response to specific threats, specialised squads have been funded by 
the private sector and government to provide a coordinated and more efficient 
approach to the policing of payment card fraud, organised insurance fraud and 
intellectual property crimes.  
A modest regional approach has also developed, with regional enforcement teams 
(such as the Eastern Region Special Operations Unit) which cover, from an organised 
crime perspective, asset recovery, financial intelligence, covert surveillance and so 
on. Economic crime or fraud is a part of this, but the level of staffing is influenced by 
regional priorities. The City of London Police and many other forces work on cyber-
related frauds as an integral part of their main role. However, in terms of cyber fraud 
specifically, the only significant targeted identification of resources outside the 
NCA’s Cybercrime Command and the City of London Police’s focus has been the 
Metropolitan Police’s Operation Falcon (Fraud and Linked Crime ONline) 
Command. As of April 2015, of the 300-plus posts in Falcon, some 18% were for 
civilians. They mostly deal with lower level cybercrime and volume fraud. Falcon also 
includes a dedicated Metropolitan Police Cyber Crime Unit which deals with 
complex and high-value cybercrime.10 
Specifically, Operation Falcon responds to government strategy for the policing of 
economic cybercrime. This strategy has been to adopt and to adapt to organised 
crime generally and cybercrime in particular, the four dimensions of the CONTEST 
counter-terrorism strategy (also known as the Four Ps Model11): Pursue, Prevent, 
Protect and Prepare – defined in chapter 2.  
As the terminology is borrowed from counter-terrorism, it is unclear where repeat 
victimisation – a key issue for economic cybercrime – sits in this model; arguably, 
somewhere between Prepare and Protect. As we shift from consideration of the 
protection of individuals to the protection of businesses, Prepare lessons can be 
learned from patterns of victimisation to improve protection and reduce the impact 
of economic cybercrime.  
Finally, there is also a draft national Protect strategy (City of London Police, 2015) 
which intends to: 
• Maximise the effective use of the variety of tactics and techniques available to 
policing under the Four Ps Model, including doing more to ‘protect’ communities; 
• Integrate national, regional and local resources and capabilities;  
• Tackle both volume crime and support the NCA in tackling serious and organised 
crime; and 
• Ensure that the focus remains on the key outcome – reducing the impact of 
fraud including supporting victims. 
At the time of writing, the strategy is in draft form and has yet to develop an 
implementation timetable and performance measures or to set out how far police 
10 City of London Police resources are not separated out for such purposes. 
11 The model has not been without its critics – see, for example, Innes (2014).  
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 forces will respond uniformly to the objectives. Nevertheless, subject to these 
caveats as well as resource capacity, which has not yet been calculated or 
allocated, the strategy aims to reduce the impact of fraud, the volume of crime and 
the value of the losses incurred, as well as the wider impact on quality of life for 
individual victims. It does this by: 
• Putting in place a national economic crime prevention centre; 
• Establishing a national fraud prevention network; and 
• Integrating Protect activity within the overall strategy for the policing of fraud 
developed by the National Police Coordinator for Economic Crime. 
The objective of the strategy is to deliver: 
• An enhanced threat picture; 
• Empowerment of individuals and organisations to protect themselves; 
• More effective evidence-based ‘designed-in’ fraud protection bespoke to 
individuals and groups most at risk; and 
• Engagement of the volunteering community. 
In terms of Protect, the purpose behind the strategy is to promote or encourage the 
conditions in which crime prevention against fraud, particularly when cyber-
enabled, mirrors the best aspects of physical crime prevention. This includes industry 
‘designing-in’ crime prevention to their technologies and processes, and individuals 
being educated in those ways of thinking and to take responsibility for them. The 
police’s role is then to identify and advise where they see poor application of crime 
prevention processes and to focus their proactive effort where the threat is greatest.  
The challenge lies in the implementation of such policies, which require buy-in from 
bodies outside police or indeed government control. The history of designing-out 
crime risks from high-tech products that are normally rushed to market is not hugely 
positive, except where visible threats are readily attributed which would clearly lead 
to huge financial and reputational losses. So, for example, the recall by Fiat Chrysler 
in 2015 of 1.4 million Dodges, Jeeps, Rams and Chryslers with 8.4-inch touchscreens, 
following a demonstration that remote hacking could take control of their functions 
and its publication in ‘Wired’ magazine.12  
These changes in policing impact on the two principal ways in which we might 
understand the policing landscape: 
1. Reactive, in terms of following up what is reported (e.g. Action Fraud and data 
reported by the banks, Cifas and other businesses); and  
2. Proactive, in terms of efforts to find out about and warn against unreported 
economic crimes – pushing further and seeking out acts not yet officially defined 
as frauds but which do include fraudulent aspects (for example, dating scams 
and other mass marketing frauds, or thefts by professionals from client accounts 
and estates that have not yet been identified by the victims).  
Of course, a significant dimension in relation to new or emerging strategies is one of 
resourcing. While this report does not undertake a detailed review of interventions 
against economic cybercrimes,13 the difference in approach for personal and 
12 See: www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/. 
13 There is extensive existing research into this issue, for example: ‘Net losses: estimating the global cost 
of cybercrime’ (June 2014), Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
www.mcafee.com/uk/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf; ‘The threat of 
cybercrime to the UK’ (June 2014), RUSI, 
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 corporate security expenditures is relevant for considering how to police crimes that 
have an impact on these groups. Both require assessments of future risks under 
conditions of uncertainty, and benefit from collective intelligence gathering. The 
difficulty is to work out what interventions to prioritise and how to get from where we 
are now to where we might plausibly be.  
3.3. Data and measurement as challenges to effective policing 
As highlighted in the previous section, there are both a number of challenges to the 
effective policing of economic crime, and new approaches being developed to 
address these. A key challenge to policing is the lack of accurate data and 
measurement of the nature, scale and impact of economic cybercrime. 
Many of the data problems are due to the relatively recent emergence of 
cybercrime and its poor capture in crime surveys and datasets. The majority of non-
government British and international studies lack rigour in this area. While large-scale 
government surveys – such as the Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly the 
British Crime Survey); the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey; and the Commercial 
Victimisation Survey – adopt ‘gold standard’ methodologies, they have only recently 
begun to systematically include questions on cybercrime. This means that, currently, 
it is not possible to rigorously examine trends using this data.  
Private security surveys are often based on breach data identified by vendor 
software, so they show only part of the picture. Official criminal justice-related 
datasets rely on both reported and officially recorded incidents of cybercrime, 
which is often insufficient as this relies on (i) the crime being reported by the victims 
and (ii) accurate recording of the nature of the crime. In the case of the former, 
there is often reluctance on the part of businesses to report security breaches, due 
to the anticipated negative financial and reputational impacts they might suffer if 
the damage becomes public knowledge and is picked up by the media. Individual 
victims similarly may report online fraud to their bank, but not to the police. In the 
case of the latter, as already mentioned, recording of cybercrime tends to be poorly 
reflected in traditional data capture methods. Even robust administrative data in the 
private sector (such as that provided by Financial Fraud UK and Cifas fraud 
prevention service) cannot include unidentified cyber-enabled frauds (for example 
in the category of ‘bad debt’). However, there are some good practice examples. 
In the UK, the Oxford Internet Survey and the Information Security Breaches Survey14 
have produced cybercrime data that is of ‘gold standard’ methodologically over a 
significant amount of time. In Europe, the Eurobarometer Cyber Security Special 
Surveys arguably provide the most robust evidence internationally.  
Briefly, some of the core aspects and issues associated with these surveys are as 
follows: 
• These surveys tend to work on the basis of identifying an organisation or individual 
as a potential victim of cybercrime. That is to say, an employee (usually the 
person with responsibility for ICT security) is asked about security issues and 
www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201406_BP_The_Threat_of_Cyber-Crime_to_the_UK.pdf; and Kshetri 
(2010).   
14 Excluding 2010 to 2013 where a self-selecting sampling methodology was used in place of a random 
probability sampling methodology. 
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 attacks in relation to their organisation, or a member of the general public is 
asked similar questions in relation to their home.  
• These surveys therefore capture instances of ‘known’ victimisation where the 
respondent directly experiences a cybercrime attack or has been made aware 
of the attack by software (e.g. antivirus) or by another person (such as a 
payment card firm which telephones the victim about a suspect transaction). 
Circumstances in which victims are not yet aware that they have been targeted 
are not captured by the survey. 
• In terms of sampling strategies adopted for surveys, random sampling yields the 
most representative data but the majority of surveys on business cybercrime 
adopt non-random or ‘self-selecting’ approaches, which can produce partial 
and biased results. This is due to the high cost of the alternative random 
probability approach. The resulting data pool on business cybercrime is therefore 
biased towards knowledgeable victims from sectors where ICT security is well 
embedded (i.e. there is an ICT security manager to answer the survey questions). 
Those who are reluctant to respond, due to a lack of knowledge or interest or 
fear of reputational damage from notification of a breach, are absent from the 
dataset, leaving a skewed picture of the cybercrime problem. Unlike in some 
American states where security breach notification is required by law, thus 
creating an accurate account of breaches (see Anderson et al., 2008) to the 
extent that there is compliance, the UK picture, based on surveys adopting non-
random samples, is incomplete. 
• Even those surveys that adopt random probability approaches to surveying 
cybercrime are problematic. There are conceptual issues with question wording 
and the assumption of knowledge on the part of the respondents, which can 
undermine the reliability and validity of the data produced. Such problems led 
the European Commission i2010 High Level Group, for example, to conclude that 
many of the questions in the Community Surveys on ICT Usage relating to business 
cybercrime attacks were unreliable.  
• Similar problems have also been reported in relation to domestic surveys. A 
European Commission-sponsored review into cybercrime questions in the annual 
Information Society Surveys found questions relating to businesses were likely to 
be unreliable because: (i) SMEs lacked expertise with technical terms; (ii) the 
outsourcing of security to specialists resulted in a lack of technical details; and (iii) 
the general reluctance of businesses to admit a problem in their own ICT systems. 
In relation to domestic respondents, the review concluded that answers to some 
cybercrime questions may be unreliable due to: (i) a lack of expertise with 
technical terms such as ‘virus’, ‘firewall’, etc.; (ii) the inability to trace back any 
incident to a specific cause (virus/adware/spyware/fraud); and (iii) the 
ambiguous or vague wording of the questions (Empirica, 2007).  
Large-scale random probability national surveys, such as the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales (CSEW), the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey, the Offending 
Crime and Justice Survey, and the Commercial Victimisation Survey, have included 
cybercrime victimisation and perpetration in their questionnaires. However, 
surprisingly few respondents reported cybercrime experiences, and, in the light of 
other data on anxiety about identity theft and the prevalence of security breaches, 
this leads us to question the validity of the responses to these questions. Furthermore, 
questions on e-victimisation have only recently become included as standard.  
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 Given the problems outlined, it is apparent that the cybercrime data pool is 
currently unsatisfactory, both in terms of quality and quantity. The largest databases 
produced by vendors are likely to be partial and biased, while the best quality data 
from national surveys adopting random probability sampling techniques can suffer 
from poor conceptualisation and a lack of historical questions on the topic. This 
represents a key challenge to developing an effective policing response.  
A detailed exploration of surveys of cybercrime victimisation relevant to the UK 
(excluding vendor statistics) is provided in the Technical Annex accompanying this 
report. 
3.4. Key considerations and issues for policing economic cybercrime: 
innovation 
There are three broad developments within economic cybercrime which have 
implications for how policing is thought about and implemented. The first (discussed 
in this section) concerns innovation; the second involves the offenders; and the third 
development concerns the defences used by economic cybercriminals.  
Without attempting to reflect on the entire landscape within which cybercriminals 
operate, we note three examples where innovative changes are taking place that 
facilitate economic cybercrime. These are new opportunities, exploitation of existing 
opportunity and developments in how the proceeds of cybercrime are used.  
3.4.1. Innovation change: new opportunities 
The first innovation development is that the cyber landscape has changed 
dramatically as networked technologies have transformed the way that cybercrime 
is organised. Cyber security threats have been further escalated in recent years as 
cybercrime has become more professional, harder to identify and/or recognise (via 
rootkits, Zeus, botnets), and provides anonymity for offenders, at least under normal 
conditions without significant forensic investigation efforts. Cybercrimes have also 
become more automated,15 and much larger and more complex with the advent 
of social media and ‘cloud’ technology, where data is stored on servers rather than 
computer hard drives and is accessed by users remotely, online. These trends are 
compounded by emerging networked technologies that are currently being 
planned or in progress, such as mesh technologies which join devices together, 
developing lateral networks, self-deleting (Tiger) texts which eradicate evidence, 
and cryptocurrencies (explored in section 3.4.3). The latter create alternative value 
systems. 
Collectively, these technologies further challenge policing and attempts to impose 
governance, especially across jurisdictions as networked technology has 
increasingly enabled cybercrime to become borderless. To quote the Australian 
Crime Commission (n.d.): 
 “the internet is particularly attractive to criminals and organised crime groups. 
 It is globally connected, borderless, anonymous, fast, low-risk, easily 
 accessible and has high volumes of rich data including financial data, 
 personal information, military information and business information.”   
15 For example, the fake antivirus and ransomware which lock the functionality of computers unless a 
ransom is paid to the offenders. 
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 There are also new forms of service delivery and types of services. These include 
services supplied by reputable online suppliers to legitimate users. There is also the 
delivery of harmful services via more sophisticated versions of crimeware-as-a-
service, where criminals require no knowledge of computers or systems because 
online specialists supply them with the means. This might include malicious software, 
supporting infrastructure or stolen personal and financial data. This makes it 
“relatively easy for cybercrime initiates – lacking experience and technical skills – to 
launch cyber-attacks not only of a scale highly disproportionate to their ability but 
for a price similarly disproportionate to the potential damage” (Europol, 2014: 20–21; 
see also Europol, 2015). The concern here is that the fear of crime that arises from 
such developments reduces incentives for businesses to invest in networked 
activities, while further encouraging the infiltration by offline organised criminals into 
the online markets. This widens the gap between the levels of security required by 
the public and business, and the levels of security that government and the police 
can realistically deliver.  
Technology and market dynamics offer the potential for further criminalisation. For 
example, the new card-aggregation technologies that promise to unify payment 
cards on a single device could be misappropriated as tools that facilitate carding, 
fraudulently accessing goods or services with financial data including payment 
cards and bank account details. Other well-intentioned technologies that seek to 
streamline or enhance user experiences may carry similar risks – raising the question 
of the role of law enforcement and others in undertaking criminal impact 
assessments of such technologies to assess their exploitability by criminals and by law 
enforcement/intelligence bodies.  
Further, it is important to recognise that the digital market is not one that is 
geographically restricted. As technologies become cheaper and more widely 
available, not only will there be an increase in global internet penetration in general, 
but new users and new activities and products will be incorporated into what is now 
a global online community, growing the pool of potential victims and potential 
criminal actors. Due to ease of access, a greater proportion of users than previously 
may be unfamiliar with technologies, which contributes to the insecurity of the 
internet; these users are ‘easy targets’ who inadvertently help facilitate criminal 
activity. Even large, otherwise sophisticated businesses may be vulnerable in this 
way, especially if they have merged component businesses with different ICT 
platforms. There will be both anticipated and unanticipated problems of patching 
vulnerabilities in the ‘internet of things’, through the hacking of technology products 
such as smartphones, which ‘misbehave’ as a result. 
As well as these new opportunities for economic cybercrime, it is worth highlighting 
those innovative developments that require particular consideration from a policing 
perspective – the exploitation of existing opportunity and how the proceeds of 
cybercrime are used.  
3.4.2. Innovation change: the exploitation of existing opportunity 
The second innovative development in economic cybercrime is the exploitation of 
existing opportunity – such as intellectual property. This is a complex challenge, in 
that online sales and subsequent payments are recognised by the IPO as a major 
threat to legitimate manufacturers and retailers (IPO, 2014). Public attitudes are 
deeply ambiguous towards counterfeit products (Large, 2014), except in safety-
critical and some health frauds. For example, the Police Intellectual Property Crime 
Unit (PIPCU) of the City of London Police launched its ‘Wake up – Don’t fake up!’ 
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 campaign in May 2015, warning consumers of the risks posed by fake beauty 
products. In the last 18 months, the PIPCU has suspended more than 5,500 websites 
selling fake luxury branded goods as well as seizing more than £3.5 million worth of 
fake goods, and in May 2015 made two arrests.16  
Counterfeit goods sales can be reduced by third party economic pressures. As an 
example, Amazon’s rules for hosted vendors – adopted after criticisms that they had 
a relaxed attitude to hosting counterfeits – place the onus on the vendor to source 
and sell only authentic products. The consequences of selling counterfeit goods 
include immediate suspension or termination of selling privileges, without 
reimbursement. Legal action may also be taken, including civil and criminal 
penalties.  
Inter-agency collaboration is also effective, as in the UK Real Deal campaign. This 
was set up by the National Markets Group, consisting of industry groups and digital 
anti-piracy units, Trading Standards, the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
police and the UK IPO, to encourage business to commit to trading in legitimate 
goods and to refuse to sell illegal digital media including DVDs, music, games and 
software. Currently, 200 markets have signed the Real Deal Charter, which is 
supported by 50 local authorities, 34 Trading Standards services and 23 private 
operators. 
Addressing insider theft of IP is more complex. In terms of information rather than 
products, ongoing efforts are being made to tackle this through detailed analysis of 
previous cases and identification of characteristic patterns of conduct (‘signatures’) 
that indicate an insider is attempting or is likely to exfiltrate data. Care needs to be 
taken by corporate boards as well as by security functions in large businesses, SMEs 
and public sector organisations to investigate the range of data held by the 
organisation, the risks of this data being sold, lost or stolen and the value of the data 
should this occur.  
3.4.3. Innovation change: the proceeds of economic cybercrime 
The third innovative development within economic cybercrime is the growth of 
virtual market currencies that fall outside normal financial systems. 
‘Cryptocurrencies’ are a means by which online users can circumvent the money 
controls of the state and, in theory, may be traded anonymously. The regulation or 
prohibition of cryptocurrencies is open to debate. At present there is no legislation in 
European countries regulating their use. In July 2014, the European Banking Authority 
urged national policymakers to discourage payment institutions from buying or 
selling virtual currencies, pending a regulatory framework.17  
The most popular virtual currency is Bitcoin, launched in 2009, which exists through 
an open-source software program. Bitcoins are stored entirely on computers, are not 
backed by any government or central bank and allow the owners to trade and 
move money from place to place almost as cheaply as sending email.18 Bitcoin 
showed promise as a low-cost mechanism for e-commerce and money transfer, but 
can also be used for criminal purposes. The creation of a ‘wallet’ generates a Bitcoin 
16 For more information, see: www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-
crime/pipcu/pipcu-news/Pages/Two-arrested-in-%E2%80%98Wake-up-%E2%80%93-don%E2%80%99t-
fake-up!%E2%80%99-campaign.aspx.  
17 See ‘European Banking Authority, Opinion on Virtual Currencies’ (EBA/OP/2014/08). 
18 See Böhme et al. (2015) for a review. 
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 address for the transactions and a personal key of 32 characters or more. Details are 
available online19 about all transactions made from one Bitcoin address, and the 
internet protocol address from where a transaction was initiated. However, wallet 
owners can use many tools to hide their identity, such as the Bitcoin Laundry 
(designed to unlink Bitcoin addresses from each other) and the Bitcoin Fog (a wallet 
designed to mix up all funds transferred so they are indistinguishable from each 
other). When requested, funds are paid out in multiple randomised transactions for 
further anonymity of the source of the money. Some such ‘tumblers’20 even 
introduce delays and use random fees that they deduct from the incoming amount, 
making it difficult to link the incoming and outgoing transactions. Transferring Bitcoins 
without access to the personal code of the wallet owner requires sophisticated 
technical tools and complicated processes.  
There is potential, then, for cryptocurrencies to be used for financial value transfers 
and money laundering. However, this presents problems of effort and liquidity. An 
additional obstacle is that cryptocurrencies cannot be used to buy licit items unless 
converted into legal tender. Converting cryptocurrencies into cash without a trace is 
more difficult; very few vendors currently accept cryptocurrencies for purchases, 
though the number is increasing. There are few Bitcoin ATMs, so most users have to 
convert their funds by bank transfer or going to a bureau de change. In reality, 
cryptocurrency is not as anonymous as initially envisaged.  
Moreover, the market for cryptocurrencies has been extremely volatile. A meteoric 
rise in the value of Bitcoins and Litecoins21 in the winter of 2013/14 was followed by a 
crash; at the time of writing, they are trading at about a quarter of the value of the 
early 2014 peak. The use of questionable markets that do not require much 
authentication to process transactions is exceedingly risky, with cryptocurrency 
wallets being hacked or the market potentially going bust. Consequently, while 
some people do try to store, transmit or launder wealth via cryptocurrency, market 
volatility coupled with security risks mean that it is not a reliable way of fulfilling those 
goals at scale. 
The criminal potential of cryptocurrency technologies has yet to be determined and 
until cryptocurrencies have much more widespread expenditure opportunities, they 
will continue to be of limited value to criminals. On the other hand, in terms of 
markets and their functioning, it is important to anticipate trends and practices (see 
section 3.6) and to anticipate consequences. There are no obvious methods by 
which cyber-enabled money laundering can be reduced, beyond a continued 
focus on enhancing general anti-money laundering efforts. Some European 
investigations have led to seizure of Bitcoins and their transfer to the authorities. 
Speed in asset freezing is a particularly important factor in preventing serious 
economic crimes, but this is affected by the speed of identification and reporting to 
the authorities (or to a court for private action) as well as by the speed of response 
when alerted. 
19 See: http://blockchain.info.  
20 ‘Tumblers’ are services, often operating on Tor, which allow users to transfer their cryptocurrencies 
into a pool of funds and then receive them back (minus a small commission) into newly generated 
‘clean’ addresses, thereby breaking the financial trail. 
21 Litecoin is another type of cryptocurrency, similar to Bitcoin – a peer-to-peer internet currency that 
enables instant, near-zero cost payments to anyone in the world. For more information, see: 
https://litecoin.org/. 
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 3.5. Key considerations and issues for policing economic cybercrime: 
offenders  
Evidently, innovation in economic cybercrime raises a range of issues and 
considerations for policing approaches. However, there are other areas of 
challenge that also require attention – the offenders themselves and the defence 
mechanisms used by cybercriminals for protection against policing (see section 3.6). 
3.5.1. Types of offenders and offences 
Table 3.1 presents a categorisation of the key types of offenders and offences in 
economic cybercrime and the main characteristics of each group (further detail 
can be found in the Technical Annex, available online). 
The categorisation highlights both the range of threats and the divergence between 
ideological and political threats which fall within our definition of economic 
cybercrime (covering both cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled economic crime).   
Table 3.1: Categorisation of the types of offenders and offences in economic 
cybercrime 
Category  Target Organisational type Economic crime 
threat22 
Amateur hackers Security 
breaches 
Individual/amateur Low 
Crackers and 
leechers 
Software 
security, 
copyright piracy 
Individual/amateur Low 
Pirates Security, 
copyright piracy 
Individual/ organised Low 
Attackers IP theft, extortion Criminal/organised High 
‘Black hat’ 
vulnerability 
scouts 
ICT vulnerability Individual/amateur Low on performance; 
high on 
consequences if 
vulnerabilities sold or 
passed on 
Professional 
malware 
developers and 
script kiddies 
ICT vulnerability 
and means to 
exploit them 
Individual/amateur Low on performance; 
high on 
consequences if 
vulnerabilities sold or 
passed on 
Carders and 
money mules 
 
Data theft Organised High 
Extortionists Botnets and 
malware in 
order to set up 
extortion rackets 
Individual/amateur/organised Medium 
Phishers and 
social engineers 
Spam for data Organised High 
‘Black hat’ 
fraudsters 
Script attacks Organised High 
Cheaters Online gaming Individual/organised Medium 
22 Authors’ assessment from the data. 
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 Category  Target Organisational type Economic crime 
threat22 
and gambling 
cheating 
Click fraudsters Cheating ad 
clicks and views 
Individual/organised High 
Hacktivists Political hacking Individual/organised Low 
3.5.2. What about the role of organised crime? 
One significant issue here is understanding how far the threats emanate from the 
same or different sources in terms of economic cybercrime. Another, concerning the 
general categorisation of offenders in Table 3.1, is to what extent ‘organised crime’ is 
involved: the latter would typically generate more interest from law enforcement. 
The term ‘organised’ is used for a multiplicity of forms of organisation, from small 
loose confederations to Mafia-type organisations. Those allegedly involved in the 
Libor and Forex rate-fixing scandals used ICT in their schemes, and their alleged 
activities might fit the definition of organised crime; but one might imagine such 
market manipulation occurring via hacking by unauthorised persons also, though it 
might be detected more quickly if repeated than if conducted by regular market 
participants. A key question here – and one particularly relevant to a law 
enforcement approach – is, ‘What is organised crime?’ 
The Australian Crime Commission (n.d.) distinguishes between three types of 
organised crime groups: 
• Traditional organised crime groups that use ICT to enhance their regular criminal 
activities; 
• Organised cybercriminal groups that operate exclusively online; and 
• Organised crime groups made up of ideologically and politically motivated 
individuals who use ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct.  
The UK Serious and Organised Crime Strategy states that ‘organised crimes’ are 
serious crimes planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together 
on a continuing basis where the motivation is often, but not always, financial gain.  
While there are claims that organised crime in this traditional sense is making a foray 
into cyberspace, the evidence indicates otherwise, at least in the classical sense of 
Mafia-type groups (Lusthaus, 2013). It is plausible that some organised criminal 
groups are taking advantage of ICT in order to facilitate their otherwise offline 
crimes. Moreover, it is possible that such groups are employing or bankrolling 
individuals or small groups that do engage in cyber-dependent crime. But the 
likelihood that these organisations have the intellectual capital necessary to 
navigate the internet as a conduit for criminal activity is, as yet, unproven. Setting 
aside economic crimes, evidence indicates that the use of ICT to execute criminal 
activity generally has been modest (Montoya, Junger & Hartel, 2013; Pyrooz, Decker 
& Moule Jr, 2013).  
Of course, some organised criminal activity does take place online. It might involve 
a decentralised and/or networked group of actors who have never met outside 
cyberspace. This presents new challenges to law enforcement, particularly as it 
attempts to disrupt and disable complicated networks with horizontal and 
interchangeable command structures. 
The innovation enabled by the internet allows criminal entrepreneurs to operate 
relatively efficiently. Currently, there are several technologies and forums that 
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 criminal actors can take advantage of in order to anonymise themselves and 
facilitate criminal activity. This results in an arms race between criminal developers 
and those who try to foil them. The difficulty in protecting against unknown 
vulnerabilities is high, making it hard to stay ahead of criminal actors. Law 
enforcement has had some limited success in penetrating these technologies to 
identify and capture criminals, and/or has taken advantage of sloppy use of these 
technologies to find those who hide behind them.  
However, the speed and capacity of cybercriminals to develop and guard what 
they do, how they do it and where they do it in cyberspace should not be 
underestimated. Law enforcement experiences have shown that cybercriminals are 
very efficient in learning from policing operations and responding to these with 
improved software security and encryption, and mechanisms for conducting 
criminal activity (as, for example, with the Darkode forum).23  
3.6. Key considerations and issues for policing economic cybercrime: 
cyber defences 
Semi-licit or illicit goods can be acquired in largely licit, grey and black markets; the 
label is a matter of degree, and it may be more helpful to describe them as 
‘underground’ markets, with or without encryption. They provide access to products 
or host interactions which can be legal but which can also be exploited for criminal 
purposes: for example, a vulnerabilities market where vulnerabilities are identified 
and cyber security patches developed. A grey-marketer would use this information 
to sell an attack, knowing that most users would not be attuned to the available 
patch or fix to protect against it (Ablon, Libicki & Golay, 2014). Black markets, by 
contrast, trade exclusively in illicit products including vulnerabilities, attack 
frameworks, data, contraband, counterfeit items and stolen merchandise.  
Cryptomarkets exist in a variety of locations and employ technologies not 
commonly used by average internet users, such as bulletin board systems, Usenet, 
the Tor network and internet relay chat (IRC) (Johnson, 2009). These markets have 
lifespans which date from months to a few years as law enforcement shuts them 
down. So far, new markets have consistently emerged to fulfil the demand left by 
the collapse of old ones, making prevention and implementation of Protect and 
Prepare difficult. Disruption does have an effect, however, as forcing such markets 
into short lifespans increases the risk of participants losing money even if they are not 
being successfully prosecuted. On the other hand, those operating in such markets 
are often effective at disguising or denying access to their markets using a number 
of cyber defences, including: 
• Bulletproof hosting: These are crimeware services that protect cybercriminals 
from law enforcement, and are typically hosted at offshore locations which are 
difficult for law enforcement to access. If attacked, these services are designed 
to reroute in order to avoid interruption (Bradbury, 2014).  
• Anonymisation: Experienced users who attempt to maintain online anonymity 
can change their user names and disguise their internet protocol address. Skilled 
cybercriminals continue to operate through forums with administrators who vet 
participants (Lusthaus, 2012).  
23 See: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/the-darkode-cybercrime-forum-up-close/ – which mutated 
into the Darkcode forum after arrests.  
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 • Alternative cyber networks: In an effort to be anonymous, some internet denizens 
use platforms such as Usenet or, more recently, Tor and P2P networks such as 
OpenBazaar and I2P. Usenet groups have, in the past, facilitated black markets 
for viruses and child pornography (Ghosh & Turrini, 2010; Jaishankar, 2011). 
Participants are required to follow particular techniques rigorously to ensure that 
they achieve true anonymity (Dingledine & Mathewson, 2006).  
• Encryption: Companies are starting to provide software and hardware that claim 
to be secure from prying eyes. Offenders who attempt to anonymise their actions 
risk discovery if anyone they communicate with does not engage in best 
practices. This is illustrated clearly in the FBI’s take-down of Ross Ulbricht, better 
known as the former Silk Road administrator ‘Dread Pirate Roberts’, and the 
subsequent tracing of his Bitcoins to the cryptomarket he once managed. 
Information was recovered from his unencrypted computer after he was arrested 
while online (Oakford, 2015; Weaver, 2015).  
3.7. What do these issues mean for the policing of economic cybercrime? 
As the internet continues to become entrenched in our daily lives and we share 
increasing amounts of data, cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime will 
increase if only because the permutations of incentive, opportunity, and low risk of 
investigation and prosecution traditionally invite criminal activity. The task ahead is 
to manage the risks so as to devise and ensure Prevent and Protect interventions 
that complement patterns and levels of use as well as to minimise the negative 
socio-economic impact of such crimes. This inevitably involves making evidence-
based judgements about trends in offending and impacts on different sectors of the 
population, directly and via business and government.  
There are efforts to head off some criminal actors before they can make contact 
with their potential victims, such as applying spam filters, which are nearly universal 
throughout all email providers. Some companies which provide internet browsers, 
such as Google and Mozilla, and internet service providers have attempted to take 
on the role of guardians by providing software, free of charge, which alerts users to 
potential fraudulent websites or malware. 
However, as the licit market moves towards standard anonymisation for all users as a 
privacy measure, it is important to pre-empt the vulnerabilities and legal difficulties 
that will present themselves (Blakeslee, 2012; Denning & Baugh, 1997). This task is 
much easier said than done. The evolution of botnets and the sophisticated attacks 
that emanate from them are also daunting problems. Given the central role that 
botnets play in attacks, it is worth attempting to combat them so long as they 
remain a significant means of conducting cybercrime (Amoroso, 2012; Bleaken, 
2010).  
The speed at which the internet and internet behaviour evolve is also an ongoing 
challenge when attempting to keep up with the threats and risks posed by 
economic cybercrime (Calderoni, 2010). Accordingly, there is a need to improve 
levels of proactive as well as reactive responses and focus to match those that 
policing has achieved in other areas such as organised crime and corruption. It is 
worth noting here the objectives of the 2011 ‘UK Cyber Security Strategy’,24 which set 
24 “Objective 1: The UK to tackle cybercrime and be one of the most secure places in the world to do 
business in cyberspace; Objective 2: The UK to be more resilient to cyber-attacks and better able to 
protect our interests in cyberspace; Objective 3: The UK to have helped shape an open, stable and 
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 out a vision for 2015; these reflect the continuing need to review and refresh that 
vision and strategy.  
Given that the internet is an important driver of economic growth (Manyika & 
Roxburgh, 2011) it is clear that government actors need to take steps to ensure that 
criminal actors do not offset these gains. The speed of post-strike interventions is 
critical to reducing harms – the time lag between implementing new criminal 
strategies and the effective countering of those strategies leads to economic losses. 
However, given the disadvantages of being attacked, and the costs required to 
minimise the impact of such attacks, the problem that law enforcement, 
organisations and governments will continue to face is the ‘cost-to-pay-off’ analysis 
vis-à-vis cybercrime.  
As it is the sovereign responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, it is arguably 
reasonable to demand that government provide the necessary policing responses 
to economic cybercrime, although these responses must inevitably compete with 
other agendas and priorities. As noted earlier, the police are not required to be the 
sole player in the law enforcement landscape; rather, it is more about identifying 
specific roles and responsibilities in that landscape, as well as the role of other 
agencies, and the promotion of partnership and other collaborative arrangements. 
The crux of the challenge lies in the speed and volume of economic cybercrime, the 
global nature of the internet, and the scale at which this allows crimes to be 
committed. Subsequently, responsibilities for global protection and the pursuit of 
offenders lie with a plethora of national governments, requiring strong and effective 
collaborative networks.25 Differences in political regimes and economic success 
raise the risk of ‘free-rider’ governments that refuse to participate in a global 
protection regime against online criminal actors. This is an issue that has been rising 
up the political agenda, though it is somewhat undermined by the politics 
surrounding allegations of state-sponsored hacking for economic and political 
intelligence and to cause damage. In this context, frauds against individuals and 
SMEs are normally subordinated. 
3.8. Summary 
This chapter has explored the current policing landscape and approach to 
economic cybercrime, and has identified some of the key challenges linked to the 
nature of economic cybercrime. 
In the face of competing priorities and agendas, the general approach to fraud by 
the English and Welsh police forces has tended to focus on and reflect one 
particular significant policy agenda as identified in the 2011 government strategy 
‘Fighting Fraud Together’. This prioritised organised crime and fraud committed by 
organised crime groups (OCGs). Where fraud squads have not been abolished, they 
have merged with Serious Crime Units or been rebadged as Economic Crime Units in 
order to align existing expertise and resources with government priorities to address 
OCGs, corrupt professionals and asset recovery. At the same time, and as a 
consequence of a number of initiatives that emerged from the 2006 Fraud Review, 
vibrant cyberspace which the UK public can use safely and that supports open societies; Objective 4: 
The UK to have the cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability it needs to underpin all our cyber 
security objectives.” 
25 These currently include Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the FBI’s Strategic Alliance 
Cyber Crime Working Group, and the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation.  
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 there has been a national approach to the reporting and recording of intelligence 
relating to fraud that has recently culminated in a national strategy.  
Until issues of local priorities and resourcing are addressed, there may be a gap 
between a national strategy and local delivery; the regional response appears at 
present to address primarily the organised crime dimension of economic crime (in 
both senses of the term ‘organised’). However, the strategy itself acknowledges that:  
 “while fraud is rising in its current volumes, it cannot be satisfactorily dealt with 
 by the police alone, and its volume needs to be kept at a manageable level 
 – crime prevention. Furthermore, the first obligation of the police is to prevent 
 crime and given that much, if not most, fraud relies on some degree of 
 participation by the victim, this holds particularly true for this crime type.” 
 (City of London Corporation, 2015: 28) 
Certainly, taking government, business and individuals as a whole, the dominant 
thrust of policy and action is in the Protect and Prepare sphere. Policing plays a 
complementary role in that space and has potential for a greater role (possibly with 
a tighter focus on the types and perpetrators of crime) in terms of Pursue.  
Such a response has, however, to understand the specific issues associated with 
cybercrime. These include the range of victims and crimes, which can be 
committed from a single source or by a number of perpetrators; the ability to insert 
or disguise the criminality as part of legitimate cyber activity; the speed and 
instantaneous nature of the criminality itself; and the exploitation of jurisdiction and 
territorial boundaries in terms of perpetrator, means or mode of delivery and 
location of victim. All of these considerations throw up a number of strategic 
questions pertinent to any response to economic cybercrime, such as who else 
should be involved and in what capacity, and what should be the specific roles and 
responsibilities of the police: 
• Cybercrime is an evolving law enforcement issue which requires clarification of 
the roles and responsibilities of a range of agencies and stakeholders, 
determining the specific foci of law enforcement responses and the deployment 
of appropriate resources to do this properly. 
• Policing resources are reducing, driven as they are by competing priorities and 
agendas in a time of economic stringency. Those initiatives that are in place are 
emerging rather than comprehensive and established. 
• Cyberspace is constantly evolving, for an extensive range of functions, services 
and products, while also providing platforms for aggregation and innovation. 
Most of these outstrip preventative and other measures for control protection. 
• Cyberspace has multiple actors whose typologies, levels of engagement in 
criminality and particular types of criminality and methods of organisation and 
operation do not lend themselves easily to existing definitions or ways of 
understanding. 
• Cyberspace is developing its own marketplaces and financial arrangements that 
require specialist awareness and access if they are to be addressed. 
These are just some of the issues that a future approach to the policing of economic 
cybercrime needs to consider. The following chapter explores the impacts of 
economic cybercrime on different groups, considering the existing evidence base 
to explore the responses to the issues discussed in this chapter. The meaning of these 
developments for trying to tackle and police economic cybercrime is then explored 
in chapter 5.  
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 4. The impacts of economic cybercrime: who, what and how 
much 
This chapter explores in detail how different types of economic cybercrime affect 
certain groups, focusing in particular on individuals/the general public and 
businesses, with some consideration of government entities also. The analysis draws 
largely on the existing evidence base and the chapter goes on to consider what is 
currently being done to help police the impacts of economic cybercrime for each 
group, and to identify where the gaps are. This analysis is central to developing 
preventative and investigative policing responses. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part (sections 4.1 and 4.2), the 
report draws on a literature review to identify key themes and threats to business 
and individuals, and analysis of Action Fraud data, while noting that the evidence 
base is not as robust as it should or could be.  
In the second part (sections 4.3 to 4.6), we address the issues facing the police if 
they wish to respond to specific categories of victims and potential victims. We do 
not specify what the police should do in strategic, policy or operational terms but 
simply identify areas of possible response; the specificity is addressed in chapters 5 
and 6.  
4.1. The main themes of economic cybercrime 
As identified in chapter 3, the key barrier to a better understanding and tackling of 
cybercrimes is the lack of reliable data on their frequency and the nature of their 
impact on businesses, the national infrastructure and the general public.26 These 
data issues include (i) inconsistencies in the information held by various stakeholders; 
(ii) lack of data sharing protocols; (iii) confidentiality and anonymity of respondents; 
(iv) failure to adopt ‘gold standard’ data collection practices, linked to under-
reporting; and (v) knowledge and perception of victimisation. This combines with a 
failure to report (or decisions not to report) identified crimes in the first place in some 
instances, and therefore results in significant under-reporting of economic 
cybercrime. 
Despite these issues and areas of challenge, the available research and data, if 
treated with due care, play an important role in understanding economic 
cybercrime. In this section, we focus on themes drawn from the most ‘satisfying’ 
datasets in relation to two key groups affected by economic cybercrime: individuals 
and businesses. We also explore what data is held by police in the UK on economic 
cybercrime through Action Fraud.  
4.1.1. Malware and virus attacks 
The main perceived threat or risk associated with cyberspace for both businesses 
and individuals is the prevalence of malware and virus attacks (these can be cyber-
dependent and/or cyber-enabled).  
Data from the UK Information Security Breaches Survey (ISBS) shows that, in 2010, the 
reported prevalence of malware infection, insider misuse and unauthorised access 
26 Several papers provide insightful reasons why existing data is flawed: see, for example, Anderson et al 
(2008, 2013); Casper (2007).   
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 had a sharp increase, and there was a slightly modest increase in reports of theft 
and fraud. Reports of insider misuse and unauthorised access peaked at new all-
time highs (42% and 49% respectively), while malware attacks returned to near their 
peak prevalence in 2004, having declined between 2004 and 2008.  
In a 2015 report by PwC, 90% of large organisations said that they had suffered a 
security breach, up from 81% in 2014. Small organisations recorded a similar picture, 
with 74% reporting a security breach, up from 60% in the previous year 
(HM Government, 2015). Of these, 11% of respondents changed the nature of their 
business as a result of their worst breach. The average cost of the worst single breach 
suffered by organisations surveyed has gone up sharply for all sizes of business. For 
companies employing over 500 people, the starting point for breach costs - – which 
includes elements such as business disruption, lost sales, recovery of assets, fines and 
compensation – commences at £1.46 million, up from £600,000 the previous year. For 
small businesses, the lower end for security breach costs increased to £75,200, up 
from £65,000 in 2014. Malicious software affected nearly three-quarters of large 
organisations and three-fifths of small organisations, for whom there was a 
substantial rise. Three-quarters of large organisations suffered a staff-related breach 
(up from 58% in 2014) and nearly one-third of small organisations had a similar 
occurrence (up from 22% the previous year). 
The 2012 and 2014 UK Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) found that computer 
viruses were the most common type of online incident among UK businesses. The 
2014 CVS estimates that there were 136,000 incidents of online crime against 
businesses in the wholesale and retail sector in the 12 months prior to interview. This is 
a notable decrease compared with 2013 (234,000 incidents), but an increase 
compared with 2012 (69,000 incidents) (Home Office, 2015b).27 Around 10% of all 
wholesale and retail premises experienced at least one type of online crime in the 
last year, with 9% experiencing a virus and 2% experiencing hacking in the 12 months 
prior to interview. Computer viruses accounted for 87% of all online crime (although 
the low levels of other types of online crime may be because these crimes do not 
come to the attention of victims; for example, in the case of phishing, the offending 
email may be caught by spam filters, or victims may not know that their computer 
systems have been hacked).  
Similarly, there is an upward trend in recorded domestic phishing attempts, 
indicating, as with business-recorded cybercrime, that cyber-enabled fraud is on the 
increase.  
4.1.2. The volume of economic cyber-related incidents 
Fraud is not currently covered by the CSEW. However, additional analysis by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) on existing questions in the 2012/13 CSEW suggests 
that plastic card fraud and building society fraud taken together could potentially 
have contributed between 3.6 and 3.8 million crime incidents in 2012/13 – almost 
half the total crimes against individuals (7.3 million in the year to September 2013) 
(ONS, 2015: 89). CSEW data does show that, for the year ending September 2014, 
5.2% of payment card owners were victims of card fraud. This is an increase of 4.6%, 
27 We would propose a caveat, here: it may be surprising that so few businesses did suffer from viruses 
but the percentage that were not actual victims doubtless owe much to their investment in cyber 
security measures rather than to their lack of vulnerability to attack. Attempts in such cases are likely to 
be unknown except to the cyber security vendors. 
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 and reverses the trend of small reductions in payment card fraud over the last few 
years.  
It is also worth noting that the financial services industry is not alone in being subject 
to significant levels of economic cyber-related incidents. Although over half of UK 
adults are aware of mass-marketing frauds, approximately 2.6 million individuals 
have fallen victim to these scams in some way – some 800,000 UK adults in 2012 
alone (Whitty, 2013; ONS, 2013). Data collected by a YouGov survey in April 2013 
found that, in their lifetime, approximately 500,000 UK adults had fallen victim to a 
dating scam; around 900,000 had been conned by a boiler room scam; 700,000 by 
a charity scam; 900,000 by a ‘need funds for an emergency’ scam; 700,000 by an 
inheritance scam; and 800,000 by a lottery scam. There is also a significant repeat 
victimisation problem, as a quarter of those scammed had been subsequent victims 
of another or a similar scam. This is consistent with earlier surveys commissioned by 
the Office of Fair Trading showing high victimisation and repeat victimisation risks 
(Levi et al., 2007). 
4.1.3. Financial losses to victims 
There is also a need to establish the financial losses to victims as a consequence of 
economic cybercrime. Given that many datasets record significant levels of and 
concerns about cybercrime, it is necessary to distinguish crimes where the primary 
intentions are disruptive and malicious rather than financial, and where the 
associated costs are more to do with recovery and resilience than losses. While 
useful, the number of cases tells only part of the story. To get a more realistic idea of 
the actual impacts or losses of such frauds on business or individuals, it is better to 
think about losses as a proportion of turnover or (more difficult to obtain and 
analyse) as a proportion of profit. Industry data has now been released showing 
some fraud rates per capita card expenditure: the loss to fraud was 0.7p per £100 
spent via contactless payments. In 2014, card fraud losses were 7.5p per £100 spent, 
compared with a peak of 12.4p per £100 spent in 2008. The overall UK e-commerce 
fraud-to-sales figures equated to 9.2p per £100 spent in 2014. Online banking fraud 
losses were marginally greater in 2014 than in 2008, but e-commerce fraud went up 
from £181.7 million in 2008 to £217.4 million in 2014. For online banking, although the 
sterling value of losses was greater in 2014, the rise in online banking volume means 
that the effect on the industry was significantly less than in 2008 (setting aside any 
effects from changing industry profitability rates) (FFA UK, 2014).  
4.1.4. Targeted prevention strategy and risk areas 
Is there a correlation between a targeted prevention strategy and risk areas? The 
main losses to the banking sector between 2003 and 2014 related to internet-
enabled CNP28 fraud, offline CNP fraud (i.e. by telephone) and internet banking 
fraud, as counterfeit card frauds declined due to the introduction of Chip and PIN. 
Offline CNP fraud declined in the early 2000s with the growth of internet shopping 
(and related fraud). Losses from internet-enabled CNP fraud (i.e. e-commerce 
fraud) increased rapidly in the early 2000s and totalled £217.4 million in 2014, when 
they accounted for 45% of all card fraud and 66% of total remote purchase fraud. 
28 CNP (card-not-present) fraud involves transactions where the merchant, retailer or other service 
provider does not have physical access to the payment card; examples are transactions by telephone, 
mail order or internet. 
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 Overall, losses on purchases made using a card remotely – those made online, over 
the phone or by mail order – rose 10% in 2014 to £331.5 million, while the number of 
fraud incidents rose 7% in the same period. In recent years, losses to UK retailers 
have remained stable and this rise has been almost entirely the result of UK cards 
being used fraudulently abroad in those countries (like the US) which do not have 
Chip and PIN or other security measures applied to online orders. Internet-enabled 
CNP declined between 2008 and 2010 with the introduction of security measures 
such as American Express SafeKey, MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by Visa, 
but then began to rise again (FFA UK, 2014).  
There is also an element of customers being scammed, for example in investment 
scams, dating scams and wine scams. Typically, not all of these cases are reported 
to the victim’s bank and are therefore also excluded from the numbers. Via 
Financial Fraud Action (FFA) UK – the fraud coordination body for the UK financial 
services industry – the banking industry is working to educate customers to protect 
themselves against this type of scam and report it to their bank. In future press 
releases, FFA UK will also be expanding the data provided to include 
attempted/prevented fraud, which will help demonstrate more fully the scale of 
attack being mounted against UK account holders via their financial institutions. 
4.2. The current UK situation 
The analysis in section 4.1 identifies four key themes that emerge from official 
research. We now cross-reference these findings with incident reporting data for the 
UK, to Action Fraud (see 4.2.1) and other UK industry bodies (section 4.2.2). 
4.2.1. Action Fraud 
Action Fraud collects data for reported frauds by UK individuals and businesses, 
excluding reports for ‘plastic crime’ which is collected by Cifas and FFA UK, to avoid 
double counting (see section 4.2.2). Analysis of data from Action Fraud covering 
October to December 2014 (Q4 2014) shows, overall, a considerable rise in reported 
fraud in the UK.29 On the other hand, the data indicates both divergence and 
convergence with the material reviewed in section 4.1, in terms of victims reporting 
a loss or an attack. 
First, the types of frauds reported: overall, there were 106,681 reported incidents,30 
4,062 (4%) of which involved computer misuse crime, a much smaller proportion 
than might have been expected. The two largest components of computer misuse 
crime involved viruses or malware, and hacking of emails and social media. By 
volume, the single largest types of reported fraud are banking and credit industry 
frauds (33%), a large proportion of which (18%) are cheque, plastic card and online 
bank account frauds. This is followed by non-investment frauds (29%), which include 
online shopping and auctions (12%) and also computer software service frauds (8%). 
The latter may include, for example, fake antivirus and ransomware. Advance-fee 
payments (and their different forms) follow (14%). Specific technology-related 
29 Caution should be exercised when talking about earlier periods, since reporting and recording 
standards have changed in the interval (‘Crime in England and Wales’, ONS, 2015). 
30 There are some inconsistencies in the Action Fraud data relating to the total number of cases, due to 
missing data. For the purposes of this research we have worked with the available detail for each issue. 
Totals match up closely wherever possible. It is also worth highlighting that the analysis presented in this 
report is not comparable to ONS analysis of Action Fraud data due to different datasets covering 
different time periods.  
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 offences are less prevalent, covering telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) at 
5%. The remainder of the offences are relatively small in volume. Table 4.1 presents 
data for reported crime by volume by category (including the two largest sub-
categories within each).  
Table 4.1: Typology of reported frauds, Q4 2014 
Fraud type No. of 
frauds 
Proportion of 
total reported 
frauds 
Banking and credit industry fraud 34,913 32.7% 
Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not PSP) 19,127 18% 
Application fraud (excluding mortgages) 10,091 9.5% 
Non-investment fraud 30,490 28.6% 
Online shopping and auctions 12,405 11.6% 
Computer software service fraud 8,455 7.9% 
Advance-fee payments 15,065 14.1% 
Other advance-fee frauds 7,498 6.7% 
Lender loan fraud 2,078 1.9% 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) 4,817 4.5% 
No identified category 12,404 11.6% 
Categories as % of total 92,872 87% 
Total  106,681 100% 
 
Second, the data highlights that the internet has not always been the source of or 
medium for the initial contact that leads to a fraud. The single most common way 
that offenders contacted their victims was by phone or text (35%). Almost a fifth 
(18%) were contacted after visiting a website, 12% in person, 11% by letter or fax and 
8% by email. From these figures, the overall degree of involvement of network 
technologies can be estimated, though with some caveats.31  
  
31 Percentages are indicative rather than absolute; adjusted for cyber-involvement (email+visit to a 
website+web forum+(0.66) of TV, radio or online advert, or flyer) (‘in person’ and ‘other’ have been 
excluded); classification depends on when the victim feels the fraud began, e.g. at first contact, or the 
point at which money was being requested. With most frauds today, online usually goes offline to get 
the money; blanks are excluded and percentages are based upon total known information; ‘simplified’ 
means main offence and information are joined. 
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 Table 4.2: First contact method (offender), Q4 2014 
Contact method No. of frauds Proportion of 
total reported 
frauds 
Phone call, text message or similar 31,088 35% 
Visit to a website 15,587 18% 
Other 11,625 13% 
In person 10,932 12% 
Letter or fax 10,159 11% 
Email 6,859 8% 
Web forum, chat room or similar 1,582 2% 
TV, radio or online advert, or flyer 462 1% 
Newspaper, magazine 179 0% 
Total 88,473 100% 
 
The data in Table 4.2 suggests that reported fraud offences using networked 
technologies are actually relatively low as a proportion of the total. However, it is 
likely that the data underestimates the extent of cyber-involvement throughout the 
crime, because reporting reflects only first contact by the offender. Many economic 
crimes involve a cyber-element at a later point – for example, a phone call 
generated via voice over internet protocol (VoIP) might be used to make initial 
contact and ‘hook’ a victim, after which a fraudster will take over. Subsequently, it is 
not always clear for classifiers (and victims) from the data when the fraud actually 
began. This relates to a wider challenge of defining fraud: is it with the initial contact 
or later on when an attempt to extract money takes place? Some victims are 
carefully groomed and often will not realise the fraud until well after the event. 
Nevertheless, the data does provide a clear indication of the different levels of 
cyber-involvement in the different offences. Though, at this point, the data does not 
reveal whether it is cyber-enabled or cyber-dependent (or indeed cyber-assisted, or 
not relevant); this can only be seen when it is cross-tabulated by fraud type.  
From another perspective and although offences that use networked technologies 
are relatively rare – a fact that may reflect the newness of Action Fraud, different 
reporting patterns of individuals and businesses, and different victimisation profiles – 
the differentiation by crime and the cyber-involvement is important. When the data 
is ordered according to the level of estimated cyber-involvement, it cuts across32 a 
number of the Action Fraud data headings (see Table 4.3). The data presented in 
Table 4.3 highlights the degree of estimated cyber-involvement for specific types of 
fraud and helps to better understand where cyber technologies are involved. For 
example, advance-fee payments are not generally indicative of cyber-involvement, 
but specific forms of advance-fee payment fraud offending are. Traditional 419 
advance-fee payment frauds are very low in cyber-involvement (15%), whereas 
32 Our analysis orders the fraud types in terms of cyber-involvement via first contact. Including all of the 
types of cybercrime (assisted, enabled and dependent), it is calculated from the combination of the 
following values (email+visit to a website+web forum+(0.66) of TV, radio or online advert, or flyer) (‘in 
person’ and ‘other’ have been excluded). 
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 others, such as dating scams (88%) and online shopping and auctions (86%) are the 
most cyber-involved.  
Table 4.3: Level of cyber-involvement, first contact method (offender), Q4 2014 
Action Fraud category/sub-categories Total n= 
 
Cyber-
involvement 
% of cyber-
involvement 
Dating scam 835 737.6 88% 
Online shopping and auctions 11,350 9,754.2 86% 
Counterfeit cashiers’ cheques 559 428.4 77% 
Rental fraud 773 572.8 74% 
Ticket fraud 910 655.0 72% 
Computer virus/malware/spyware 1,370 975.2 71% 
Denial of service attack 47 26.0 55% 
Mandate fraud 966 520.4 54% 
Hacking – social media and email 1,047 524.0 50% 
Denial of service attack extortion 10 5.0 50% 
Hacking extortion 106 53.0 50% 
Mortgage-related fraud  144 69.0 48% 
Fraudulent applications for grants from charities 9 4.0 44% 
Hacking – server 86 29.6 34% 
Hacking – personal 428 132.0 31% 
Business trading fraud 124 38.0 31% 
Other regulatory fraud 72 22.0 31% 
Prime bank guarantees 12 3.6 30% 
Other consumer non-investment fraud 4,703 1,358.0 29% 
Fraud by failing to disclose information 160 46.0 29% 
Pension fraud by pensioner (or their estates) 7 2.0 29% 
Charity fraud 238 63.2 27% 
Insurance broker fraud 39 10.0 26% 
Pyramid or Ponzi schemes 164 38.6 24% 
Other fraud 11,553 2,250.8 19% 
Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts 
(not PSP) 
13,437 2,449.4 18% 
Consumer phone fraud 352 61.6 18% 
Fraudulent applications for grants from 
government-funded organisations 
41 7.0 17% 
Other financial investment 1,017 170.8 17% 
Bankruptcy and insolvency 18 3.0 17% 
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) fraud 6 1.0 17% 
Lender loan fraud 1,929 319.2 17% 
Other advance-fee payments 6,794 1,017.6 15% 
Inheritance fraud 743 109.6 15% 
419 advance-fee payment 550 80.2 15% 
Door-to-door sales and bogus tradesmen 1,242 170.2 14% 
Banking and credit industry fraud – information 
(only) 
3,637 495.6 14% 
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 Action Fraud category/sub-categories Total n= 
 
Cyber-
involvement 
% of cyber-
involvement 
Share sales or boiler room fraud 387 44.0 11% 
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit 32 3.6 11% 
Corporate procurement fraud 33 3.0 9% 
Pension fraud committed on pensions 24 2.0 8% 
Insurance-related fraud 253 20.2 8% 
Lottery scams 1,238 97.2 8% 
False accounting 133 9.6 7% 
Fraud recovery 368 26.0 7% 
Time shares and holiday club fraud 219 15.0 7% 
Application fraud (excluding mortgages) 6,350 428.8 7% 
Retail fraud 1,660 109.6 7% 
Fraud by abuse of position 500 29.8 6% 
Pension liberation fraud 230 12.0 5% 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) 3,194 119.2 4% 
Corporate employee fraud 451 12.6 3% 
Computer software service fraud 7,813 167.0 2% 
Hacking – PBX/dial through 100 2.0 2% 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) fraud 9 0.0 0% 
Passport application fraud 1 0.0 0% 
 
Though useful in identifying what types of economic crimes most involve cyber 
technologies, there are a number of issues with the data. First, the level of cyber-
involvement within categories varies significantly in terms of initial contact. For 
example, within advance-fee payments, first contact method for lottery scams 
suggests 8% cyber-involvement; dating scams involve fewer cases but suggest 88% 
cyber-involvement. Similarly, lender loan fraud represents nearly14% of all advance-
fee payments but the data suggests only 17% cyber-involvement on first contact 
method.  
The second issue is that it is not immediately apparent which offences are cyber-
enabled and which are cyber-dependent. It also does not provide sufficient data to 
develop horizontal or vertical analyses of perpetrators, specialisms, networks or 
interactions, or information sources for exploitation (although this clearly does exist in 
terms of repeat victimisation).  
It is possible to identify which types of fraud are most lucrative for the fraudster (i.e. 
where the most money is lost by the victim). From this data it is possible to calculate 
the median financial losses by the main categories of fraud (medians have been 
calculated as they generate less distortion of the data than the figures alone or 
mean averages, though there is still potential for inaccuracies). This data is 
presented in Table 4.4. It highlights that, in Q4 2014, the most money was lost to 
fraudsters through pension fraud, business trading fraud, financial investments, and 
bankruptcy and insolvency fraud.  
These levels of reported losses confirm the earlier assessments that fraud continues to 
involve significant costs to individuals and business. However, the third issue 
highlighted by the data is that there is no direct correlation between the volume of 
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 cases and the value of financial losses. Similarly, there is no correlation between 
either of these and the level of cyber-involvement in a fraud. 
Table 4.4: Median amounts given to fraudster by victim (Q4 2014) 
Fraud type Estimated loss to 
fraudsters per victim33 
Pension fraud £38,974 
Business trading fraud £28,609 
Financial investments £21,534 
Bankruptcy and insolvency £20,000 
Fraudulent applications for grants from government-funded 
organisations 
£11,500 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust £8,100 
Corporate fraud £3,869 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) fraud £3,298 
False accounting £2,000 
Other regulatory fraud £2,000 
Banking and credit industry fraud £1,721 
Insurance fraud £1,084 
Advance-fee payments £784 
Computer misuse crime £536 
Fraud by failing to disclose information £440 
None of the above £420 
All charity fraud £390 
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) fraud £281 
Non-investment fraud £274 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) £112 
 
The fourth issue with the data concerns the level of impact and harm of the fraud. 
The data provides some useful graded indications of the impact upon the victim,34 
which provides an understanding of the victims’ perspectives and thus helps to 
prioritise action. This analysis is presented in Table 4.5. It shows that the types of fraud 
with the most impact on the ‘victims’ are: Pyramid or Ponzi schemes, followed by 
dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit, fraud by abuse of position of trust and then 
pension frauds. By comparison, offline retail fraud has the lowest impact on victims. 
Again, the degree of cyber-involvement associated with each type of offence is 
highly variable.  
33 The table illustrates the amounts lost to fraudsters per victim. It is estimated by using the median 
because the averages are skewed by large standard deviations, and often estimations of loss. The 
advance-fee payments, for example, many of which are cyber-enabled, are numerous and yield 
relatively small amounts to fraudsters. The data field is skewed because of some large entries, so, to 
correct for these, the median has been used to demonstrate the difference. 
34 The range of data collected from reporters of crime is (i) ‘Concerned about the fraud but it has not 
impacted on health or financial well-being’; (ii) ‘Minor – only a small impact on either health or financial 
well-being’; (iii) ‘Significant – impacting on health or financial well-being’; (iv) ‘Severe – have received 
medical treatment as a result of this crime and/or at risk of bankruptcy’. There is an ‘other’ category, 
which is where the impact is either unknown or not deemed relevant to reporting the case. 
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 Table 4.5: Fraud impact levels by severity, Q4 2014 
Fraud type % of 
severe 
Harm 
factor 
% cyber-
involvement 
Pyramid or Ponzi schemes 74% 2.87 24% 
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit 73% 2.73 11% 
Other financial investment 70% 2.77 17% 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust 70% 2.76 6% 
Rental fraud 68% 2.70 74% 
Pension fraud committed on pensions 67% 2.80 8% 
Lender loan fraud 66% 2.68 17% 
Dating scam 64% 2.65 88% 
Other regulatory fraud 62% 2.67 31% 
Bankruptcy and insolvency 60% 2.80 17% 
 
The fifth issue concerns where the emphasis of a cyber-related law enforcement 
response should be placed. Those categories reflecting the biggest losses – such as 
pension, business trading and financial investment frauds – are areas where cyber-
enablement or cyber-dependency was not an obvious significant factor. Those 
offences with significant cyber-involvement seem to vary in both number of cases, 
average loss and likelihood of realistic levels of recovery (where such data is 
available), as shown in Table 4.6. The data also shows that much of the financial loss 
of frauds is unlikely to be recovered for the victims. 
Table 4.6: Estimated median amounts lost to, and recovered from, fraudsters by 
highest levels of cyber-involvement,35 Q4 2014 
Fraud type (sub-categories) % of cyber-
involvement 
Estimated 
median loss 
per victim  
Estimated 
median 
recovery 
per victim 
Dating scam 88% £2,595 
(n=528) 
£1,700 
(n=27) 
Online shopping and auctions 86% £210 
(n=9,329) 
£160 
(n=483) 
Counterfeiting cashiers’ cheques 77% Not known £305 (n=36) 
Rental fraud 74% £980 (n=603) £700 (n=28) 
Ticket fraud 72% £450 (n=897) £528 (n=32) 
Computer virus/malware/spyware 71% £100 (n=191) £132 (n=48) 
Denial of service attack 55% £605 (n=6) £6 (n=1) 
Mandate fraud 54% £9,820       
(n=682) 
£3,845 
(n=32) 
 
35 The number of cases may differ because: (i) the recoveries may be from a different time period to 
the losses; (ii) there are fewer recoveries than losses because there are simply fewer recoveries, 
recoveries from any given set of losses may arise in subsequent time periods, or there may be 
inaccuracies in the reporting process (e.g. the losses may be overestimated, or the person who lost the 
money may not know that it was recovered, say by someone else such as a bank). 
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 Finally, and conversely, Table 4.7 shows that the data suggests that those areas 
where the greater (mean or median) amounts are likely to be recovered are in the 
business or public sectors (such as DWP, HMRC, business trading fraud or false 
accounting) where cyber-involvement is low (the highest level of cyber-involved first 
contact method was less than 16%).  
Table 4.7: Average amounts (median and mean) recovered from fraudsters, Q4 2014 
 Amount recovered  
Fraud type Median Mean N 
Financial investments £7,107 £39,958 150 
Banking and credit industry fraud £1,621 £47,542 966 
Corporate fraud £988 £35,863 47 
Pension fraud £24,244 £30,904 10 
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) fraud £40,141 £40,141 2 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust £1,629 £20,882 30 
 
Evidently, the picture is complex and the data highlights the different considerations 
that policing approaches need to make. However, overall, the data is useful in 
providing a clear indication of which crimes have the greatest levels of cyber-
involvement and the relative scale of that involvement in contemporary fraud. This 
initial assessment of three months’ reports to Action Fraud suggests that of cyber-
related frauds reported, just over a third (34%) are cyber-assisted, half (50%) are 
cyber-enabled and just under a sixth (15%) are cyber-dependent (see Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8: Cyber-involvement 
 Numbers % of all % of cyber-involvement 
Cyber-assisted 30,759 28.8% 34.2% 
Cyber-enabled 45,293 42.5% 50.4% 
Cyber-dependent 13,859 13.0% 15.4% 
Not applicable 16,773 15.7%  
Total 106,681 100.0% 100.0% 
4.2.2. Reported fraud by UK industry bodies 
Data from industry bodies shows a considerable rise in reported fraud (though 
caution should be taken about earlier periods, since reporting and recording 
standards have changed in the interval).36 Nevertheless, it is notable that the 
number of fraud offences reported by industry is greater in total than the number of 
recorded frauds (see Table 4.9), since they are reported direct to the NFIB rather 
than via Action Fraud. 
  
36 ‘Crime in England and Wales’, ONS, 2015. 
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 Table 4.9: Fraud offences reported by UK industry bodies to NFIB, 2013/1437 
 
Fraud type  Cifas FFA UK Total  
Banking and credit industry fraud 181,737 100,462 282,199 
Cheque, plastic card and online bank 
accounts (not PSP)38  
121,565 100,462 222,027 
Application fraud (excluding mortgages) 55,525 0 55,525 
 Mortgage-related fraud  4,647 0 4,647 
Insurance-related fraud 9,484 0 9,484 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts)  41,862 0 41,862 
Business trading fraud 97 0 97 
Fraudulent applications for grants from charities 30 0 30 
Total  233,210  100,462  333,672  
4.3. Key issues 
4.3.1. Reviewing the data 
The available data and various surveys contribute to our understanding by providing 
a ‘snapshot’ insight into economic cybercrime, rather than either a narrative or even 
a basic analysis. It does show that there are significant levels of non-economic 
cyber-attacks as well as economic, and significant but specific types of cyber-
involved crimes; but that there is also a lack of information on the financial loss 
impacts of these attacks, as opposed to the number of incidents; and it shows 
differentiated patterns of cyber-involvement and the impact of targeted Prevent 
and Protect approaches (albeit primarily in the financial services sector) in reducing 
criminal attempts. There is also very limited information on perpetrator profiles and 
their organisation or interaction, information sources and approaches.  
Nevertheless, the Action Fraud data – in relation to fraud and fraud involving 
cybercrime – shows that: 
• Most reports (53%) were by a third party, followed by individual victims (32%) or 
businesses (14%).  
• The largest number of reports relate to banking and credit industry frauds (33%) 
and non-investment frauds (29%). Technology-related offences are less 
prevalent. The proportion recorded as computer misuse crime was relatively 
small (4%), though this is partly an artefact of the data counting rules. 
• Offenders mainly engaged with victims by telephone (35%), followed by websites 
(18%), in person (12%), letters or fax (11%) and email (8%). 
37 Source : National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. This data is not designated as National Statistics but, from 
2012/13, the table presents fraud data collated by NFIB from Cifas and FFA UK only and does not 
include fraud offences recorded by Action Fraud, which are now represented alongside police 
recorded crime. The data presented here is therefore not comparable with past published NFIB figures. 
38 A PSP is a payment service provider (e.g. PayPal, World Pay) that is not a bank, dealing in electronic 
money transfers. Fraud offences perpetrated using PSPs fall under 'Online shopping and auctions' (not 
collected by industry bodies); the Cifas telecom industry fraud figure is substantially higher than that 
seen in the year ending September 2013 bulletin. This is due to a correction of an error that was caused 
by the NFIB system not accurately picking up certain Cifas fraud types. 
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 • Cyber-enablers were identified in a fifth of cases and varied according to the 
modus operandi. They ranged from online sales (19%) to email (17%), hacking 
(11%) and social network media (9%). (We would expect some victims to have 
reported more than one fraud.) 
• Offenders (96%) and victims (98%) were mainly located in the UK39 with only a 
small percentage located outside the UK, distributed in small numbers globally 
(4% of offenders from 130 countries outside the UK and 2% of victims in 119 
countries outside the UK). 
• As the evidence highlights, broadly speaking there are two main groups affected 
by economic cybercrime: individuals or the ‘general public’, and businesses 
(which includes companies, banks and industries). A third relevant group is 
government entities, but they seldom report via Action Fraud and are not 
members of Cifas, so data pertaining to government entities is not explored here. 
Indeed, frauds against government departments are no longer collated or 
published centrally. In many cases, trust itself can be the ‘victim’ – which has 
broader social impacts, beyond the scope of discussion here. 
4.3.2. Identifying financial losses 
One of the issues in the Action Fraud data is, where does the materiality of losses 
occur? Cyber-enabled fraud reflects much greater financial loss than cyber-
dependent crimes, whose losses are more likely to be incurred through payment for 
business disruption and recovery.  
The definition and measurement of actual financial losses in the data require much 
greater refinement to provide an accurate measure, if any law enforcement 
response is to be predicated on cost as well as complexity. The main problem, 
however, is getting an accurate assessment; this is due to inconsistencies with data 
entry. First, it may be difficult to define and categorise the crime and to discover the 
actual loss. For example, there could be a reported loss which, upon examination, 
appears to be a crank call or a lottery scam rather than a real loss. In a few cases, 
victims have reported lottery scams where they have been told that they have won 
£10 million or more – which is recorded as the loss sum in some cases – but where the 
actual loss is usually a much smaller fee to release the monies, say £200. The fraud 
here is not the lottery winnings (which were always illusory) but the alleged fee 
extracted from the victim for (apparently) converting the currency and transferring 
the amount from the bank. The figures are not wholly representative of actual losses, 
but they are broadly indicative of the impacts of different forms of victimisation.  
This highlights some of the complexities with accurately measuring financial losses 
from frauds, particularly where the data is taken from self-reporting mechanisms. 
4.3.3. Identifying the cyber component 
The Action Fraud reporting system, as the first centralised, national reporting structure 
for economic crimes, is undoubtedly pioneering and hugely important. 
However, there are still a number of challenges raised by the system, not least 
because it is still in its early stages of implementation. The Action Fraud data is 
39 The victim location is explicable in relation to Action Fraud’s role as a UK reporting body and the 
Home Office counting rules. The offender location may reflect (mistaken) victim perceptions of where 
they believe the offenders to be. 
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 imperfect, primarily because it is intended to be used by law enforcement for 
tactical law enforcement purposes. Some refinement is needed so that a wider 
range of people (including social scientists) can use the data to explore its strategic 
implications for crime, intelligence and policy purposes. The data input fields appear 
to have evolved yet remain limited in places because of the (intentional) functional 
changes in Action Fraud since its inception. On the positive side, the data and its 
collection process do provide a good basis for refinement and improvement in 
quality and quantity. As it stands, the data contains some useful information that 
can be used for analysis. Although imperfect, the sheer volume of data (at least 
300,000 reports per year) does mean that anomalies can be statistically eliminated, 
as long as they are not systemic.  
In relation to identifying the cyber component of reported economic crime, this is 
largely missing from the current reporting process as a standalone data field. There 
could, for example, be a cyber-flag, but the problem in applying this is that the 
crimes/frauds that use network technologies and ICT do not always start off as such. 
They tend to have at least two stages: the engagement with the victim and the 
actual fraud, including its laundering. Hard to capture (even for the victim) are 
occasions when the fraud involves different types of networked technology, such as 
VoIP, to enable offenders to engage with victims online. So, for example, to infect a 
computer with a remote access Trojan (to connect it to a botnet or to steal financial 
and personal information); or to con the victim into thinking that they are speaking 
to a bank when they phone back. Later on in the process of the fraud, the fraudsters 
may also need to go offline in order to access the fraud money, for example 
through a money mule or financial transfer. There also seems to be a large 
difference in victim profile between businesses, single investors (SMEs through to 
pension plans) and everyday frauds linked to common purchasing practices. The 
figures here can skew findings, so arguably a filter of sorts is needed.  
The volume of cyber-enabled or cyber-dependent economic crime indicated by 
the data is significant; when cyber-assisted crime is included, the vast majority of 
reports to Action Fraud show some degree of cyber-involvement. The problem is 
actually capturing the essence of the crime because many start online until a victim 
is hooked; then the fraud goes offline. Other crimes stay online all of the time, for 
example, many dating scams and some other advance-fee payments, and most 
computer misuse crimes.  
4.4. The data: key questions for further consideration  
Aside from the issues concerned with identifying actual losses or the location of 
multiple perpetrators, the data does emphasise a number of key considerations that 
will require greater attention as the basis for determining any law enforcement 
response under the Four Ps Model: 
• There is a high level of cyber-involvement in reported cases of fraud but there is 
no established pattern of what crimes are cyber-involved or who carries them 
out. 
• Cyber-involvement is an elastic term, given its role among a number of other 
media in initiating and perpetrating frauds. 
• Cybercrime for gain is significant, much more significant than perceptions of non-
economic cybercrimes but much less in terms of volume of attempts or reported 
cases. 
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 • Financial losses are substantial by case and by crime, but there are significant 
variations – not all economic cybercrime results in significant losses and not all 
crimes involve ICT. 
• Even in those industries with established Prevent and Protect approaches, such 
as financial services, the level of cybercrime remains high. 
• The level of recovery of financial loss is relatively low. 
The key point from the data is that what appears to be the main perception or fear 
of cybercrime relates to denial of access, disruption and loss of data and identifiers; 
few economic cybercrimes result in actual immediate and direct financial loss (other 
than time expended on putting things right). Action Fraud data by its nature 
addresses a very different dataset since nearly all involve financial loss. What we see 
is a significant level of high-volume, often low-value economic cybercrime with 
varying degrees of severity and harm but where the cyber component varies by 
crime. It is clear that the number of cases with cyber-involvement is significant but 
there are a number of gaps in the information; for example, we know little of who 
and where the perpetrators are, and the links between them and their crimes, 
degree of specialisation and targeting, etc. It is not always clear whether victims are 
businesses or individuals, and this makes it harder to plan responses on the basis of 
the data. 
The data does address some significant policy- and police-related issues within in the 
volume-value-category-cyber matrix. While this does not offer a clear response 
focus, it does underline that volume economic cybercrime tends to target 
individuals, while organisations suffer the greater losses (although they are also more 
likely to recover some of those losses). It is clear that the current approach to non-
cyber fraud would exclude investigations in a significant number of Action Fraud 
cases, in terms of volume and level of losses. We might hope that the data would tell 
us whether OCGs were involved, but unfortunately it is seldom sufficiently clear-cut 
to do so. Nor does it help us with the precise context of the use of cyber in the 
crimes. So it is not merely whether or not a differentiated response is required at 
national and local levels but also whether the main drivers of such a response 
require a technical-led investigative capability to determine the Four Ps emphasis by 
volume, loss, harm, perpetrator or deterrence. Certainly, the steady decline in police 
resources for high-volume, low-value fraud where there is no cyber component 
would imply that unless there is a good chance of conviction and confiscation, the 
effective pursuit of economic cybercrimes will not happen. 
4.5. The impact of economic cybercrime on individuals/the general public 
Individuals are often ‘targeted’ by criminals for two principal reasons. First, the level 
of technological sophistication required to defraud individuals is typically less than 
that required to attack an organisation or government. Second, the proceeds from 
these crimes are seldom enough on a crime-by-crime basis to merit a major 
investigative response, unless they are identified by the media or police as especially 
deserving such support (Blakeslee, 2012; Doig & Levi, 2012; Levi, 1992, 2013).  
Though individual thefts often involve relatively small amounts in financial value, 
fraudsters who are successful ‘en masse’ can make significant financial gains if they 
are not stopped (Wall, 2007a:40). For example, in money laundering, ‘smurfs’ – who 
make several small transactions rather than one large one – are used to avoid the 
threshold amounts set up to identify suspicious transactions (Florêncio & Herley, 
2010). Targeting several individuals is fairly low-risk in terms of the likelihood of action 
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 being taken, especially if no systematic intelligence is gathered that links individual 
events and the highest common factors.  
There are several techniques used to target individuals. Fake websites which mimic 
legitimate ones and malware, such as key trackers and Trojans, are used to covertly 
gather personal data, which can be sold on the underground market and exploited 
for further financial gain (Ablon et al., 2014; Asgher et al., 2014; Cross, Smith & 
Richards, 2014). Individuals may become targets of fraudsters through self-selection 
by responding to a phishing scam, a mule scam or a dating scam (McGuire & 
Dowling, 2013; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). Personal attacks may make use of social 
engineering techniques, whereby the attackers manipulate targets psychologically, 
encouraging atypical behaviour such as sending increasing amounts of money to 
the attacker, providing the attacker with personal information, or with unauthorised 
access to accounts or computer systems (Ghosh & Turrini, 2010; Hutchings, 2013; 
Kshetri, 2010; Ståhlberg, 2008).  
Finally, there is a need to consider the individuals who are vulnerable as a result of 
engaging in deviant behaviour online, and are thus selected as targets by others 
(Lauritsen, Sampson & Laub, 1991; Singer, 1986; Wolfgang, Ferracuti & Mannheim, 
1967). This could include those who download pirated materials which are infected 
by malware; complacent actors, such as money mules, who are duped into 
facilitating a scam; and more malevolent actors, such as the botmasters who 
operate botnets, thus making themselves the targets of their competitors (Bossler & 
Holt, 2009; Dittrich, 2012; Gragido et al., 2012; Kikuchi, Matsuo & Terada, 2011).  
4.5.1. How could policing help individuals?  
Reports from software suppliers and computer security organisations highlight the 
issues arising from using no or little antivirus protection. Despite the simplicity of use, 
up to a quarter of UK computer owners do not have current antivirus installed. This 
should become a smaller problem over time as software packages integrate 
security systems, such as Windows 8/10 which come with Windows Defender. A 
number of antivirus packages are free, so cost alone should not be a factor. There 
have also been other initiatives, such as Blackfin’s pop-up workshops with industry 
and law enforcement, and the local ‘web constables’ in Estonia and Finland. 
However, the increasing use of internet-connected devices in addition to computers 
(tablets, e-book readers etc.), which seldom have countermeasures pre-installed, 
means that malware has become increasingly problematic. There is some 
recognition of these issues, for example Cifas40 and FFA UK41 offer useful advice to 
help individuals avoid becoming a victim of identity fraud and other scams.  
While efforts to educate the general public about internet dangers have improved, 
individuals who fail to adhere to best security practices can become profitable 
targets for motivated and skilled offenders (Pratt, Holtfreter & Reisig, 2010). This is 
particularly true of relatively new internet users (Gragido et al., 2012), but it also 
applies to more experienced users, and to users who make their own assessment of 
what information is at risk or what type of security is suitable. Consequently, more 
effort needs to be made to create uniform, centralised or market solutions to 
encourage and support individuals, particularly novice users, into engaging in good 
40 See: www.cifas.org.uk/avoid_being_a_victim.  
41 See: www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/%5Cconsumer-landing.asp. 
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 security practices, as well as providing them with guardianship against grooming 
and offering support if that guardianship fails.  
A starting point is to educate individual internet users about the dangers they face, 
particularly with regard to scams that use social engineering techniques to hook 
victims, for example via offers made by email or on internet dating sites, as well as by 
telephone using VoIP (Hutchings, 2013). This might include the following areas of 
activity: 
• A Cyber Security Protect Police Officer could identify and assess individuals who 
might be vulnerable, delivering appropriate awareness events to various 
communities and identifying partners. They could also act collectively as ‘public 
interest’ lobbyists, persuading banks and other financial services that provide 
online facilities to mandate the use of service provider software for all financial 
transactions; and they could offer to undertake impact assessments of new 
products or services from an individual user’s perspective. 
• While useful, having a single point of responsibility in itself is unlikely to make much 
impact on the public in general. Therefore, attention must be given to 
developing coherent strategies to warn individuals, drawing on issues relevant to 
them.  
• When addressing the deeper challenge of individuals’ susceptibility to social 
engineering, reducing levels of malware invasion is only the first stage of 
protection. Investment in crime prevention education does not have a good 
history in terms of serious evaluation, but the sheer variety of potential victims and 
enablers make it hard to target prevention efforts. Tailoring and targeting 
messaging to particular groups, picking up on their specific vulnerabilities, is key.  
• There is a need to understand how and why different groups use the internet and 
for what purpose; targeted marketing and communication; persuading partners 
such as banks to require appropriate levels of installed controls; partnership 
working with associations already engaged with groups (from schools to Citizens 
Advice, to signal events such as university and college enrolment weeks etc.). 
Monitoring such delivery is vital and will require appropriate funding.  
• At the same time, for those who fall victim to online scams or attacks, there 
needs to be a better system in place to provide them with support when they 
report the crimes. This should include those who have been reimbursed for their 
direct financial losses and are reported in bulk by FFA UK, and efforts (at a local 
or regional level) to go after those who engage in low-value but high-frequency 
crimes (Cross & Bradshaw, 2014; Jeffray, 2014).  
4.6. The impact of economic cybercrime on organisations 
Any business or organisation can become a target for cybercrime, though ICT 
security companies, financial institutions and online gambling outfits are particularly 
common targets due to the nature of their commercial and business activities 
(Botezatu, 2011, 2012; McMullan & Rege, 2010; Mickelberg, Schive & Pollard, 2014). 
The types of crimes which affect businesses vary considerably – often reflecting their 
business activities as well as their size – but include extortion (for example via 
ransomware); misrepresentation (such as bank mandate fraud); theft (of both data 
and money); illegal access; and system interference (Calderoni, 2010; Mickelberg, 
Schive & Pollard, 2014).  
In 2012, 8% of business premises (covering the accommodation and food services, 
wholesale and retail, manufacturing, and transportation and storage sectors) had 
experienced at least one type of online crime during the past 12 months (McGuire & 
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 Dowling, 2013). However, there are substantial variations in the nature of the cyber-
attack for each sector and the reasons why, as well as whether financial gain is the 
sole or primary intention of the perpetrator. Some cyber-dependent crime against 
big business is to facilitate other economic cyber-enabled crime; data security in 
particular is a mainstream concern for large businesses and organisations (Jeffray, 
2014). 
Government entities often fall victim to the same crimes that businesses face. 
However, there is greater potential for economic disruption, and greater costs in 
responding to and/or repairing damage from attacks. Compromising or controlling 
the government infrastructure – particularly those services that make up the UK’s 
‘critical national infrastructure’42 – can result in large economic losses for the state 
and potential gains for the perpetrators, not only from monetisation of stolen data 
but also from the unauthorised use of government infrastructure (Brenner, 2010). 
There are also likely to be indirect, knock-on impacts such as hindrances to 
economic growth, and a reluctance to move operations online, thus reducing 
overall efficiency and opportunities for innovation (Detica & The Office of Cyber 
Security and Information Assurance, 2011). 
It is difficult to estimate from data the prevalence and damage of economic 
cybercrimes to organisations, due to systemic under-reporting by victims who are 
reluctant to disclose breaches in their cyber security.43 Organisations fear that 
disclosing security breaches will result in a drop in consumer trust (Brenner, 2010; 
Heinonen, Holt & Wilson, 2012; Wall, 2007b). Nevertheless, what data there is 
underpins the need for breaches to business to be taken seriously, given the value of 
financial loss, which is greater than for crimes against individuals. Businesses often 
lose the most in economic terms from cybercrime, particularly through high levels of 
intellectual property theft and espionage. Also of note is that the impact of 
economic cybercrime does not fall equally across industry sectors. Although 
government understandably continues to prioritise protecting the critical national 
infrastructure, providers of software and computer services, financial services, 
pharmaceutical and biotech, and electronic and electrical equipment are at 
particular risk from cybercrime, including corruption by and social engineering of 
insiders as well as hacking of sensitive commercial data. Detica &The Office of 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance (2011) argue that, without urgent 
measures to prevent the haemorrhaging of valuable intellectual property, the cost 
of cybercrime is likely to rise even further in the future as UK businesses increase their 
reliance on ICT. Since then, the hacking of IP in various forms has markedly 
ascended the political agenda. 
We also acknowledge that, in addition to private actors, the cyber threat to 
governments may come from other states. While outside the scope of this research, 
the point highlights that the internet is a globally shared commodity yet there is no 
42 The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) comprises nine sectors: 
communications, emergency services, energy, financial services, food, government, health, transport 
and water. Criticality is determined by whether the loss or compromise of the sector would have a 
major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe 
economic or social consequences or to loss of life. For more information, see: www.cpni.gov.uk/. 
43 Although, in the US, but not yet in the UK, organisations whose security breaches result in personal 
data loss are legally mandated to inform individuals and offer them free protection via credit reference 
agencies. 
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 clear-cut governance model for cyberspace, nor is there a dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
4.7. How could policing help organisations? 
4.7.1. Large organisations and businesses 
Government and public sector organisations have recognised the importance of 
safeguarding against cybercrime in terms of protecting the integrity and 
confidentiality of both data and ICT portals. The government has allocated 
£860 million until 2016 to establish a National Cyber Security Programme following 
the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy. That funding has gone to government 
departments, agencies and some other non-governmental organisations. These 
include the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) which supports the 
organisations that provide essential infrastructure services. Modest sums have gone 
to the police and into protecting consumers, beyond substantial funding for Cyber 
Streetwise44 (a government-funded campaign aimed at changing the way people 
protect themselves from falling victim to cybercriminals) whose impact remains to 
be evaluated. 
Many of the frauds which affect businesses are fairly well understood as a result of 
analyses by the major financial consulting firms and membership organisations such 
as the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. The difficulty for businesses is 
recognising the signs or risk areas, investing the resources and communicating them 
effectively to time-pressed staff. Although the consequences may fall in the first 
instance upon individual account holders, businesses (and sometimes governments) 
are generally liable for security breaches which lead to mass leaks of personal 
financial data.  
Encouraged by the CPNI and the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
programme, but acting independently, some of the worst-affected sectors have 
already learned the advantages of pooling data and actions in response to the 
collective threat of economic cybercrime.45 For example, this happened in the 
payment card sector in the 1990s following a large rise in offline and online fraud 
(Levi, Bissell & Richardson, 1991), though mobile payments remains an area of 
significant risk. The British Bankers’ Association and groups within it have increasingly 
experimented (and continue to do so) with data integration and data sharing to 
44 See: www.cyberstreetwise.com/. 
45 In addition to informal, organic arrangements, the first formal information exchanges were 
established in 2003. As the CPNI notes, trust is built up slowly. Representatives at information exchanges 
are expected to attend all meetings, and generally only two named members from the same 
organisation are allowed. Substitutes cannot attend. Current (2015) information exchanges include: 
ADMIE – Aerospace and Defence Manufacturers Information Exchange; CIPSIE – Communications 
Industry Personnel Security Information Exchange; CNSSIE – Civil Nuclear Sector SCADA Information 
Exchange; FSIE – Financial Services Information Exchange; MSPIE – Managed Service Providers 
Information Exchange; NIXIE – Northern Ireland Cross-Sector Information Exchange; NSIE – Network 
Security Information Exchange; PIIE – Pharmaceutical Industries Information Exchange; SCSIE – SCADA 
and Control Systems Information Exchange; SPIIE – Space Industries Information Exchange; SRIE – 
Security Researchers Information Exchange; TSIE – Transport Sector Information Exchange; VSIE – Vendor 
Security Information Exchange; WSIE – Water Security Information Exchange (see more at: 
www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-we-work-with/Information-exchanges/#sthash.31IUdVan.dpuf). 
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 enhance their speed of response to attacks in the form of DDoS, hacking and insider 
corruption/IP data theft. Similarly, major successes against volume fraud have been 
achieved following voluntary or organised data sharing and integration within the 
credit sector (particularly by Cifas), the insurance sector (via the Insurance Fraud 
Bureau) and local government (through the Audit Commission’s National Fraud 
Initiative, before its disbandment). There are many other fraud reduction initiatives, 
omitted here as they are not cyber-related. 
The growth of DDoS and malware attacks on relatively well defended banks has 
given impetus to cross-industry sharing, especially where there are genuine fears that 
the attacks might bring down the institution or have wider sector ramifications. There 
has been significant investment in analysis and protection services offered by 
financial consulting firms, and by a plethora of technology and consulting firms, pre- 
and post-cybercrime events. 
Overall, the needs of large organisations are predicated on information sharing and 
police guidance – including the development and use of technical standards and 
common taxonomies to make information sharing easier and more efficient – on 
emerging threats and trends, around which they can develop their responses. We 
would expect major incidents to prompt a police response which should have an 
appropriate level of resource and expertise to provide assurance, in order to 
increase business confidence in the security of the internet and offer a credible 
deterrent to criminals.  
4.7.2. Small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
There has been less governmental and cross-sector investment in SME security as 
firms focus on those who are willing and able to pay for cyber security. This 
‘willingness to pay’ model does not correspond to the impact of cybercrime as a 
ratio of profits, turnover or assets, which is likely to be more significant for smaller than 
larger businesses. A 2015 report by the London Assembly’s Police and Crime 
Committee notes that banks are reluctant to refund SMEs money lost through online 
fraud, especially if linked to ‘customer error’; though, of course, the estimated 
likelihood of crime against large versus small businesses is also relevant. 
One of the significant challenges for SMEs is a lack of awareness, knowledge or 
understanding of the issue – unpublished survey research by Cyber Streetwise on 
1,000 SMEs states that two-thirds do not consider their business to be vulnerable to 
cyber-attack, and just 16% say that improving their cyber security is a top priority for 
2015. A quarter (26%) of respondents believe that only firms that accept online 
payments can be hacked; another 22% said they did not think that small companies 
were targets for hackers. A key problem for business in general, large and small, is 
staff not knowing how to identify easily when they ought to be suspicious of an 
email.46 Research into good practice suggests that: (i) warning text should include a 
clear and non-technical description of potential negative outcome(s); or (ii) an 
informed direct warning should come from a credible position of authority. Concrete 
warnings are much more effective than vague ones; soft powers of persuasion work 
much better than harsh ones (Modic & Anderson, 2014).  
46 See, for example: www.cpni.gov.uk/advice/Personnel-security1/Social-engineering-Understanding-
the-threat/; and: www.getsafeonline.org/information-security/social-engineering/.  
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 The government has sought to counter this risk-taking through greater information 
provision, for example highlighting that the average cost of major breaches 
outweigh the costs of security.47 There are an increasing number of short guides48 
and free training available for SMEs, though the impact of these is difficult to 
evaluate due to a lack of data. Though useful, this approach of information sharing 
is persuasive only if the organisation understands that it is likely to become a victim 
of such attacks. Of course, risk assessments of the likelihood and impacts of potential 
cyber-attack versus the costs of security will vary widely for each organisation. It may 
be hard to shift this subjectively estimated risk. However, irrespective of this, relatively 
cheap security measures are available and should be taken.  
In addition to raising awareness and educating staff, a key step to helping SMEs 
address economic cybercrime threats is to make sure messaging is presented in an 
accessible way for employees. Those we interviewed agreed that SMEs were the 
most time-pushed to provide cybercrime advice to employees, especially for those 
without a dedicated ICT department, and it is therefore vital to frame such advice 
correctly for easy comprehension. Much of the effort made by Get Safe Online and 
Cyber Streetwise (both free government-funded online security advice services) has 
gone into creating relatively clear graphic communications, both for individuals and 
for SMEs, to drive home key messages more effectively.49 One promising initiative 
was undertaken in connection with Research Council UK’s Partnership for Conflict, 
Crime and Security Research. Young entrepreneurs were given some IP and other 
cyber-protection awareness training during a workshop, in addition to their regular 
management skills, and although the longer-term effects are unknown, building in 
this sort of practical cyber risk management at an early but salient stage appears to 
be the sort of initiative that is needed. 
Providing effective solutions for SMEs is also essential. PROOF is a free online filing 
service via Companies House, which seeks to protect firms from the risk of identity 
theft. Once signed up, anyone not possessing authentication codes issued by 
Companies House will be unable to file documents for the company, for example 
changing addresses or bank accounts. Such websites can offer some cyber security 
assurance in terms of their own initiatives. 
As well as these approaches, there is a trend for mandating cyber security measures 
as a private sector contract issue. For example, current procurement rules require 
those tendering for central government contracts to pass the CyberEssentials or 
CyberEssentials Plus certification, though this rule applies to only a modest proportion 
of SMEs.50 Also salient is the growing awareness among larger companies of the 
need to secure their supply chain, as ICT vulnerabilities in the chain can compromise 
their own security. Nevertheless, Cyber Streetwise’s study found that 22% of SMEs 
“don’t know where to start”. Rather than a shortage of information or advice 
sources, it is perhaps the wide range of advice sources, including overlapping 
official websites that poses challenges. Efforts to streamline sources and make 
advice consistent, to maximise effectiveness, may therefore be of value.  
47 See: www.gov.uk/government/news/cyber-security-myths-putting-a-third-of-sme-revenue-at-risk. 
48 One example is available here: www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-what-small-
businesses-need-to-know. 
49 For example, ‘The Rough Guide to Online Safety’. See: www.getsafeonline.org/businesses/. There is 
no consensus among experts about which messages are accurate.  
50 Also see LCCI (2014) for some trenchant criticisms of how the scheme operated. 
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 In terms of identifying gaps for law enforcement, a starting point for SMEs will be to 
replicate the information offered to individual internet users about the threats and 
risks they face, and the options available to them, including delivering appropriate 
awareness events to the various communities and to identify partners.  
The police will also have a formal role in terms of coordinating the provision of 
protective security and preparedness advice as well as receipt of allegations of 
criminal activity. The key question, however, across all three ‘victim’ groups – 
individuals, large organisations and SMEs – is, where would targeted interventions 
have, in policing terms, the biggest impact? As we will explore later, there may also 
be issues of desert and need: some we interviewed suggested that those who 
cannot afford to adopt security measures should be prioritised for police help. 
However, where victims can cause social harm to others in the supply chain or to the 
nation’s economic interests, they cannot be ignored for prevention, even if they are 
denied criminal investigation. 
4.8. Summary 
This chapter has drawn on an extensive literature review on economic cybercrime 
as well as Action Fraud data. It notes that the evidence base is not as robust as it 
should or could be in order to distinguish variations in the economic dimensions of 
cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crime or to identify the frequency and the 
nature of their impacts on businesses, government and the public. Nevertheless, and 
despite these issues, the available research and data, if treated with due care, 
could play an important role in understanding economic cybercrime. The Action 
Fraud data has the potential to provide for an evidence-based law enforcement 
response. More work, however, is required to make this a reality.  
This chapter has also highlighted that a very varied response to the threat of 
economic cybercrime is required of businesses, government and individuals, and 
thus to their engagement with law enforcement if they wish to respond to specific 
categories of victims and potential victims. While there are some similarities in terms 
of the challenges faced, there are differences in the ability of each of these three 
groups to address the challenges. 
Larger organisations often have dedicated ICT departments and are better 
informed of the risks and threats. They are also likely to be able to afford the 
appropriate resourcing responses. For them, the issue is less of awareness and 
education, or even of having access to law enforcement resources to investigate 
and prosecute fraud, than it is an issue of access to guidance on threat and risk 
profiles and types so that they can design and deploy their own responses. Larger 
organisations can leave law enforcement agencies to take action against 
identifiable groups who initiate the more significant or recurring cyber-attacks 
against them (although whether this responsibility lies with technologically-savvy 
economic crime departments or dedicated cybercrime units requires further 
consideration). The insurance industry’s Insurance Fraud Bureau, the City of London 
Police’s Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED), and the Dedicated Card 
and Payment Crime Unit, in sharing information, joint working and targeted 
operations, are examples of added-value to a relatively well organised sector. 
However, they would be of much less use as a response for smaller organisations. 
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 For SMEs, dedicated awareness and education are required. However, in an 
atmosphere in which many smaller businesses are suspicious of government (and to 
some extent of larger businesses, too), it may not be easy to find someone who is 
seen as having across-the-board credibility to issue such warnings.51 A combination 
of experience to increase perceptions of risks and having mitigations/solutions in 
place is likely to help overcome the scepticism barrier for the majority (and would 
have equal relevance for individuals). It is important here to consider the need for 
‘knock-on’ effects, such as through the supply chain, which can generate systemic 
weaknesses if not addressed. It may also be important to supplement such responses 
with specialist guidance and advice on a planned basis – but that raises questions 
about who else should be involved and what law enforcement’s role should be. We 
turn to this issue in the next chapter. 
 
  
51 An issue in counter-terrorism and counter-drugs efforts also. 
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 5. The implications of economic cybercrime for policing 
This report has explored the nature of economic cybercrime and the impact it has 
had on two key groups, namely individuals and businesses (of all sizes). This chapter 
seeks to draw this analysis together and to explore how the various issues highlighted 
have implications for policing approaches to economic cybercrime, and what 
these might be. It goes on to review current policing approaches to consider how 
they can be developed to effectively reduce the risks of economic cyber-attack for 
individuals and businesses. This is done in the context of existing government strategy 
and, particularly, its CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, which has four components 
(the Four Ps Model):  
• Pursue organised criminals by prosecution and disruption;  
• Prevent people from becoming criminals;  
• Protect business and the public against serious and organised crime; and  
• Prepare for attacks by building post-event resilience to reduce the impact of 
crime as well as improve resilience for future prevention. 
5.1. Introduction 
Policing economic cybercrime involves a multiplicity of national and transnational 
actors intervening both before (Protect and Prevent) and after (Pursue and Prepare) 
criminal activity. As highlighted in chapter 4, economic cybercrime affects a range 
of actors, principally individuals or the ‘general public’, businesses and government; 
it also often affects different groups in different ways. Although historically economic 
crime and its impacts have not always been recognised by these groups – 
particularly among corporate boards (Levi, Morgan & Burrows, 2003) – this has 
begun to change. 
Following a spate of major cyber-attacks,52 an increasing number of businesses, 
especially but not exclusively in financial services, have begun to take information 
security very seriously. This is reflected in the rise in the number of jobs in cyber 
security53 and is evident from a study of CEO priorities,54 as well as in the general 
52 For financial services, a key ‘wake-up call’ was the attack on JP Morgan in 2014; if a relatively well 
defended bank could be attacked, it was time to take cyber security more seriously. But the regularity 
of attacks on all financial institutions has played an important part, showing that it is both potentially 
serious and regular. Globally, since 2005, more than 75 data breaches in which one million or more 
records were compromised have been publicly disclosed. The attacks on Home Depot and eBay in 
2014, and on Target at the end of 2013, illustrate an increase in attacks on retail and merchant data. 
The largest attacks have been on US retailers. In the US alone, over the period July 2005 to July 2015, 
over 853 million records (not individuals) were compromised from 4,569 data breaches made public 
(see: www.privacyrights.org/data-breach). The UK Information Commissioner’s Office does not supply 
data in the same way, but 1,414 data breaches were notified to it in 2014. In the year to April 2015, 
British financial institutions were investigated 585 times for data privacy breaches (see: Financial Times, 2 
June 2015), though it is not clear what such ‘investigations’ comprise. We are not suggesting that 
prosecutions are an appropriate measure of its performance, but the Information Commissioner’s 
Office has prosecuted 21 persons and companies over its entire history. 
53 No reliable aggregate data on cyber security jobs is available for the UK (and media reports often 
cite US data without noting that it is not UK data), but the banks and major financial advisory firms 
interviewed for this project had all conducted a major recruitment expansion. See: 
www.scmagazineuk.com/more-jobs-but-cyber-security-skills-gap-widens/article/340103/; for US data to 
end 2013, see: Burning Glass (2014).  
54 For rising CEO concern, especially in North America, see: www.pwc.com/us/en/ceo-survey/secure-
assets.jhtml.  
53 
 
                                              
 attention being paid to cybercrime by academia and the media. Individuals in all 
social strata are fearful of direct scams such as identity crimes, and many are willing 
to pay for tools such as antivirus software and (to a lesser extent) identity theft 
monitoring to provide protection.55 However, even simple messages about security 
are harder to apply in an online environment than offline (raising the question as to 
whether it is the message or the medium that is the issue),56 and action often follows 
a negative experience rather than being taken proactively.  
Cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent economic crimes harm the interests of all 
businesses, UK/regional government and individual consumers. The need for policing 
is unquestionable. In this context, the core issues now involve four questions: 
• Who within and outside policing should be involved and in what capacity? 
• What are the specific roles and responsibilities of the police and where should 
ownership lie in terms of tackling economic cybercrime? 
• What resources (in money and effort) will be considered worthwhile for greater 
cyber security?   
• How will that security be organised for and/or by the huge numbers of businesses 
and people that are (potentially) affected?  
Both in principle and in practice, there is uncertainty about what is expected from 
the police – and what it is reasonable to expect from them – in tackling economic 
cybercrime. The response to this conceptual problem may determine the extent to 
which there is a gap between the emerging fraud strategy and its delivery. 
Evidently, one strand of the effective policing of economic cybercrime involves 
Protect and Prepare measures, though the police are constrained from 
recommending particular products, and their specific skills as cybersecurity advisers 
are open to question. Another issue is whether the police should take on cybercrime 
roles where the objectives are less about preventing and investigating financial loss 
than they are about deterring those primarily involved in disruption, and so on, thus 
securing business continuity and delivery and supplementing in-house security 
arrangements. 
Moreover, such measures may not solve or even mitigate the problems they are 
designed to address. A further strand for consideration is how far the police can 
investigate economic cybercrimes that have international dimensions and where 
offenders are beyond practical reach. Even where the police can arrest offenders 
and disrupt cybercrime markets – often via the FBI and/or Europol EC3 – the effects 
may be short term. Perhaps this is too severe a test of effectiveness for many, since 
many police interventions may be largely symbolic, but it is reasonable to ask what 
economic cybercrime control functions, on the basis of the available evidence, are 
necessarily performed by sworn officers (rather than by PCSOs, volunteers or by the 
private sector), and what the impact of such operations is on the levels, types and 
organisational forms of criminality. These issues are themselves linked to data 
collection, recording and measurement to inform practice; an area that, as 
55 For a sceptical view on US identity theft protection, see: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/03/are-
credit-monitoring-services-worth-it/. 
56 It is instructive to note that the various websites giving guidance on identity theft/fraud – Cifas, Action 
Fraud, the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Metropolitan Police, the BBC, Get Safe Online and 
commercial companies such as Equifax and Experian – appear to confirm that cyber-related fraud is a 
crime that continues to rise (see: www.cifas.org.uk).  
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 discussed earlier in the report, faces a number of challenges and requires further 
consideration. 
The emerging 2015 strategy is very much focused on centralised organisation, given 
that the City of London Police can allocate its resources in collaboration with a 
national economic crime prevention centre, a national fraud prevention network 
and the National Police Coordinator for Economic Crime. It has also, in terms of the 
two identified strands of volume and of serious, organised fraud, a much clearer 
direction through the Economic Crime Command of the NCA, the regional Special 
Operations Units and Economic Crime Units. Centralisation is also evident in the 
forthcoming national prevention and awareness campaigns, although they should 
be tailored to local circumstances in ways that need to be developed. Much less 
clear is the intersection of locale and volume. Here the strategy suggests, under the 
Four Ps Model, that, in relation to Pursue: 
 “the nature of volume fraud, particularly when cyber-enabled, often from 
 overseas, means that it will not always be feasible for the police to investigate 
 and pursue an offender with the core aim of securing conviction and a 
 custodial sentence... public expectations and the ambitions of investigators 
 should therefore be managed accordingly.”  
In other components the strategy envisions roles for local forces that include victim 
support, local initiatives driven by local priorities and NFIB risk profiles, as well as 
delivery of locally tailored prevention campaigns, community engagement, 
championing prevention in force (e.g. all officers and staff with victim contact) and 
collaboration with local victim support services.  
As with many public policy issues, there is a tension between coherence and 
localism, but the approach is predominantly a top-down one. This has yet to 
recognise the very complex picture of crime patterns and the level of cyber-
involvement, the different ways in which individuals and businesses are affected by 
different types of economic cybercrime and under what circumstances. 
Understandably, there is a lack of clarity over offender types and interaction. 
Building on the issues presented here, there also needs to be a much more 
comprehensive assessment of what is currently being done to address and tackle 
economic cybercrime, the range of efforts and organisations required, the level and 
ownership of the resources required, and the context in which the responses are 
presented. The language of the Four Ps Model, for example, was met with confusion 
by most business people we interviewed who were not security professionals (and by 
some police officers, especially overseas). In part, we feel, this is because the model 
is designed with counter-terrorism in mind as opposed to helping potential victims to 
avoid the consequences of criminal activity. This chapter thus looks at the Four Ps 
Model in some detail and considers how the strategy may be refined and realigned 
to respond more effectively to the issues – and the four questions – it has identified. 
Given the strategy’s comments about the role of organised crime in cyber fraud, we 
also focus on volume cyber fraud. 
5.2. The police role in Protect 
The police currently play a fairly minor role in the Protect function against economic 
cybercrime. Given the range of potential victims in the general population and in 
business, they have no way of reaching this almost universal population of potential 
victims before they become actual victims. Government in general does play a role, 
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 and the private sector seeks to make profits from advertising better cyber security, 
as it does in other spheres of offline crime prevention.  
Clearly, this is both a marketing and service delivery issue. Governments have 
previously run campaigns in favour of specific safety requirements (whether the use 
of seat belts or the dangers of smoking) to ensure a general basic level of 
awareness. Such an approach may be essential to allow the police, as trusted 
guardians, to offer additional guidance on protective measures against economic 
cybercrime for business and individuals. Compulsory built-in antivirus with automatic 
updates on all ICT devices might be one way forward – but this would raise issues of 
whose security offerings are to be taken up, and by what criteria, as well as the fact 
that there are sometimes technical limitations to having built-in security. 
Understandably, banks have avoided engaging with this issue beyond providing 
free antivirus protection, due to the complexities. Despite such free offerings to their 
customers, a notable (though unpublished) proportion of individuals and businesses 
do not take it up (some, but presumably not all, because they already have other 
antivirus software installed). It could be argued that encrypted online banking and 
communications should be a compulsory precondition of internet banking as part of 
the reciprocity of the commercial arrangements. 
In addition to the general sources of information and guidance on what to do about 
cyber security, Coventry et al. (2014) and Ashenden & Sasse (2013) offer some useful 
advice on how to embed better security practices in the general population and 
business respectively. Using behavioural insights, Coventry et al. (2014) present a 
target-hardening and educative framework (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Setting up a preventative approach to economic cybercrimes 1 
Approach Actions 
Defaults – is it possible to 
make the secure option 
the default option and 
design in security from the 
start? 
 
• The UK cookie policy; the default should be opt-out 
• Security software should be installed and part of the initial 
set up not an optional extra 
• All programs with privacy and security access should be 
defaulted to secure 
• Websites should log out the user when they leave, not 
leave them open – or at least prompt the user to log 
out 
• Users should not go online with administration rights 
to prevent hidden programs executing without 
asking permission 
Salience – how can 
the information be 
made noticeable 
and relevant to the 
target audience? 
 
• Make security assessments easily visible and preferably 
at the point-of-vulnerability – a security monitor app 
• Personalise security messages – how has the 
individual improved, what risks are they open to 
(based on sites they visit)? 
• Give software ratings based on their security 
provisions – the UK has mandatory Security 
Performance Certificates for all websites 
operating within the UK 
Priming – how can we 
subconsciously influence 
users? 
 
• Build on the Internet Explorer anti-phishing green URL 
indicator and ensure that any insecure sites are more 
noticeable – actively interrupt the user 
• An active visual indicator of the current security level of 
the PC and the user – what is being downloaded on to 
their system etc. 
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 Further, a gap analysis may be necessary to understand what some sectors do or do 
not do and how far that is a consequence of past experience, size and sensitivity of 
the product or activity. For example, for (usually large) businesses, there are growing 
numbers of full service security firms that take care of cyber-risks on all platforms. 
Official neutrality to avoid recommending particular firms or products makes 
consumer choice harder to undertake – on what basis do non-experts choose 
between technically complex options? – but there is some kite-marking process 
supported by government (for example, the two levels of the Cyber Essentials 
badge). More importantly, and a lesson that the Cyber-security Information Sharing 
Partnership (CiSP) has understood, is that voluntary arrangements, conversation 
sharing, speed of exchange, demonstration of added-value, hard data sharing in 
real time and, especially, trust in the arrangements are important as the basis for 
partnership and engagement. CiSP has over 1,000 members and 3,000 people 
involved.  
5.3. The police role in Prevent 
Prevent is the mechanism used to attempt to ‘divert’ potential criminals from 
committing crimes. Some potential offenders can be identified from their role in chat 
rooms, social media and other forms of internet presence, but the level of threat 
they pose may vary considerably.57 If the evidence suggests that they may be 
reaching a serious threshold, then some disruption may be attempted. Some police 
officers interviewed for this project were sensitive to the risk of longer-term isolation 
from the labour market that might result from bringing minor offenders into the 
criminal justice system. Though HR and employee vetting functions may benefit from 
recent developments such as the Cifas Staff Fraud Database, the prediction of 
future harm from past conduct remains in an early stage of science at present. 
Though there is some security information in schools, colleges and universities, this is 
patchy, and issues around the morality of cyber-conduct or fraud, as well as the 
legal requirements for data protection under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the 
Data Protection Act 1998 receive little or no attention, either in general or in relation 
to ICT and other courses. However, resources available for a significant police or 
non-police role in reducing the risk of future cyber criminality are very modest, and 
since many of the threats come from regions overseas, those potential criminals or 
victims are not readily influenced by UK interests or by education here. This is an area 
of preventative intervention that needs to be worked on internationally if progress is 
to be made.  
5.4. The police role in Protect and Prepare: information and awareness 
The police are and need to remain partners with other organisations involved in both 
the Protect and Prepare roles. As with Police and Community Together (PACT), 
travel safety and other school- or community-based initiatives, the broader family of 
policing can both inform the agenda about threats and risks and also provide 
figures of authority to deliver the message to individuals and SMEs (larger 
organisations are already networked or have in-house expertise in this area). 
Proposed ‘Cyber Security Protect Officers’ will have specific roles in interventions, 
primarily in schools and colleges, to dissuade or divert individuals at risk of engaging 
57 As highlighted by preliminary research into the association between autism and cybercrime, and 
international law enforcement, following a rise in cybercrimes involving individuals with autism. See: 
www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/AIA-05-2015-0003. 
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 in cyber-related criminal conduct, but this should include economic cybercrime as 
well as anti-bullying, grooming and terrorism. 
The key relationship will be their own networks with those agencies which are 
already engaged with specific sections of the community – whether Age UK, Citizens 
Advice or the Confederation of Small Businesses – or organisations such as the Fraud 
Advisory Panel or the North East Fraud Forum (NEFF). Such public/private 
partnerships are crucial as an approach; a point noted as far back as the 2006 
Fraud Review. In 2015, the NEFF co-sponsored the North East Regional Cyber Crime 
Conference as a platform to bring businesses together to raise awareness of the 
current cyber threats and to explore means of preventing a cyber-attack within their 
organisations. The conference also promoted the North East Regional CiSP.  
While this does not require significant staff input, it will require limited amounts of 
funding and a clear central source of information, material and, crucially, accessible 
sources of both online and offline support and guidance to address specific issues. 
5.5. The police role in Protect and Prepare: increasing resilience and 
reducing repeat victimisation 
5.5.1. Increasing resilience 
Building cyber resilience involves a number of aspects. It is about being an 
‘intelligent’ user of information on threats and responses; taking those actions or 
steps to mitigate and respond to cyber threats; and being able to prepare for, 
adapt to, withstand and rapidly recover and learn from, disruptions caused by 
cybercrime (see Scottish Government, 2015). Given that every individual and every 
organisation (whether a business or government entity) is a potential victim and that 
all have assets of some sort of worth, it is essential to have in place a risk 
management approach that involves thinking strategically and pre-emptively. 
Assessing the probability that an individual or organisation is likely to be the victim of 
a targeted or untargeted attack of a particular harm level, and thus needs basic or 
more sophisticated (and expensive/burdensome) security controls, is a key 
component of an holistic understanding of the role and importance of cyber 
security (GCHQ and CERT-UK, 2015).  
The key issue is breaking down the nature of the threats and concerns at a macro-
level to what it means in practice to develop and implement controls to protect and 
prepare for economic cybercrimes. While there is a range of initiatives – from 
standards such as ISO 27001, to the Cyber Essentials certifications, to government 
funding for SMEs (in the form of the 2015 £5,000 voucher scheme to obtain specialist 
advice) – there need to be more tailored and accessible sources of guidance and 
support that address the totality of the risk environment and effective responses (see 
Table 5.2).  
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 Table 5.2: Setting up a preventative approach to economic cybercrimes 258 
Organisational information risk management regime 
Policy Components 
• Establish an effective governance structure 
and determine your risk appetite 
 
• User education and awareness 
• Home and mobile working 
• Secure configuration 
• Produce supporting information risk 
management policies 
• Removable media controls 
• Managing user privileges 
• Maintain the senior management’s 
engagement with the cyber risk 
• Incident management 
• Monitoring 
• Malware protection 
• Network security 
5.5.2. Victimisation 
Repeat victimisation has become very important as a focus of police and 
Prepare/Protect interventions. If those individuals and businesses who are most likely 
to become repeat victims can be identified and encouraged to improve their 
security and resilience, with support as required, they can be saved from harm and 
Pursue costs reduced (including policing and, if it gets that far, criminal justice and 
penal costs). Whitty (2013), for example, notes that a quarter of dating scam victims 
had been previous victims of fraud. Although this may not be generalisable to other 
forms of cyber-enabled fraud, it seems likely that there will be a concentration of 
victims in some demographic and business sectors, which the police may be well 
placed to identify via the Action Fraud database and thus use as the basis for part 
of the emerging strategy. It should also be noted that repeat victimisation help is not 
restricted to economic cybercrime: the telephone is a common method of 
communication for mass marketing and investment frauds. 
Some progress has been made at a general level in some categories of fraud, such 
as mass marketing frauds, but more effort needs to be made across the range. While 
segmentation work has been undertaken for organised crime (including fraud) 
victimisation and enablers, there needs to be a concerted push to identify 
individuals and businesses particularly ‘at risk’ and to help them. This can be done for 
groups in advance of their becoming victims (or not) – as has recently been done to 
discourage frauds against those liberating occupational pensions – and/or after 
they first report a fraud, when people are more likely to be receptive to advice.  
Primarily, the mechanisms for doing this to date have been websites and formal 
organisations. However, awareness measures may need to be supplemented by 
outreach by trusted (and trustworthy) persons. Peer influence and community-level 
bodies seem particularly well placed to perform this function and it is better that 
such bodies proactively seek out or arrange face-to-face sessions with 
representative organisations – Women’s Institutes, senior citizen groups, etc. – rather 
than rely on vulnerable or poorly-informed individuals to use the internet for 
information. Age UK, Citizens Advice or even a vetted group of ‘cyber-savvy’ 
volunteers would be appropriate service deliverers, depending on the 
demographic. Victim Support has also expressed a willingness to become more 
58 Source: www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-risk-management-a-board-level-
responsibility/10-steps-summary. 
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 involved than in the past (Button, Lewis & Tapley, 2009; Levi & Pithouse, 1992). This, 
however, would require a shift in skills from those used when dealing with victims of 
theft, burglary and violence, since the demographic of volunteers may itself need 
training in fraud victimisation and cyber-skills. 
In short, people find advice more credible when it comes from their peers and 
people they can relate to, and they are more likely to follow security advice when it 
is very simple and requires little effort to implement; better still, when it is conducted 
on their behalf by third parties such as their internet service providers and social 
media service providers.  
Finally, in addition to reducing repeat victimisation (and saving future policing and 
collateral costs), the dimension of care for victims has begun to receive more 
attention. The London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) recently 
established a Victim Care Unit; though important, this relatively expensive resource 
can be applied only to a small percentage of victims. Being a victim of fraud is 
sometimes accompanied by guilt and self-blame; counselling and help for both 
mental health and practical needs is an important and underdeveloped area, 
whether the individual or business person is a first time or repeat victim. Limited 
research has been conducted into the impact of different forms of face-to-face, 
cyber-enabled or mixed mode economic crimes, but there is no reason to suppose 
that fraud victims are any more resilient than the victims of other crimes. The fact 
that the individual might have been tricked into parting with their money voluntarily 
does not make them less in need of help, and the social benefits of reduced fraud 
are significant. Some will consider fraud victims to be less deserving of help, but this 
does not mean that they should not be equipped with the knowledge and skills to 
reduce repeat victimisation. Who is available to help with these tasks and how they 
will be paid for (if needed) and by whom, remains a difficult issue. 
5.6. The police role in Pursue reassessed 
Prepare, Protect and Prevent dimensions offer the police minor roles and, in light of 
resource constraints and expertise, these roles are possibly more suited to other 
institutions which can integrate these responsibilities into wider, complementary 
functions. Policing has in any case gradually shifted towards intelligence-led efforts 
to reach out and enhance sources of information (Levi and Maguire, 2012). 
Nevertheless, with fraud, the police are mostly dependent on what gets reported to 
them by victims or third parties with guardianship roles. Unless connected with 
already actively monitored OCGs or suspected terrorists, insider threats are 
reactively policed by law enforcement following reports by the private or public 
sector. Although recorded and victim-survey-measured property crimes have been 
falling, there are a host of other crime and non-crime demands on falling police 
resources, and newer or redefined issues requiring attention, which include counter-
terrorism, child sexual exploitation online, modern slavery, online bullying, offline 
sexual grooming and racial harassment. Against this background, it is necessary to 
explore where to engage in terms of the Four Ps and how to integrate them into 
current policing plans and priorities.  
5.7. Engagement and integration 
We would argue that a number of initiatives should be undertaken, the first of which 
is to establish economic cybercrime as a policy and policing priority within the 
Four Ps framework, whether or not it is connected with formally defined OCGs. 
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5.7.1. Getting cybercrime from policy agendas on to policing agendas 
The 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy proposed helping law enforcement agencies to 
tighten up their operational response, and provide support to police forces. In the 
case of the latter, the Strategy sought “to drive up wider national capability on 
cybercrime, including through shaping the training for mainstream law enforcement 
on cyber issues”, and to encourage all police forces to make use of NCA cyber-
specialists – volunteers with specialist cyber-skills or expertise. It has been argued, 
however, that the commitment, performance measures and, particularly, resources 
has not followed; nor have they been sufficient to enable proactive as well as 
reactive policing, or been devolved to local police forces to address low-value, 
high-volume cybercrime. As the Home Affairs Select Committee (2013: 9) noted: 
“Ministers have acknowledged the increasing threat of E-crime but it is clear that 
sufficient funding and resources have not been allocated to the law enforcement 
responsible for tackling it.” 
This sort of critique is not unique to economic cybercrime – fraud in general has also 
seen this disconnect between policy and operationalisation – but policy, no matter 
how good, requires the means of implementation to have more than rhetorical 
impact. This disconnect is perhaps reinforced and exacerbated by the cyber 
element, given the issues of speed, scale and impact highlighted earlier in this 
report.  
Economic crimes have never been a popular component of police work, for cultural 
reasons as well as pragmatic, due to the resource-intensive nature of investigation 
(Levi, 2013). In the aftermath of the government’s 2006 Fraud Review, an attempt 
was made to address this, with modest results (Gannon & Doig, 2010; Button, 
Blackbourn & Tunley, 2014). Those we interviewed suggested that the term ‘cyber’ 
creates even more alarm, because it conjures up visions of technically difficult 
investigations that are unlikely to be fruitful in terms of a successful prosecution or 
recovery of assets, both of them key drivers of police resources. To date, progress 
has been slow; a critical HMIC (2014) report observed that only three forces of 43 
(Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and West Midlands) had made ‘comprehensive plans’ in 
relation to potential cyber-attack. Furthermore, only 15 out of the 43 had considered 
cybercrime at all in their strategic threat and risk assessments.  
Recent data suggests that less than half of the police forces in England and Wales 
included the impact of fraud within their last strategic assessments, and only a 
quarter include it regularly in their tactical assessments. Forces’ assessments of the 
impact of crimes tend to focus on offender profiles (i.e. they are linked to crime 
disseminations) rather than on victim profiles and general levels of fraud in the 
area.59 Indeed, our interviews helped highlight how pressure on police to give 
service to those who live in a particular area, systematically disadvantages those 
who are victims of geographically widespread multi-police force crimes, such as 
mass marketing frauds, especially when suspects are not within the jurisdiction, 
making the output or outcome of the Pursue role deeply uncertain. Evidential and 
extradition rules have always strongly affected the 
59 National reporting via Action Fraud does not include economic crimes in local crime maps based on 
postcodes.  
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 handling of serious fraud cases (Levi, 2008, 2013), but with economic cybercrime, the 
need for cross-border evidence and mutual legal assistance is paramount.60  
Unfortunately, due to capacity and resource constraints, around half of cyber-
enabled frauds reported to Action Fraud are not distributed to forces if the offenders 
are deemed to be outside the UK. These cases are considered outside the scope of 
investigation, although some will be investigated by the City of London Police and 
the NCA. Nevertheless, discussions with a sample of police and crime commissioners’ 
staff suggest that identity theft and other cyber-enabled economic crimes are now 
of major concern, and are important parts of current plans for combating business 
crime in London (MOPAC, 2014) and in many other regions, metropolitan and 
otherwise. 
An important question is how to establish cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled 
economic crime on the policing agenda in ways that allow for a meaningful 
response. Taking the Pursue component of policing, for example, we can subdivide 
economic cybercrimes into those where (i) some or all of the suspect(s) are inside 
the UK, the EU or other areas that allow for extradition, and those where they are 
not; (ii) the offenders are part of networks that are susceptible to monitoring in 
advance of crimes, such as OCGs, and where they are not; and (iii) the crimes 
themselves can be known about in advance, or can only be investigated reactively. 
(In the former instance: Ponzi schemes, long firm frauds committed by OCGs, 
counterfeiting rings and payment card frauds; in the latter: corporate collapses, 
major misstatements of corporate earnings, insider dealing and dating scams.) Many 
of these are assisted by collaborations with the private sector, not only via 
information sharing but also via Cifas, FFA UK, the IPO, anti-counterfeiting bodies 
such as FACT and others, and the major financial advisory firms who play an 
increasing role in investigations and forensics. The NCA has become increasingly 
active in the cybercrime attribution and prosecution arena, in line with its mission to 
make the UK an unwelcome place for criminals to operate. 
There is also a need for clarity in tasking and messaging from strategic and symbolic 
police actions as part of Pursue. Assessing the impact of prosecutions, disruption and 
asset recovery on domestic and foreign offenders remains in its infancy, but needs 
very careful consideration for each case. There is a need to show particular criminal 
networks and individuals that involvement in crime has its costs, even if the medium 
and long-term impact on limiting the online criminal opportunities available is 
modest, as has been shown, for example, in the rapid revival of alternative drug and 
identity data cryptomarkets following take-downs such as DarkMarket and Silk Road. 
Target audiences may include not just the immediate offenders but others at home 
and abroad, and also victims and potential victims who may need reassurance, but 
also Protect and Prepare lessons discussed above, via media reporting about how 
to handle risks.  
5.7.2. Paying for the policing agenda 
Another area of challenge for the medium term is the cost of policing economic 
cybercrime, both in terms of the availability of additional funding, where such 
funding should be placed and to what purpose, and who has ownership of it. High 
60 Our analysis of Action Fraud data suggests that the overwhelming majority of fraud suspects are UK-
based; however, this finding is somewhat counter-intuitive, and may simply reflect victims’ assumptions 
that their offender is in the UK.  
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 travel and communications costs and time long pre-date the formation of police 
and crime commissioners and austerity policing, but are brought to the fore when 
‘non-essential costs’ are considered. As noted above, although policing resource 
full-time equivalents for fraud now total at least 1,000 in England and Wales, half of 
these are in London. The consequence is that the scope for investigation of difficult 
cyber-enabled cases in London and especially elsewhere is constrained. No analysis 
is currently available of how many typical cases this resource could actually pursue 
to conviction, but when compared with reports to Action Fraud and Cifas/FFA UK, it 
indicates that those difficult cases that are not of the highest priority receive little 
police input and therefore are not prosecuted. Though desirable, good liaison 
arrangements alone will not solve this problem, since there are few resources 
available for leverage, especially given significant cuts in Trading Standards and 
other bodies. This risk-averse approach to expenditure on cases that may not lead to 
prosecution or conviction suggests that many cases are closed off at an initial stage 
without deep investigation. Challenging though this may be in the light of media 
criticism and individualised case reviews/victim demands, it can be considered 
irrational to spend time on cases that will ‘lead nowhere’. 
The cyber element of economic crime has put greater demand on policing. This has 
coincided with a drop in the general crime rate and in the profile of both crime and 
policing in contemporary Britain. One response strategy has been the growth of 
unconventional police funding from the private sector and government. Some of 
the police interviewed for this research from outside the UK were concerned that this 
constituted privatised policing, offering special access to state functions. However, 
we argue, considering trends in fraud policing resources, that provided care is taken 
with governance arrangements, special funding of police units cuts down 
inefficiencies in search time and persuasion time to help find officers willing to take 
on cases, for example in organised crash-for-cash insurance fraud61 or payment 
card cases. The lead author’s observation of these negotiations before formal 
arrangements suggests that previous efforts were often wasteful and unpredictable. 
However, the resources in these specialist units remain insufficient for the cases that 
exist, both cyber-enabled and not, and so even where they could be successfully 
prosecuted, they will not be. In these specialist areas, the principal direct victims are 
corporations which then pass on their losses and it may be argued that the 
preventative remedy lies mainly with their own efforts at reducing their vulnerability. 
If they find that cost-ineffective, or are unwilling to share data and efforts, then why 
should the taxpayer pay for the externalities thus created? 
If cases are not pursued, then much of the pre-police investigative work is wasted, 
unless it can be turned to preventative or disruptive effect, or used for civil law 
measures. Interviewees from the City of London Police, the private sector and the 
IPO praised the ease of liaison and information transfer enabled by the creation of 
the 20-strong PIPCU, the IFED and by the Dedicated Card and Payment Crime Unit 
(DCPCU).62 Interviewees outside London noted challenges of prioritisation between 
London and other UK regions. This evokes broader issues of relative crime seriousness, 
where what is relatively trivial in a major metropolis like London may be very serious 
to the public (and police) in a local constabulary, and vice versa (this is an 
important point of discussion, though outside the scope of this work).  
61 This refers to instances where OCGs stage car crashes in order to commit insurance fraud.  
62 In the case of the latter, DCPCU was the forerunner of these other units that began in 2002. 
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 5.7.3. Learning from abroad? 
This study does not examine in detail the experience of other countries in the broad 
components of economic cybercrimes. The closest parallels to the UK are in 
Australia, discussed in the next section. US federal agencies have a well-deserved 
reputation for the aggressive pursuit of transnational crime – including economic 
cybercrimes – with the aims of disruption and prosecution, and have played an 
active role in joint cases with the UK and others (in particular Europol), including 
infiltration and sting operations. However, there have been no independent 
evaluations and even prosecution data is difficult to find. Data in a recent 
Congressional study (Finklea, 2014) suggests that out of 12.6–16.6 million identity theft 
cases in the US in 2012, there were some 450 convictions for aggravated identity 
theft, and fewer than 800 for identity theft in 2013. Although there may have been 
many other charges brought (e.g. for wire fraud and racketeering), this shows that 
the US has a huge gap in bringing identity and other cyber-related fraudsters to 
justice. 
The Dutch police High Tech Crime Unit has attracted top-level graduates to work on 
difficult cases, though retention is difficult when the cases become more routine. In 
addition there is the Dutch Electronic Crimes Task Force, an initiative of the main 
Dutch banks and the Dutch High Tech Crime Unit and Prosecution. The task force is 
about information sharing among banks and law enforcement bodies, and is 
located at the High Tech Crime Unit. 
Estonia has a large pool of volunteer ‘cyber-warriors’ recruited in the aftermath of 
the Russian DDoS attacks of 2007, and (like Finland) street ‘web constables’ who 
dispense advice on cyber security at a very local level. Hong Kong and South Korea 
have very active policing agencies, but little is known about their effectiveness. 
Europol has begun to be more active in encouraging international days of action, 
collaborating for example with the international travel industry to combat airline 
fraud, such as through the Europol EC3’s EU prevention strategy and the 
establishment of an EU network of prevention Points of Contact. In general, the 
relationship between policing inputs and outputs and outcomes has not been much 
investigated in this difficult sphere.  
5.8. Targeting responses and integrating the Four Ps: combating economic 
cybercrimes against individuals 
As the Action Fraud data suggests, the majority of economic cybercrimes (by 
volume) impact upon individuals – which presents a greater challenge than dealing 
with businesses. Thinking about how to address this challenge requires a careful 
assessment of resources, police priorities and engagement with other agencies to 
complement police roles. The effective implementation of the Four Ps will depend 
very much on the nature of the cybercrime. The key, we would argue, is an 
evidence-based approach drawing on the specific types of the main economic 
cybercrimes identified by Action Fraud and the NFIB. Each will require a tailored 
response that may or may not be applicable to other types of economic 
cybercrime. 
To illustrate this, we look in detail at the possible responses to one fraud – dating 
scams – which has a very high incidence of cyber-involvement (88% as per our 
analysis of Action Fraud data – see chapter 4). This approach, modelling a 
framework for policing responses to specific types of economic cybercrime by risk, 
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 severity, likely loss, methods of perpetration, and so on, could serve as guidance to 
forces. 
Any strategy for policing economic cybercrime needs to have a significant 
educative component that is intelligible (i) to victims and intended victims and (ii) to 
those in a position to monitor behaviour and provide relevant advice. Such an 
approach also has to recognise and reflect the specific characteristics of the crime 
itself. Here we examine cyber-enabled dating scams to illustrate how we might 
apply the Four Ps Model and what could be added to this approach to increase 
effectiveness: 
1. Prevent: Domestically, some effort has gone into encouraging people to use the 
internet safely and avoid dangerous activities, but this has focused more on 
protecting the victims than on discouraging potential offenders (especially when 
they are targeting foreign victims), or shifting them into less socially damaging 
activities. The Prevent component has not been seriously attempted, since 
people who operate primarily overseas – and many dating scams have an 
international dimension – are not considered susceptible to behavioural change 
in development. Early developments of serious and organised crime strategy had 
little focus on trying to re-orientate dating scammers, online or offline. There is 
some messaging about prosecution and imprisonment, most commonly from the 
US which puts more resource into international prosecutions.63 Logically, this 
might lead to more reluctance among offenders to target US-based individuals, 
but there is no evidence to support this.  
2. Protect: Here the approach has been to warn people about the dangers of 
dating scams. There is evidence that scam victims know about the risks but simply 
fail to register their own situation as an example of a scam (Professor Monica 
Whitty, informal communication). To protect customer relationships and reduce 
the costs of handling fraud complaints, some banks have developed schemes 
where the withdrawal of substantial sums in cash as a departure from normal 
behaviour in client accounts is considered an indicator of a scam of sorts. Once 
flagged, they try to talk the suspected victim out of doing so and/or identify why 
they are withdrawing the funds. In the case of bank transfers, such activity can 
be reported as a suspicious activity report (SAR) to the authorities in the hope of 
quick action. Nothing is known of how frequently such enforcement responses 
happen to what are suspected by the bankers to be crimes-in-action but are not 
yet formally reported by victims. 
The financial services sector is also seeking to develop software to spot patterns 
of scam victimisation. In the safeguarding space, there have been efforts to get 
(largely unregulated) online dating firms to share information about persons who 
have been barred from one website or firm for suspected misconduct, so that 
they do not just move to another website or another firm’s books. Unlike child 
sexual exploitation online, where the card schemes have made it difficult for firms 
to get merchant authorisation once suspected of involvement, there is not 
usually much leverage for a collective market solution for economic cybercrime.  
3. Pursue: There are some strategic efforts at selective prosecutions, and attempts 
by the private sector to identify patterns of receipt of bank and money service 
63 But still only prosecutes federally a small number of identity thieves annually – see Finklea (2014). 
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 business transactions that are unusual and ought to be reported. Making SARs to 
the national financial intelligence unit (in the UK, the NCA) enables interception 
when funds are delivered or picked up, provided that there are mechanisms for 
prioritising them and ensuring they do not get lost in the morass of volume 
reports, and there are police available to make the arrests. In high-profile cases, 
UK and US authorities have developed good relationships overseas for 
cooperation with money transfer firms and police/prosecutors.64  
This response can be developed and augmented through inter-agency working. For 
example, in Queensland and Western Australia, efforts have been made to develop 
a multi-pronged strategy for identifying and dealing with romance and other scams. 
Project Sunbird, a collaborative project between the West Australian Police 
(WAPOL) and the West Australian Department of Commerce (Commerce), which 
began in 2012, focuses on people who are sending money to five known high-risk 
countries in West Africa: Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo and Sierra Leone. There are five 
stages to Project Sunbird:  
1. Identification: In the context of data capture of all international wire transfers by 
AUSTRAC (Australia’s anti-money laundering agency), WAPOL access financial 
intelligence about individuals who are sending money to the five high risk 
countries. They screen this list to generate a list of individuals they suspect are 
fraud victims. 
2. Intervention: This list is passed to Commerce, which contacts each person, 
notifying them that they may be victims of fraud. The letter encourages the 
individuals to stop sending money and invites them to contact Project Sunbird 
staff to discuss it. If they continue to send money, they are contacted again in a 
more targeted effort, which outlines further details of their likely involvement in 
fraud and provides a fact sheet for fraud victims.  
3. Interruption: This stage is focused on the interruption of payments, and funds 
transferred to West Africa, and is primarily undertaken by Commerce. 
4. Intelligence: This involves gathering intelligence from letter recipients from both 
agencies which feeds into the fifth stage.  
5. Investigation: The investigation is led by WAPOL and can focus on local offenders 
if relevant, or make the appropriate referrals to an overseas law enforcement 
agency. This final stage is quite problematic, given limited resources and the time 
and cost of mutual legal assistance and extradition. 
Relating this back to the Four Ps Model, from a Protect perspective, initial results from 
Project Sunbird were positive (Cross & Blackshaw, 2014). Between March 2013 and 
July 2014, 1,969 first letters were sent to individuals. Financial intelligence indicates 
that approximately two-thirds stopped sending money, with a further 14% reducing 
the amount of money transferred. Of those who continued to send money and 
received a second letter, 44% stopped sending money and a further 33% reduced 
the amount being sent.  
This suggests that there was some Protect and Prepare effect from these initiatives. 
The UK NCA and its predecessor, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, have been 
involved in significant collaborative initiatives in West Africa, but details of their 
64 For example, a Ghanaian fraudster was jailed in 2014 in Ghana for five years and ordered to repay 
(with what result is unknown) £800,000 conned from 19 British women. 
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 impact are not available. In terms of the Prepare component, intermittent effort has 
been made so far to deal with repeat victimisation. In a southern UK force area, 
Trading Standards officers persuaded community police officers to visit victims at 
home and talk through their experiences, to help identify and manage social 
engineering. Observations suggest that some individuals respond well to this 
counselling, while others have difficulty. The MOPAC/City of London Police-funded 
Economic Crime Victim Care Unit is seeking to develop a more systematic approach 
as well as offering support services to individuals affected by economic cybercrime. 
Research on dating scams has shown that, unlike for many other crimes, friends and 
family often blame the individual rather than the criminal, so they are without the 
sympathetic support typically available to victims of crime. However, there is 
uncertainty over which type of support is most effective. Internationally, Action 
Fraud and the FBI sometimes suggest that individuals use specific online support 
groups; Australian police sometimes suggest they join a face-to-face group; the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police sometimes suggest that victims use a telephone 
support service. 
The ad hoc and uncoordinated nature of such responses suggests a more coherent, 
joined-up approach should be taken to addressing those economic crimes (if the 
analysis provides the basis – identified by volume, value and harm) which appear to 
pose the biggest risk to individuals, not only setting in place networks and 
partnerships but also providing the police with a model on which to base and build 
their responses. Their effects will require careful evaluation. 
5.9. Targeting responses and integrating the Four Ps: combating economic 
cybercrimes against business 
The role of the police and state in combating the impact of economic cybercrimes 
on business is more complex than it is for individuals. As discussed in chapter 4, it is up 
to businesses to make a risk-based decision on what cyber security measures to 
deploy. The question, then, is what resources should be put in place by the police, 
via intelligence-led policing, to reduce the risks to business and to investigate the 
crimes which have not been prevented.  
Quite apart from the difficulties of implementing cybersecurity and the weak 
evidence base for the impacts of education and awareness campaigns anywhere 
in the world, there are considerations about how business should balance and 
prioritise its demands. For example, Sony has been criticised for its lax cyber security 
in the aftermath of the 2011 Sony Playstation hack which cost $171 million and the 
2014 Sony hack estimated to cost $100 million. Jason Spaltro, then executive director 
of information security, made the point that, essentially, he would not pay the high 
costs of cyber security to avoid the risk of a cyber-attack, if the costs of being 
hacked were still significantly less than the cost of protection.65  
Some commentators ridiculed his short sightedness in not including the risk of 
regulatory penalties, etc. and (with the benefit of hindsight) in underestimating the 
probability that violation would happen. Had the extra money been spent on 
security, then it would have been difficult to know whether or not this would have 
been money well spent, and the CIO might have found it hard to justify to the Sony 
board (if the expenditure proposal got that far). However, this underlying judgement 
65 See: www.cio.com/article/2439324/risk-management/your-guide-to-good-enough-compliance.html. 
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 problem is true of many risk decisions in business (and in government), and both risk 
from criminal threats and risk from regulatory action have become far more salient 
as well as prevalent in business today. Security is not a value that either does or 
ought to trump all others, and risk appetites reasonably may vary; the risks should be 
measured where possible in a human security context, depending on the type of 
business. It could be argued that if Sony had taken such a risk-based decision and 
decided to economise, the police (in this case, the FBI) should not waste US 
taxpayers’ funds on investigation. But quite apart from (in)consistency with other 
police practices in theft, burglary and violence reports – where victim ‘negligence’ is 
not usually viewed as disqualifying them from police help – there may be other 
reasons to investigate: for example, the wider political conflict with North Korea 
associated with this particular case. If individuals or the government in North Korea 
had been demonstrated to be behind the hack, then genuine mutual legal 
assistance and extradition would not have happened. Hence the complexity of 
evaluating whether investigation is or is not a good use of public resources.  
5.9.1. The current approach: the police 
The existing strategy involves a combination of active and passive elements. The 
traditionalist model of policing is to take the cases that come in and handle them 
according to the resources available, discarding them if crucial evidence is 
unavailable or the suspect is unobtainable. When forensic and/or investigative 
resources are exhausted, the remainder of cases are queued until resources are 
freed up. Historically, a resource boost has seldom happened except when a fraud 
has exceptional political or media interest. The more active model is to try to 
increase policing capacity, either by demonstrating serious harm from crime/threat 
from offenders, or finding new sources of income, such as proceeds of crime funds 
or sponsorship.  
The City of London Police has been proactively following the latter strategy. Three 
units have been created with financial support from the business sector to deal with 
organised frauds. These are staffed by police and civilians, with fairly hands-off 
governance arrangements so that the industry sectors can influence overall strategy 
but not individual cases. In the medium and longer term, the relevant business 
groups can reduce or increase support for the policing units if they consider that the 
latter are no longer meeting their needs or that their work merits more funding. These 
are areas where business and the police have moved towards working 
arrangements in terms of resourcing and information that address what each 
perceives as significant and organised threats.  
These include: 
• Payment card and online fraud: Immense progress has been achieved via 
cooperation between the industry-funded DCPCU, FFA UK and Cifas, but issues 
of individual responsibility remain. Police Scotland is currently outside Action 
Fraud but has strong relationships with the financial services sector across the UK. 
The Scotland Unit has developed good external relationships with foreign police 
forces through regular joint work. 
• Insurance fraud: This has a relatively low cyber component, other than that ICT is 
used for communications and software for data analysis for the Insurance Fraud 
Bureau, which pools industry-wide data, and in other insurance fraud initiatives 
by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and individual firms. There is also the 
police unit IFED which targets serious and organised attempts to defraud the 
insurance sector. 
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 • Intellectual property crimes: There is strong inter-agency working between the 
IPO, the police and Trading Standards. However, they are working in an 
environment in which public attitudes are deeply ambiguous, except in safety-
critical and some health frauds (Large, 2014; Wall & Large, 2010). Scotland is a 
good role model for inter-agency collaboration, but there are good initiatives 
elsewhere (for example, North Yorkshire) to disrupt IP and other consumer crimes, 
if not necessarily those with a strong cyber component.  
Such collaborative efforts are to be praised and welcomed. This level of joint 
working responds to identified and co-resourced issues that balance organisations’ 
concerns with a level of response in one particular area – Pursue – while leaving the 
Prevent and Protect element of risk management to organisations. 
Quite apart from the practical difficulties of implementing cyber security through 
changing personnel, distributed workplaces and complex supply chains, and the 
weak evidence base for the impacts of education and awareness campaigns, this 
raises the question of how businesses should balance their security demands against 
other functions. However, these are wider issues for industry and business rather than 
policing.  
On the other hand, and outside the three areas noted above, one of the 
weaknesses of the police response to economic cybercrime has been in the area of 
cross-force, national and international crimes below the level of seriousness to 
warrant the scarce resources of the Serious Organised Crime Agency and its 
successor, the National Crime Agency. The situation has been improved by 
additions to the regional Special Operations Units, but there remains the problem of 
fractured responses from individual constabularies and a need for national units to 
deal with the externalities exploited by criminal networks, cyber-enabled or not, and 
which have to be paid for. We would argue that three of the Four Ps should be less 
of a law enforcement concern, apart from the provision of intelligence and 
information, than for industry bodies, government bodies and collaborative 
arrangements. We would also urge that, in terms of resilience, governments, public 
organisations and local government might want to be more proactive in requiring 
demonstration of effective risk management systems from those with whom they do 
business, certainly as suppliers and contractors. We would also argue that business 
requires much more evidence of an effective deterrent, whether in terms of 
disruption or prosecution, and the emphasis should be on Pursue. Nevertheless, there 
still remains a challenge as to what type of Pursue efforts we are prepared to 
resource. 
In such circumstances, law enforcement may have to develop a hierarchy of 
responses that takes into account not just the impact and economic losses suffered 
by victims but also the broader social impacts captured in the concept of ‘signal 
crimes’ (Innes, 2014). This would include robust evidence that the threat is taken 
seriously, judged by reassurance and commitment. It may be necessary to 
confiscate the ICT tools employed by some of those involved in hacking and other 
disruptive but non-acquisitive cybercrimes as a visible sign that, alongside Prevent 
and Protect, there is some attempt to stop offending: mechanisms may have to be 
found to stop offenders accessing the internet, as was done with the American 
hacker Kevin Mitnick, for example. For economic cybercriminals, it may be possible 
to request (through civil or criminal routes) a Serious Crime Prevention Order under 
the Serious Crime Act 2007 as amended by the Serious Crime Act 2015, which is 
available for offences including fraud, money laundering, public revenue cheating, 
corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, blackmail and intellectual property theft. This 
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 creates civil contempt powers to regulate the number of offenders’ mobile phones, 
their travel and business activities and contacts, etc. We consider that, given the 
small number of offenders convicted, restorative justice is not a particularly salient 
response, but this might serve as a way of reinforcing a message of harmfulness 
among younger offenders or potential offenders. (Though, we need to be aware 
that there are risks inherent in the different ways that such measures could be 
interpreted). 
Of more importance would be the reliance within the Pursue framework on 
disrupting cyber-enabled crimes, which can be done either via 
surveillance/informants/covert human intelligence sources or by rapid reactions to 
crimes in progress which reduce criminals’ ‘take’ from one victim or a run of victims.  
On the other hand, disruption is a contested approach in terms of longer-term 
effectiveness. As noted previously:  
 “Because the notion of disruption can be used to signify a wide range of 
 acts, and can be applied to a variety of criminal actors, it is not at all clear 
 how the effects of a specific disruption contribute to the overall systemic 
 measure. Still less clear is how an annual increase in the number of criminal 
 enterprises disrupted is a measure of the increasing effectiveness of the 
 criminal justice system.” (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004: 22). 
Nevertheless, disruption does offer an extensive set of tools which are used against a 
number of other areas, from child sexual exploitation to organised crime groups. 
They are also used by major industry players such as Microsoft and FACT, and by 
transnational police agencies such as Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre. As 
early as 2011, the NFIB suspended a number of websites, telephone numbers and 
email accounts and redirected those who accessed the suspended websites to an 
alert page. Disruption also allows law enforcement to take a more proactive 
approach in engaging with potential offenders and their networks. It can provide 
relevant intelligence and the basis for reciprocity of information sharing that, as we 
have already noted, is a significant part of the development of Protect and Prepare. 
Nevertheless, although these indicate to victims and politicians that something is 
being done, the effectiveness of disruptive tactics such as incapacitation beyond 
the immediate case is often difficult to assess, whether they are small operations or 
massive take-downs such as DarkMarket and Silk Road.  
There is arguably a case for realism combined with transparency – telling individuals 
and businesses that their cyber-enabled frauds cannot be investigated effectively to 
conviction unless the offenders are within the jurisdiction of our legal system, and 
even then these investigations are difficult enough. The high numbers of people 
being given extra training to roll out core cyber-investigative competence to the 
police, should help to address this challenge.  
However, it may be necessary, given businesses’ concerns about the absence of an 
effective law enforcement deterrent, that business funds a specific task force whose 
objective is to address cybercrime directed against UK business – and possibly some 
material cybercrimes against individuals such as dating scams – from overseas 
jurisdictions. This model, as we have noted, has worked in three specific areas and 
has been utilised to some effect, using a spectrum of quasi-law enforcement 
approaches and a range of criminal and civil sanctions, in the private sector (such 
as intellectual property, where its use has been contentious). It may encourage the 
privatisation of policing but it is a pragmatic route to efficiency.  
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 There is a risk that the police and media have overstated the technical difficulties of 
cyber investigation but understated the jurisdictional problems in recovering both 
offenders and money. To date, there have been a few cases of cyber money 
laundering in Europe (e.g. via Bitcoin) and offenders will usually cash out the 
proceeds at some stage. Recovering them may require better implementation of 
existing mutual recognition mechanisms within the EU and Council of Europe, and 
globally. Though the European Central Bank currently takes a different view, the UK 
has more positively expressed an intention to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges for 
anti-money laundering and other purposes, as well as to examine the prospects for 
making them work at scale (HM Treasury, 2015), and the use of proceeds of crime 
approaches, through using: 
• Laws on cybercrime or fraud against hackers targeting users (Bitcoin-stealing 
malware, mining malware, network disruption malware); 
• Laws on financial regulations against intermediaries and third party platforms 
making transactions without any agreement (unlawful banking/deposit-taking); 
and 
• Laws on money laundering for marketplaces that assist criminals to launder 
proceeds of crime. 
This approach, which has to address economic cybercrime against individuals as 
well as business, with the purpose of seeking prosecution and/or confiscation, would 
act as a necessary policing signal that, across the Four Ps, law enforcement is 
responding to security and confidence issues with a range of measures. It would also 
be of value if any recovered assets were, as with the general ‘payback’ approach, 
seen to be used to fund community or other Protect initiatives.  
5.10. Challenges of the current approach to victims generally: 
choosing between the ‘Ps’ 
As the Pursue component remains under severe pressure and has not yet received 
significant allocations from police resources, the other components of the Four Ps 
Model also need revisiting and refining in terms of a targeted (and widely 
advertised) response. Indeed, to draw on previous reassurance policing and signal 
crime policing, we would recommend comprehensive messages that emphasise 
police choices and solutions through identifying ‘signal’ concerns; visible control – 
reassuring the public by offering visible proof that their problems are important to the 
police and are being addressed in specific ways; a targeted, intelligence-led 
approach focusing resources on a hierarchy of threats drawn from Action 
Fraud/NFIB data; joint action from the police and other partner agencies across at 
least three of the Four Ps; and evidence of dedicated resources where practicable 
(see Millie, 2014). 
Here, we may need a significant educational focus across all generations of the 
general public, using insights from behavioural economics to ‘nudge’ them into 
greater and better informed care of their ICT; in addition, we need a network of 
people at grassroots level and via various communication mechanisms, including 
social media, to provide support when needed. It is essential to keep emphasising 
the importance of checking whether something sounds ‘too good to be true’.  
This raises problems for banks, which are under pressure on the one hand not to act 
as oppressive paternalists when government is encouraging freedom, and which, on 
the other hand, are liable to be blamed for not protecting the vulnerable, even 
when they have no legal mandate to stop account-holders from spending their own 
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 money how they choose. Banks and Cifas are improving efforts for those identified 
as vulnerable, though the criteria used when classifying people as ‘vulnerable’ 
require considerable care. It is not just the ‘elderly’ or the ‘mentally ill’ – both of 
which are on a spectrum of vulnerability; social attitudes to victim culpability also 
play their part. For some individuals, no Protect and Prepare efforts will work. It is also 
arguable that they should not receive scarce Pursue policing resources because 
they have not exercised due diligence on their own behalf. But who will convey 
these messages and who will listen to them and respond with better self-protection? 
Or will/should they be left to make their own decisions and suffer the 
consequences? We need a more serious debate about the actual and proper limits 
of policing by the police and financial institutions than this has so far received. 
In principle, the model of external funding for particular industry-focused action for 
business increases the general funding pool for economic cybercrimes and releases 
more police for those fraud victims who cannot afford to pay for their own policing. 
In practice, this framework merely sets out a high-level set of parameters. The 
question then is what criteria should be used to guide the allocation of funds to the 
Pursue function generally, and to what particular sorts of frauds within those 
allocated funds? With finite resources and excessive demands upon them, criteria 
will exist – the question is whether they are explicit and thought through, or are 
implicit and a less well considered reflection of priorities. Whether they should be 
made public is another decision, and one that should be informed by a willingness 
to engage with the public to enhance legitimacy. This is always an uncomfortable 
area because media and political demands are often stampeded by populist 
reactions to individual cases (or by critical HMIC reports that the police should do 
better), when (as in other areas of policing such as ‘historic abuse cases’ and in 
other public services such as medicine) the question is what aggregate levels of 
support can be managed and supported collectively. This requires hard decisions on 
the differentiation and consistency of response.  
Another area of challenge relates to how the negative impacts of cybercrime are 
managed in policing. Research does not currently tell us the relative impact of 
economic cybercrime compared with otherwise similar face-to-face scams. It could 
be inferred that frauds undertaken face-to-face have greater negative impact than 
those carried out online. Yet the sense of powerlessness and violation that often 
accompanies identity fraud and, a variant of that, dating frauds might suggest that 
cybercrime has at least as much impact, if not more so in some cases.66 As regards 
personal and financial information lost in data breaches from business or 
government, this can have both financial and emotional repercussions that are hard 
to predict or measure in the current state of our knowledge. Remediation via 
reassurance mechanisms – including protective registration against identity theft – is 
possible. It is an open question whether there should be a greater degree of 
compulsion on private and public sector bodies which lose personal and financial 
data through security breaches to provide free monitoring and protection to those 
individuals affected. This might encourage organisations to protect their data better; 
though the vast data breaches in recent US corporate and government cases 
would suggest that this is a bigger cultural problem than a rational or economic one. 
Nevertheless, even if it does not lead to greater care by organisations, one might 
66 A caveat here about comparing like with like: dating frauds are not just about money but about the 
twisting of affection, so their comparators would be offline dating scams, for example. 
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 argue that it is a right of victims that contributes to restorative justice as well as to 
reduced re-victimisation risks.  
Much hinges on the interpretation of the term ‘vulnerability’ as applied to fraud 
victimisation, and on intentional or merely implicit case selection. Here we would 
propose a review of the 2004 Home Office guidance on fraud acceptance criteria 
(see Table 5.3) for fraud generally, and economic cybercrime in particular, now that 
Action Fraud and industry data paints a much clearer picture of risk and threats. 
Table 5.3: Home Office Fraud Acceptance Criteria 2004, as subsequently updated by 
one force outside London 
Higher priority cases Lower priority cases 
• The victim(s) are believed to be 
vulnerable: for example, older 
people, people with disabilities and 
other protected groups under the 
Equality Act 2010,67 businesses 
providing key services in difficult 
circumstances, or in distinct 
communities.  
• Frauds having a significant impact 
on the victim(s). For example, a 
negligible loss to a large company 
could be catastrophic for a private 
individual or small business. 
• The offence is believed to be part of 
a linked series within the force area. 
• Strong positive lines of inquiry are 
immediately apparent. 
• The offenders are part of an 
organised crime group and the 
activity reported would score ‘high’ 
on the harm matrix. 
• There are clear opportunities to 
identify and restrain assets from the 
criminals with the aim of pursuing 
confiscation or forfeiture 
proceedings. 
• The circumstances under 
investigation fall within the category 
of a critical incident, or the decision 
not to investigate could have a 
significantly detrimental effect on 
public confidence or satisfaction. 
• Frauds giving rise to significant 
public concern, possibly highlighted 
by a high degree of press interest. 
• Frauds involving substantial sums of 
money. (NB: Cases meeting the 
acceptance criteria of the Serious 
Fraud Office may be referred 
• The investigation would require a 
disproportionate level of resource to bring 
the case to a conclusion and would 
adversely impact upon law enforcement’s 
ability to investigate other crime. 
• Frauds where the likely eventual outcome, 
in terms of length of sentence and/or 
financial penalty, is not sufficient to justify 
the likely cost and effort of the 
investigation.  
• The victim has pursued civil recourse and 
has subsequently turned to the police for a 
criminal investigation as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the civil remedy. 
• Delays to the investigation would be 
caused by the location of key evidence 
elsewhere. 
• Available resources would not permit an 
immediate and expeditious investigation. 
• Victims have ignored guidelines designed 
to prevent them from becoming victims of 
fraud, for example online banking and 
auction sites. 
• Frauds where the victim’s conduct has 
contributed to the loss, in particular where 
the police have previously given guidance 
or warnings to victims about fraud risks that 
have not been acted upon. 
• Cases where the victim’s motive for making 
the complaint appears to be malicious and 
is primarily focused on recovering monies 
owed, or designed to distract attention 
from the complainant’s own involvement in 
the fraud. (Such cases might nevertheless 
merit investigation, particularly where there 
are other victims involved.)  
• Cases where victims are not prepared to 
cooperate fully with the investigation and 
prosecution, although we will always 
67 The relevant protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 are: age, disability, gender 
reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. 
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 Higher priority cases Lower priority cases 
directly to them, either by the victim 
or the police.) 
• Frauds committed by, or knowingly 
facilitated by, professional advisers, 
e.g. lawyers, accountants, 
merchant bankers.  
• Frauds likely to undermine 
confidence in leading UK institutions 
or otherwise undermine the 
economy.  
• Frauds committed by members of 
boards or other senior managers.  
• Frauds where law enforcement 
action could have a material 
deterrent effect. 
• Frauds which indicate a risk of more 
substantial/extensive fraud 
occurring.  
• Cases where the victim has 
devoted significant resources to 
fraud prevention or has been willing 
to participate in appropriate crime 
prevention partnerships or otherwise 
assist the police.  
• Frauds which it has been agreed 
should be a current law 
enforcement priority.  
consider carefully how to assist victims and 
witnesses who have concerns about safety.  
• Frauds more suitable for investigation by 
another enforcement or regulatory 
agency.  
• Cases where another police force has 
decided not to investigate other than for 
geographical reasons.  
• Frauds that have already been 
investigated by the police or another 
enforcement agency, or that have been 
the subject of regulatory proceedings, 
unless significant new evidence has come 
to light or the previous investigation had a 
narrow remit that did not address all the 
relevant issues.  
• Cases where the existence of other 
proceedings might have a detrimental 
effect on a criminal investigation and 
subsequent prosecution.  
• Frauds which took place a long time ago 
(probably more than two years), unless 
there are exceptional circumstances.  
 
Evidently this leaves a great deal of room for discretion, since there are more cases 
that fall within the higher priority category than there are resources available to deal 
with them; and if the police were to disregard the lower priority cases, this might be 
‘rational’ but not politically acceptable. Repeat victimisation in this model is also 
missing, except within the category of ‘frauds which indicate a risk of more 
substantial/extensive fraud occurring’, which suggests more concern with offender 
escalation than with repeat victimisation. Perhaps in a Pursue framework that is a 
correct approach, but in a Prepare and Protect framework we might expect a 
stronger focus on reducing repeat victimisation, as well as on victim care. It shows 
that the lessons from our growing understanding of domestic and sexual violence 
and of burglary have not yet fully transferred to the fraud arena, perhaps because 
public awareness and lobbying groups are less developed for fraud.  
The marginal status of economic crime – especially cyber-enabled – within policing 
may also be inferred from the limited information we have about its policing outside 
London. Efforts have been made to address this, such as the establishment of an 
Economic Crime Command and a National Cyber Crime Unit within the NCA, both 
of which can if necessary draw upon constabulary policing resources as well as their 
own. But it remains to be seen what impact this will have upon levels of economic 
cybercrime. 
Despite such changes, what we are prepared to resource for the policing of frauds 
that do not fall within that category remains a challenge, especially as these types 
of fraud increase as a proportion. For example, in Greater Manchester, 60% of 
volume fraud cases were cyber-enabled. With the complexity and escalating 
number of complex, high-value frauds, this led to a management decision to 
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 subsume dedicated volume fraud teams into the serious fraud teams in order to 
address the higher order demands (King & Doig, unpublished). This points to a serious 
problem: either we tell victims (as presently) that their complaints will be used for 
intelligence only, or we struggle trying to investigate cases, many of which will not 
reach the prosecution stage. In the abstract, we might prefer to raise the 
capabilities and the resources to conduct cyber-enabled fraud investigations. 
This can only come from taxation (which has been ruled out for the present), from 
reallocating resources from other areas, from unpaid private volunteers, or via 
privately or publicly paid forensic investigators from the private sector, some of 
whose work currently has to be reinvestigated by police units to ensure investigative 
continuity to satisfy the courts. Evidential rules and judicial attitudes may need to 
change before the private sector can play a bigger role. We accept that policing 
has to battle for resources with other crime and social problems. These are 
balancing issues of enormous difficulty for the police, the NCA, the security services, 
and for all those in whose name this balancing occurs – the general public and 
businesses of all sizes. Even if we were to raise investigation levels for economic 
cybercrimes to the resources found in US agencies, many such frauds would still 
remain uninvestigated or, if investigated, would not result in prosecution.  
5.11. Summary 
This chapter has addressed the question of where and how policing may become 
more engaged in economic cybercrime. The preceding chapters have emphasised 
the remarkably complex nature of the landscape in terms of types of cybercrime, 
against whom, and to what purpose. The figures of losses, while significant to 
offenders and to victims, are variable as a ratio of other crimes and their costs. The 
mass attacks, their geographical location and so on make a significant investigative 
response problematic. Certainly, business and the public sector in principle have the 
resources to respond and in those areas where a law enforcement response is 
required, dedicated units predicated on joint working have been established. This is 
currently being reinforced by high-level police cybercrime units. These, however, are 
more likely to operate at the high, organised and severity ends of the Pursue 
spectrum, leaving the bulk of volume cases at the individual level where police 
resources, staffing losses, etc., mean that prevention and protection, or even 
disruption, may be a more realistic response than pursuit through criminal courts. 
Who should do this, and how, is a significant social issue that requires informed 
debate.   
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 6. Concluding remarks and suggestions for next steps 
This report presents a modest exploration of what we know about the evolution of 
cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent economic crime and how it is being and 
could be policed. This has turned out to be a much more complex and still evolving 
inquiry into how to manage a varied set of local, national and transnational 
problems of consumer and business awareness, transformation of awareness into 
action, and private–private and public–private collaborations in risk management, 
in which police and criminal justice interventions have played a modest part. In a 
sense, this is as it should be. The regulation of harm in society is primarily about how 
we understand and manage risks socially, and there are limits to what specifically 
police intelligence and criminal justice can achieve in this regard. Some might 
argue that if GCHQ is going to continue to collect metadata about all our daily 
communications, it might be put to more use in combating fraud and cyber-
enabled crimes; but that would require not just a change in its mandate but also 
people willing and able to act on the information, from Libor and corporate price-
fixing cartels to organised mass-marketing frauds. 
6.1. The scale of the challenge 
This research has shown that incidences of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent 
economic crimes have been rising, though the lack of comparable data for 
previous years makes this a matter of interpretation rather than demonstrable fact. 
Nevertheless, fraud is a distinct and definable crime category and the Action Fraud 
data indicates that the cyber component is significant and growing. However, given 
the rise in the number of internet-enabled devices and the proportion of the 
population who are connected, it would be extraordinary if this were not so. Given a 
large number of people around the world with the motivation to defraud and so 
many situational opportunities that the internet now provides, it is somewhat 
surprising that the crime rate is not higher. The data indicates that there are 
significant variations in the impact of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent 
economic crimes by crime category, and even within the latter there are non-trivial 
variations in the level of cyber-involvement in the crime, in the types of victims 
(whether businesses or individuals), the interplay between cyber-involvement and 
other communication modes for the commission of the crime, and the losses 
associated with the crime. Such variations have implications for responses which, for 
the purposes of this report, we have addressed under the Four Ps Model. 
6.2. Developing responses 
This report has noted the various initiatives and strategies undertaken by law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement organisations, and sought to provide some 
guidance and evidence about what a broad policing approach can do – or could 
do – to protect individuals and businesses from economic cybercrimes. However, 
guidance is not self-implementing. People have to know what to do and to actually 
carry out these measures and review them over time: cyber-fraud prevention is not 
a one-time effort, and both online and offline social engineering seek to move 
potential victims away from the protections they might know about in the abstract.  
Nevertheless, we are persuaded from the Action Fraud data that much of the 
reported economic cybercrime does not lend itself to a traditional reactive law 
enforcement response, given either the criteria noted in Table 5.3 or the normal 
acceptance criteria applied by individual forces, unless there is evidence of 
numbers of linked series of allegations or large numbers of lower-value cases against 
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 groups of individuals. The police, either by themselves or with partner organisations, 
have long pursued awareness and alert campaigns and ICT vulnerability would lend 
itself to a similar approach, particularly for individuals and SMEs. 
Even once messages have been disseminated – on radio, television, the press, and 
via friends and family – there are always some who do not follow the advice, and 
we suggest automated security with opt-out rather than opt-in, especially if 
insecurity can cause problems for others, such as botnets. We suggest also that more 
behavioural research would help to identify what needs to be done to ‘nudge’ such 
people to take action to protect themselves and make better informed judgements, 
while allowing them to continue to enjoy the benefits of the internet. Certainly, the 
imperfect information on the nature, motivation and geographical location of the 
perpetrator, as well as the limited possibilities of prosecution and even more limited 
likelihood of recovery of any losses, emphasise proactive prevention rather than the 
reactivity of an investigative response. Time spent on information security, however, 
also has an opportunity cost, and many of those who are not security professionals 
are generally reluctant to ‘waste’ time on what they see as an unproductive 
function (until or unless their inaction has serious consequences). Here we would also 
like to see a ‘nudge’ to encourage financial and other services to be more 
proactive in requiring the use of mandated software, if only to encourage more 
security awareness and less self-determination among businesses and the public 
who do not have a common understanding of what to do to protect themselves, 
and why.  
There is scope for a more dynamic, structured and response-focused approach to 
guidance, warnings and awareness-raising, to complement the valuable alerts that 
the NFIB and the NCA currently put out via media contacts and by their open and 
protected circulars. The latter go directly to professionals rather than to those who 
are not ‘fraud experts’. The police have made increasingly successful efforts to 
mainstream fraud issues into radio ‘soaps’ and television documentaries, as well as 
consumer programmes on radio and television. It would be possible for the police or 
other approved bodies to set up educational ‘sting operations’ to warn users who 
respond to fraudulent offers of different kinds (created by the authorities) that they 
could have become victims of fraud, via on-screen ‘pop-ups’. (Such tactics could 
also be used on criminal marketplaces as warnings to those seeking illicit products or 
co-offenders on the web.) This might lead to greater reflection by potential victims 
on their vulnerability, though there might be attempted push-backs by the public 
and media about police intrusion.   
When people become victims and recognise that they are – two stages that do not 
always happen at the same time – they may be more receptive to prevention 
advice as well as meriting care. Button et al. (2015: 208) conducted interviews with 
some online fraud victims and assert:  
 “there was a view amongst the victims and the stakeholders that providing 
 an opportunity for the victims to meet the fraudsters and articulate the 
 damage it had done would be beneﬁcial to both the victims and the 
 offender. The global nature of online fraud would pose more practical 
 challenges compared with other volume property crimes. However, there are 
 offenders based in the UK and with modern technological developments the 
 challenges are not insurmountable.”  
This might be helpful for those few offenders who are convicted in the UK and 
overseas, but its impact both on offending rates and victim satisfaction remains to 
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 be seen. We do not currently regard restorative justice as having a major role to play 
in economic cybercrime in the near future. 
Nevertheless, it may be asked if those who do not take any protective measures 
should be entitled to the same level of policing effort than those who do, and should 
this assistance also reflect the affordability of those protective measures? (This 
applies equally to how we treat victims of other property and violent crimes who do 
not take ‘sufficient’ precautions.) 
There is another policy question concerning the appropriate level of policing and in 
which parts of the country, and about how we can ensure both adequate levels 
and an appropriate balance between prevention and criminal 
investigation/prosecution of economic cybercrimes. We have noted in the previous 
chapter that law enforcement can draw upon experiences in other, non-economic, 
areas of online crime such as child sexual exploitation and hacking, and may have 
to develop a hierarchy of responses according to their own priorities and assessment 
of the data. Nevertheless, we consider that the police need to develop and 
communicate more clearly their strategic response to ‘signal economic 
cybercrimes’, preferably accompanied by independent evaluation of the impact of 
those responses. 
This is a difficult decision because honest assessments of how much and what kinds 
of economic crime the police are able to handle are bound to arouse controversy. 
This might be accompanied by a decision about which economic crimes might be 
required to be reported and which, as under the present approach, are voluntary. 
Even if reporting were to be compulsory, it is not clear what the sanctions would be 
and how they would be enforced, and both businesses and individuals might still 
need to have explained to them the potential benefits of such aggregation of 
intelligence for the country, for their business sector, and for themselves personally.  
Larger businesses may require more sophisticated versions of the same approach, 
particularly in terms of expert alerts and guidance, so that they can revise and 
refresh their own security arrangements, including ensuring the appropriate conduct 
by staff as well as the more technical and system-based controls.  
Within the totality of the response framework, however, there will still be a need for a 
suitably resourced investigative response. Whether this will be focused on volume, 
value, harm or perpetrators will require an assessment of the purpose – deterrence, 
disruption, denial of the proceeds of cybercrime, and so on – as well as whether this 
will be located at national, regional or local levels, whether it will be technology led, 
and whether it will focus on cybercrime in general or economic cybercrime in 
particular. 
These are not issues to which there is a clear answer, but we hope that we have 
provided a basis for continuing dialogue on these important social and economic 
issues, which touch an ever-increasing proportion of the population, in proposing 
themes, issues, questions and potential police responses.  
6.3. Themes from the research 
• The routinisation and pervasiveness of internet use has made certain types of 
internet-based crimes for economic gain possible (cyber-dependent economic 
crimes), and has facilitated immensely the scale of others (cyber-enabled 
economic crimes) by reducing the cost and effort of reaching out to potential 
victims. 
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 • Cyberspace is constantly evolving, with an extensive range of functions, services 
and products, while also providing platforms for aggregation and innovation in 
the perpetration of economic cybercrime. 
• Cyberspace has multiple criminal actors living in many jurisdictions whose 
typologies and methods of organisation and operation do not lend themselves 
easily to existing categories and understanding. 
• Cyberspace is developing its own criminal marketplaces and financial 
arrangements that require specialist awareness and access to address. 
• The perpetration of economic cybercrime outstrips preventative and other 
measures for control protection and has increased the difficulties of identifying, 
investigating and prosecuting offenders as much as it has increased the 
vulnerability of businesses, governments and individuals (including the general 
public). 
• There is widespread agreement that policing, both in the UK and around the 
world, is being challenged by evolving patterns of crime, especially economic 
cybercrimes and the cyber-forensic aspects of police investigations. 
• UK policing resources are reducing, driven as they are by competing priorities 
and agendas in a time of economic stringency. Those initiatives that are in place 
in relation to cybercrime are emerging rather than comprehensive and 
established. 
6.4. Themes from the UK data 
Despite its limitations, the available data, particularly that from Action Fraud, can 
provide a foundation for more evidence-based policy with which to refresh and 
refine existing strategies and approaches.  
• There is a high level of cyber-involvement in reported cases of fraud but there is 
no established pattern in terms of what categories of crimes have cyber-
involvement, or by whom they are committed. 
• Cybercrime for gain is significant, much more significant than perceptions of non-
economic cybercrimes. 
• Losses are substantial by case and by crime, but there are significant variations – 
not all economic cybercrime results in large or emotionally significant losses and 
not all such crimes require ICT. 
• Even in those industries with established Protect and Prepare approaches, such 
as financial services, the level of cybercrime remains high. 
• The level of financial asset recovery from offenders, whether primary offenders 
(the fraudsters and counterfeiters) or money launderers (financial intermediaries 
or professional launderers), is low. 
6.5. Questions for responses to economic cybercrime 
• Who within and outside policing should be involved and in what capacity? 
• What are the specific roles and responsibilities of the police and where should 
ownership lie in terms of tackling cybercrime and economic cybercrime? 
• What resources (in money and effort) will be considered worthwhile for greater 
cyber security?   
• How will that security be organised for and/or by the huge numbers of businesses 
and people that are (potentially) affected?  
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 6.6. Potential policing responses 
1. Establishing cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled economic crime on the 
policing agenda in ways that allow a meaningful and realistic response, where 
the role of the police is less about being the sole player in the law enforcement 
landscape. It needs to be more about identification of specific roles and 
responsibilities in that landscape, alongside equally realistic assessments of the 
roles of other agencies and the promotion of partnership and other 
arrangements. 
This requires a careful analysis of resources, police priorities and engagement 
with other agencies to complement police roles. The relatively ad hoc and 
uncoordinated nature of such responses currently suggests that a more 
coherent, joined-up approach should be taken, addressing those economic 
crimes that by volume, value, harm and/or severity of threat, and identification 
of the organisation and location of perpetrators appear to pose the biggest risk, 
while admitting that the rest are going to be left unpursued. Undoubtedly there 
will be parties – politicians, the media and sections of the public – which will find 
this unacceptable. However, demonstrating that the police could do more with 
the same, with the aim of achieving greater resource provision, might help to 
address this.  
2. A review of the 2004 Home Office guidance on fraud acceptance criteria for 
fraud generally, and economic cybercrime in particular, now that Action Fraud 
and industry data paint a much clearer picture of current risks and threats 
(though the NFIB’s case screening rules go some way towards this goal). 
3. For individuals and SMEs, the dominant thrust of policy and action should be in 
the Prevent, Protect and Prepare sphere, with the police developing coherent 
strategies, coordinating identification of key risks and threats from data (plus 
‘guesstimating’ the problems of ‘known unknowns’), preparing communications 
materials, developing response packages for individual forces in relation to the 
most common and harmful economic cybercrimes, identifying relevant 
partnerships and associations with their respective constituencies, and promoting 
better arrangements for cybercrime victims (for both care and reducing repeat 
victimisation). 
4. For large organisations, there is a need for promotion and participation in 
information sharing and police/government/industry guidance on emerging 
threats and trends around which the organisations can develop their responses, 
while establishing in policing terms across English and Welsh police forces 
sufficient resource and expertise to provide some assurance. The aims are to 
increase appropriate business and customer confidence in the security of the 
internet and offer some credible downside risks to cybercriminals, including 
freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of cybercrime in countries of 
operation and offender residence.  
5. A hierarchy of law enforcement responses focused on indicating to businesses 
and the public the presence of law enforcement in this space, as well as 
investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators where feasible, are likely to have 
the greatest deterrence impact.  
It could be argued that those crimes which are reported to Action Fraud are those 
that the public want the police to do something about. Whether, in the absence of 
an insurance claim motivation for businesses to report crimes, this relative lack of 
Pursuit will lead to a fall in Action Fraud reports over time, we cannot tell, though this 
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 seems plausible. Enhancing our intelligence about fraud levels and patterns may be 
less attractive to victims than it is to security professionals. If it does lead to a fall in 
reports, there will be a greater disparity between police-recorded data and both 
individual and commercial crime surveys in the future, at least in those areas of 
economic crime that are measured by the surveys. There are arguments in favour of 
making the reporting of identified fraud to Action Fraud compulsory – it may drive up 
Prepare, Protect, Pursue and even Prevent activity, and some businesses which 
currently do not report because of fear of reputational damage relative to their 
peers would then feel less uncomfortable. Provided that the police ensured the 
confidentiality of those reporting, this would help limit media publicity to where there 
were arrests and charges. However, there needs to be acknowledgement that this 
involves firms and individuals in opportunity costs, and even if it is made a legal 
compulsion, effort should be put into using the data or it becomes a socially 
valueless burden on the private sector. If it is compulsory for the private sector to 
report cyber-enabled crimes, it seems logical to apply this to the public sector also. 
However, care must be taken about information gateways – would these also have 
to be reported/be allowed to be passed on to the Information Commissioner’s 
Office and (for regulated institutions) to the Financial Conduct Authority and even to 
the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, etc.? Would 
compulsory reporting cut across the voluntary or sometimes contractual sharing 
agreements in CiSP, CERT-UK, Cifas and industry associations that also aim at Protect 
and Prepare? For transnational firms, there are already complexities arising from the 
EU Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems which, inter alia, 
require member states separately to introduce reporting and CERT-type mechanisms 
for data breaches and cyber-attacks. 
We have no doubt that, for routine purposes, forensic digital awareness is important 
for the police: data and its retrieval are a core part of tracking, verifying and 
falsifying suspicions of all kinds, and there is no escape from this need. ‘Cyber’, like 
financial investigation – often badged as ‘money laundering’ and ‘proceeds of 
crime’– needs to be mainstreamed into criminal investigation and crime prevention. 
All these terms carry cultural baggage which should be demystified so that we can 
match the need for varying degrees of technical skills against different levels of 
investigative difficulty. The procurement of these will need the continuing 
commitment of the College of Policing, police chiefs and those to whom they are 
accountable. In principle, one might hope for a standardised service throughout the 
UK, but this should not be at the expense of the best service in some areas. 
Cybercrimes present challenges to policing, not least because one of their core 
activities (Pursue) is hardest when suspects are unknown or are believed to be 
abroad, particularly in areas where mutual legal assistance in gaining evidence and 
in extradition are difficult or impossible. This is an area for government and 
police/NCA liaison to work on, but the current system (at least outside the EU) 
cannot be expected to function well for other than the most serious crimes.  
6.7. Summary 
We have presented, at times, a somewhat bleak view of cyber-dependent and 
cyber-enabled crimes and police responses to them. While economic cybercrime is 
not an insurmountable challenge to policing, it is necessary to think critically about 
what can be achieved with existing resources, as a vital prelude to producing 
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 ‘satisfying’ approaches to the varied problems. This sentiment was recently 
expressed by the head of the National Police Chiefs’ Council.68 Even if a 
‘reasonable’ amount of extra resources was available, this would not solve a large 
proportion of the investigations into economic cybercrime, nor would greater 
investigative success alone reduce substantially the levels of such crime.  
We, the public, need to accept some responsibility for our susceptibility to internet 
and telephone-enabled offers from strangers, acquaintances and even from 
people we think to be our friends. But we deserve and need to be helped to make 
better decisions with our money, and the police can play a collaborative role in 
arrangements to provide that advice before and after we become victims. A start 
might be made by asking, for every economic crime, what it would have taken to 
have stopped it from happening or to have reduced its scale, and then to see who 
– victim awareness, software or internet service providers, third parties or 
police/other enforcement agencies – might have intervened to stop those harms, 
and why they did not either attempt or succeed. For public reassurance and for 
deterrence/incapacitation, some police action is needed and more up-skilling from 
existing officers is necessary. If we accept that paternalism is appropriate, this could 
include disruption of suspected frauds-in-action via banks, families, money service 
bureaux, etc., though the potential victims themselves might resist because they do 
realise that they are in the process of being defrauded. For the rest, we need to 
prepare ourselves for a long struggle against local and transnational criminals using 
the internet and the telephone to extort us, to deceive us into thinking we are 
dealing with genuine organisations, or who persuade us that their offers are not ‘too 
good to be true’. Indeed, for us to ask ourselves that question rather than be gulled 
into trust would itself represent progress. 
It is important to realise that all countries, not just the UK, are grappling with these 
difficulties. The substantial problems of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent 
economic crime, which have been far from eliminated by policing and prevention 
efforts, arise across the world. We are in the early stages of a long struggle to reduce 
cyber risks and economic crimes generally, and we would do better to think of this, 
practically and feasibly, in terms of better risk management than risk elimination. 
Our suggested next step for this includes the need for better, early education of risk 
management (relevant for not just economic crime but also child exploitation and 
bullying online). We also need to focus on helping vulnerable citizens to appreciate 
and manage the risks of both online and offline fraud, and this may be better done 
via peers and the third sector than by the police and websites alone, however user-
friendly. For both individuals and businesses, we need a focus on security that is built 
in to products and online interfaces, that is not obstructive and that is explained 
clearly to people.  
This report has dispensed with the usual set of advisories. Of course people and 
businesses should group together and share their experiences and engage in 
problem-solving (though in the real world, competitive advantage in security can 
sometimes get in the way). The police can play an important role in facilitating 
discussions about security, especially when they feed in examples of how risks can 
be dealt with beneficially. Traditional investigations and prosecutions also have an 
68 See: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11767419/Police-chief-warns-that-officers-may-no-
longer-respond-to-burglaries.html.  
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 important role to play, not just for reassurance but to do justice and reduce people’s 
willingness and ability to act harmfully. A sharper focus on identifying and helping 
people who are likely to become repeat victims is also important, both as a good 
practice in itself and to reduce crime levels. Beyond this, we have to appreciate 
that, in a world where many offenders are out of reach, we need to maintain our 
vigilance and educate ourselves about careful behaviour to help prevent 
victimisation. Some of us will decide that it is not worth the cost and trouble of 
protecting ourselves more fully, and sometimes those decisions will look poor in 
retrospect. But unless we adopt a hyper-paternalistic approach and mandate care 
(as we have done, not very successfully, with the prevention of data breaches), 
criminal activity will happen. The key is to prepare for it, rather than imagine that it 
will not happen. 
We end by noting that although we have expressed some scepticism about the 
likelihood of reducing substantially some types of cyber-related economic crime, this 
report does not take a negative view of current progress and approaches. We 
welcome the improved relationships between the different police units, business and 
stakeholders such as the Intellectual Property Office and Trading Standards in the 
broader ‘family of policing’, as well as international relationships. However, the 
strength of these relationships varies and they require constant respectful attention 
to avoid the impression of condescension. We acknowledge that continuing efforts 
are being taken to provide a culture of awareness and pre-emptive responses, 
ranging from practical publications from GCHQ and CPNI at one end of the 
spectrum, to the emergence of local force Protect officers with a remit for cyber 
security.  
In terms of strategy, however, much more work needs to be done on both the 
differentiation between the Four Ps and their relative weight. These should be 
focused on the patterns and impacts of different economic cybercrimes and on the 
preventative efforts of victims, whether individuals or organisations. This would help 
shape both the responses – in the case of Pursue, whether disruption is a better 
approach than full criminal investigation, and whether it makes sense to make more 
effort to go after the proceeds of cybercrime civilly and criminally – and the wider 
message on the balance of roles and responsibilities of those involved. We also 
require more clarity on resourcing, resource ownership and performance 
assessment. 
We need to continue to focus on a full range of efforts to change the security 
behaviour of individuals and businesses, building in more security with minimum 
effort to the extent technically and politically possible, and to think clearly about the 
limits of policing as well as the range of co-ownership of cyber-related crime 
reduction. This is a permanent struggle that we hope we have made a helpful 
contribution to thinking through. 
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 Glossary of terms 
Black hat An action with malicious or criminal intent. 
Bot An autonomous program on a network (especially the 
internet) which can interact with systems or users. 
Botnet A network of private computers infected with malicious 
software and controlled as a group without the owners' 
knowledge, e.g. to send spam. 
Carder A person who monetises stolen financial data such as credit 
card credentials.  
Cryptocurrency A digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to 
regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the 
transfer of funds, operating independently of a central bank. 
Cryptomarket A type of website that employs advanced encryption to 
protect the anonymity of users who trade in goods. 
Darknet A computer network with restricted access that is used chiefly 
for illegal peer-to-peer file sharing. 
Forum An online discussion site where people can hold 
conversations. 
Hacker A person who uses computers to gain unauthorised access to 
data. 
Hacktivism The subversive use of computers and computer networks to 
promote a political agenda. 
Malware Software which is specifically designed to disrupt or damage a 
computer system. 
Message board see: Forum 
Money mule A person who transfers stolen money between different 
countries. Money mules are often recruited by fraudsters to 
receive money into their bank account, then withdraw the 
money and wire it overseas, minus a commission payment. 
Newsgroup A forum on the Usenet service for the discussion of a particular 
topic. 
Pirate To use or reproduce (another’s work) for profit without 
permission, usually in contravention of patent or copyright. 
Ransomware A type of malicious software designed to block access to a 
computer system until a sum of money is paid. 
Scareware A malicious computer program designed to trick a user into 
buying and downloading unnecessary and potentially 
dangerous software, such as fake antivirus protection. 
Script kiddie A person who uses existing computer scripts or codes to hack 
into computers, lacking the expertise to write their own. 
Usenet  An early non-centralised computer network for the discussion 
of particular topics and the sharing of files via newsgroups. 
Warez Software that has been illegally copied and made available. 
White hat An action in which a breach is made in a computer network 
to test or evaluate its security systems on the organisation’s 
behalf. 
Zombie A computer that has been compromised with a bot. 
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